[Errata Rejected] RFC9001 (7785)

RFC Errata System <rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org> Mon, 29 January 2024 19:50 UTC

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Subject: [Errata Rejected] RFC9001 (7785)
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The following errata report has been rejected for RFC9001,
"Using TLS to Secure QUIC".

--------------------------------------
You may review the report below and at:
https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid7785

--------------------------------------
Status: Rejected
Type: Technical

Reported by: Tom Pearson <tpearson@tenable.com>
Date Reported: 2024-01-26
Rejected by: Zaheduzzaman Sarker (IESG)

Section: 5.

Original Text
-------------
The key and IV for the packet are computed as described in
Section 5.1.  The nonce, N, is formed by combining the packet
protection IV with the packet number.  The 62 bits of the
reconstructed QUIC packet number in network byte order are left-
padded with zeros to the size of the IV.  The exclusive OR of the
padded packet number and the IV forms the AEAD nonce.

Corrected Text
--------------
The key and IV for the packet are computed as described in
Section 5.1.  The nonce, N, is formed by combining the packet
protection IV with the packet number.  The 32 bits of the
reconstructed QUIC packet number in network byte order are left-
padded with zeros to the size of the IV.  The exclusive OR of the
padded packet number and the IV forms the AEAD nonce.

Notes
-----
Given the description of packet number reconstruction in RFC9000 section 17.1 and the example in RFC9000 Appendix A3, the length of reconstructed packet number should be 32 bits, not 62 bits.
 --VERIFIER NOTES-- 
 The full packet number is 62 bits, although it is never expressed as such in the packet number field of the header. Hence, this errata is rejected.

--------------------------------------
RFC9001 (draft-ietf-quic-tls-34)
--------------------------------------
Title               : Using TLS to Secure QUIC
Publication Date    : May 2021
Author(s)           : M. Thomson, Ed., S. Turner, Ed.
Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
Source              : QUIC
Area                : Transport
Stream              : IETF
Verifying Party     : IESG