Re: [ippm] QUIC concerns relating to draft-ietf-ippm-explicit-flow-measurements

Christian Huitema <huitema@huitema.net> Thu, 11 May 2023 16:07 UTC

Return-Path: <huitema@huitema.net>
X-Original-To: quic@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: quic@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id EB554C072E62 for <quic@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 11 May 2023 09:07:41 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.897
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.897 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, NICE_REPLY_A=-0.001, RCVD_IN_ZEN_BLOCKED_OPENDNS=0.001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001, URIBL_DBL_BLOCKED_OPENDNS=0.001, URIBL_ZEN_BLOCKED_OPENDNS=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([50.223.129.194]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id jGQs5CtFYE1p for <quic@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 11 May 2023 09:07:38 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mx36-out21.antispamcloud.com (mx36-out21.antispamcloud.com [209.126.121.69]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (2048 bits) server-digest SHA256) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id BB4C6C05DDD3 for <quic@ietf.org>; Thu, 11 May 2023 09:07:21 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from xse281.mail2web.com ([66.113.197.27] helo=xse.mail2web.com) by mx192.antispamcloud.com with esmtp (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from <huitema@huitema.net>) id 1px8p3-00061N-8z for quic@ietf.org; Thu, 11 May 2023 18:07:20 +0200
Received: from xsmtp21.mail2web.com (unknown [10.100.68.60]) by xse.mail2web.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4QHFwL1yyczBWM for <quic@ietf.org>; Thu, 11 May 2023 08:21:06 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from [10.5.2.31] (helo=xmail09.myhosting.com) by xsmtp21.mail2web.com with esmtps (TLS1.0:DHE_RSA_AES_256_CBC_SHA1:256) (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from <huitema@huitema.net>) id 1px86M-0002qQ-3Z for quic@ietf.org; Thu, 11 May 2023 08:21:06 -0700
Received: (qmail 23701 invoked from network); 11 May 2023 15:21:05 -0000
Received: from unknown (HELO [192.168.1.104]) (Authenticated-user:_huitema@huitema.net@[172.58.43.121]) (envelope-sender <huitema@huitema.net>) by xmail09.myhosting.com (qmail-ldap-1.03) with ESMTPA for <ilubashe=40akamai.com@dmarc.ietf.org>; 11 May 2023 15:21:03 -0000
Message-ID: <4e85047d-2197-e75a-a665-211075925dad@huitema.net>
Date: Thu, 11 May 2023 08:21:02 -0700
MIME-Version: 1.0
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:102.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/102.10.1
Content-Language: en-US
To: "Lubashev, Igor" <ilubashe=40akamai.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, Martin Thomson <mt@lowentropy.net>, "quic@ietf.org" <quic@ietf.org>
References: <CALGR9oZxFEXWD5hZZOJB7q+-f766FsjBGBTNjpuc1jyZyucz3Q@mail.gmail.com> <3103CBFB-5112-4FAC-A2F0-5209F52AB288@apple.com> <CALGR9oboNgFo-BA0Sqstog_JFPm+DL545VUSbksgF1chTnZ7VQ@mail.gmail.com> <791fd608-8112-bea7-9e22-5d0b8b9e8b1d@huitema.net> <5cf7edfcdf604f13b7fda36d206babfb@huawei.com> <18d470b2-ccfc-41a3-bbef-a572091502bb@betaapp.fastmail.com> <1cb7ab2a31394a19b20418ca7cd8ebb0@akamai.com>
From: Christian Huitema <huitema@huitema.net>
Subject: Re: [ippm] QUIC concerns relating to draft-ietf-ippm-explicit-flow-measurements
In-Reply-To: <1cb7ab2a31394a19b20418ca7cd8ebb0@akamai.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"; format="flowed"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-Originating-IP: 66.113.197.27
X-Spampanel-Domain: xsmtpout.mail2web.com
X-Spampanel-Username: 66.113.197.0/24
Authentication-Results: antispamcloud.com; auth=pass smtp.auth=66.113.197.0/24@xsmtpout.mail2web.com
X-Spampanel-Outgoing-Class: unsure
X-Spampanel-Outgoing-Evidence: Combined (0.17)
X-Recommended-Action: accept
X-Filter-ID: Pt3MvcO5N4iKaDQ5O6lkdGlMVN6RH8bjRMzItlySaT8NwHLxRf4IGCOkZ7QhGxeEPUtbdvnXkggZ 3YnVId/Y5jcf0yeVQAvfjHznO7+bT5x6h2yQpzTslcOqazQkKtAFKj/EwzSHE5FGYwwjsNRPCGJ/ 1o9PWgCU4yL2w0MihX/mD6wdmZPcItWbGe10hXJtXL4FsauCVkDjmcYJdU3yWp7KuHNaaKdg7iBE ZefdsNUFWKwa/wzJUjmazeC7ImcaXBOAXLHDkxHWzDmPcqL2NRQ6V51u76v35b1wNe/MvdISh5Ck herIpeUnLjfz5EXU2+J9PgaoF8SQHto3le4zsHTaeQtlKubP6iUTjj6yPARK6buALVaA782LKxg6 vRmng8N1aLhXqdc+jC1RcnVud53D5caUhbVtvqItBqoizkEt9O20UjkwI0v+LOlw05G4BS+iyyNq bT8dUMXMJ4tUCMj6G37ZfAMLceP5aNHPt26RBupu5v1nytoNnc138GfEEIgtEXyXj6S3SDvReMcV 8TXUjLjYWQt1/5xnQymMoPsgr/U0flMcy2Vi/IcBgY4arPaiJ1W6hAyiRC61jekdwIcXNugoOEbH RyFULpSjm7iff8pZ9ure3k2YtJj4Q8Z794IAGWqkPjVyHG4Kq3ogJd/sEQ9VQzabHG7jx++9uCQu tHfsa6HcCjUzAV79jhKdC8CKASqFe0kBQ5ZmwPhPJiyZvdx3ZJDsPzrvEdt+b8mxX4OQOI/UQ6jn FfMBgzwOSHunMg5j/UO+IMRndiIcrnSsI80BRiR6Mh8HWQPF4R3ZcpPgEJKLbDyaC/LdLvvYa/r5 8+cE6+VADgwkVcKfVvpVB9v9zY0h8asEYmbGGsLRRrpb2yB+9SGl7QVSZMRQgzHcx3NcN4JQghnU 1trx2B0sl4OFxBT1d23OUWLVuGpBtL9ewJnoHKUNLZpf7DfZK/JdWvgd2/FibEdMM0Jnxu/VcARR JJg0CPVGXFYA7xCx7SWZBpdAUArn/St00aGa08t44IPL25P8DLNzMDIRDLdvK/cKOEqlCIPGIfYQ DNLcNVwigJ23suxKKQl6t4RW
X-Report-Abuse-To: spam@quarantine14.antispamcloud.com
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/quic/Dwtgypt3wbfMYNnVEqSbeWxKNqo>
X-BeenThere: quic@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.39
Precedence: list
List-Id: Main mailing list of the IETF QUIC working group <quic.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/quic>, <mailto:quic-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/quic/>
List-Post: <mailto:quic@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:quic-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/quic>, <mailto:quic-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 11 May 2023 16:07:42 -0000

Igor is right. In fact, the "square bit" that he describes is 
implemented in Picoquic, under an option negotiation.

The issues are exactly the same as what led to the long discussion of 
the spin bit. Exposing ways to better calculate RTT can be use to trace 
the origin and end of calls, and detect for example if the call 
continues in a proxy. So we have a tradeoff between privacy and 
measurements, which typically leads to not turning on such features by 
default, but only in special circumstance such as, for example, debugging.

The probability that these measurement features be turned on by default 
is extremely low, and the draft should be very explicit about it, 
including a description of the privacy/measurement tradeoff.

-- Christian Huitema

On 5/11/2023 7:23 AM, Lubashev, Igor wrote:
> Matrin, the measurements described are not only feasible, but they are also feasible without an introduction of any new versions of QUIC.  It just takes a regular Transport Parameter negotiation in QUIC v1.
> 
> See https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ferrieuxhamchaoui-quic-lossbits-03
> 
> - Igor
> 
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Martin Thomson <mt@lowentropy.net>
>> Sent: Thursday, May 11, 2023 6:30 AM
>> To: quic@ietf.org
>> Subject: Re: [ippm] QUIC concerns relating to draft-ietf-ippm-explicit-flow-
>> measurements
>>
>> On Thu, May 11, 2023, at 19:44, Giuseppe Fioccola wrote:
>>> I think your concerns about QUIC are reasonable, but they can be taken
>>> into account only for the specific application to QUIC, that would
>>> eventually be defined in a separate draft.
>>
>> I think that Lucas' point is that the draft describes something that isn't likely
>> to ever be feasible.  At a minimum, the draft should be clear about the
>> conditions that would be necessary to realize this goal.  From what I can see,
>> the conditions involve deploying a new version of QUIC that completely
>> displaces the existing version of QUIC, which - if not completely impossible -
>> is at least highly improbable.
>