Handshake costs 2-RTT when token validation fail
Jiuhai Zhang <jiuhai.zhang@gmail.com> Fri, 12 July 2019 09:45 UTC
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From: Jiuhai Zhang <jiuhai.zhang@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 12 Jul 2019 17:45:31 +0800
Message-ID: <CAG9+TpZgzncJF_TCode98QhxKM4wZhPUfSKkQhOCZJ05scW2kQ@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Handshake costs 2-RTT when token validation fail
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Can server continue to handshake when token validation fail? Client
may send new token in Handshake packet.
Just like this
Client Server
Initial ->
<- Retry+Token
<- Handshake
Handshake+Token->
Is there other solution to avoid 2-RTT?
--------------------
Client Server
Initial[0]: CRYPTO[CH] ->
<- Retry+Token
Initial+Token[1]: CRYPTO[CH] ->
Initial[0]: CRYPTO[SH] ACK[1]
Handshake[0]: CRYPTO[EE, CERT, CV, FIN]
<- 1-RTT[0]: STREAM[1, "..."]
Figure 5: Example Handshake with Retry
- Handshake costs 2-RTT when token validation fail Jiuhai Zhang
- Re: Handshake costs 2-RTT when token validation f… Martin Thomson