Re: Packet Number Encryption Performance

Ian Swett <ianswett@google.com> Fri, 22 June 2018 18:51 UTC

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From: Ian Swett <ianswett@google.com>
Date: Fri, 22 Jun 2018 14:51:38 -0400
Message-ID: <CAKcm_gMc6y_2+KU3L+XpifNK4JESFA0V=OX4Nj51jTFfAm9M1A@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: Packet Number Encryption Performance
To: nibanks=40microsoft.com@dmarc.ietf.org
Cc: Praveen Balasubramanian <pravb@microsoft.com>, Kazuho Oku <kazuhooku@gmail.com>, IETF QUIC WG <quic@ietf.org>
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I expect crypto to increase as a fraction of CPU, but I don't expect it to
go much higher than 10%.

But who knows, maybe 2 years from now everything else will be very
optimized and crypto will be 15%?

On Fri, Jun 22, 2018 at 12:34 PM Nick Banks <nibanks=
40microsoft.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:

> I just want to add, my implementation already uses ECB from bcrypt (and I
> do the XOR) already. Bcrypt doesn’t expose CTR mode directly.
>
>
>
> Sent from Mail <https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkId=550986> for
> Windows 10
>
>
> ------------------------------
> *From:* Praveen Balasubramanian
> *Sent:* Friday, June 22, 2018 9:26:44 AM
> *To:* Ian Swett; Kazuho Oku
> *Cc:* Nick Banks; IETF QUIC WG
> *Subject:* RE: Packet Number Encryption Performance
>
>
> Ian, do you expect that fraction of overall cost to hold once the UDP
> stack is optimized? Is your measurement on top of the recent kernel
> improvements? I expect crypto fraction of overall cost to keep increasing
> over time as the network stack bottlenecks are eliminated.
>
>
>
> Kazuho, should the draft describe the optimizations you are making? Or are
> these are too OpenSSL specific?
>
>
>
> *From:* QUIC [mailto:quic-bounces@ietf.org] *On Behalf Of *Ian Swett
> *Sent:* Friday, June 22, 2018 4:45 AM
> *To:* Kazuho Oku <kazuhooku@gmail.com>
> *Cc:* Nick Banks <nibanks@microsoft.com>; IETF QUIC WG <quic@ietf.org>
> *Subject:* Re: Packet Number Encryption Performance
>
>
>
> Thanks for digging into the details of this, Kazuho.  <4% increase in
> crypto cost is a bit more than I originally expected(~2%), but crypto is
> less than 10% of my CPU usage, so it's still less than 0.5% total, which is
> acceptable to me.
>
>
>
> On Fri, Jun 22, 2018 at 2:45 AM Kazuho Oku <kazuhooku@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> 2018-06-22 12:22 GMT+09:00 Kazuho Oku <kazuhooku@gmail.com>:
>
>
>
>
>
> 2018-06-22 11:54 GMT+09:00 Nick Banks <nibanks@microsoft.com>:
>
> Hi Kazuho,
>
>
>
> Thanks for sharing your numbers as well! I'm bit confused where you say
> you can reduce the 10% overhead to 2% to 4%. How do you plan on doing that?
>
>
>
> As stated in my previous mail, the 10% of overhead consists of three
> parts, each consuming comparable number of CPU cycles. The two among the
> three is related to the abstraction layer and how CTR is implemented, while
> the other one is the core AES-ECB operation cost.
>
>
>
> It should be able to remove the costly abstraction layer.
>
>
>
> It should also be possible to remove the overhead of CTR, since in PNE, we
> need to XOR at most 4 octets (applying XOR is the only difference between
> CTR and ECB). That cost should be something that should be possible to be
> nullified.
>
>
>
> Considering these aspects, and by looking at the numbers on the OpenSSL
> source code (as well as considering the overhead of GCM), my expectation
> goes to 2% to 4%.
>
>
>
> Just did some experiments and it seems that the expectation was correct.
>
>
>
> The benchmarks tell me that the overhead goes down from 10.0% to 3.8%, by
> doing the following:
>
>
>
> * remove the overhead of CTR abstraction (i.e. use the ECB backend and do
> XOR by ourselves)
>
> * remove the overhead of the abstraction layer (i.e. call the method
> returned by EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_do_cipher instead of calling
> EVP_EncryptUpdate)
>
>
>
> Of course the changes are specific to OpenSSL, but I would expect that you
> can expect similar numbers assuming that you have access to an optimized
> AES implementation.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Sent from my Windows 10 phone
>
> [HxS - 15254 - 16.0.10228.20075]
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> *From:* Kazuho Oku <kazuhooku@gmail.com>
> *Sent:* Thursday, June 21, 2018 7:21:17 PM
> *To:* Nick Banks
> *Cc:* quic@ietf.org
> *Subject:* Re: Packet Number Encryption Performance
>
>
>
> Hi Nick,
>
>
>
> Thank you for bringing the numbers to the list.
>
>
>
> I have just run a small benchmark using Quicly, and I see comparable
> numbers.
>
>
>
> To be precise, I see 10.0% increase of CPU cycles when encrypting a
> Initial packet of 1,280 octets. I expect that we will see similar numbers
> on other QUIC stacks that also use picotls (with OpenSSL as a backend).
> Note that the number is only comparing the cost of encryption, the overhead
> ratio will be much smaller if we look at the total number of CPU cycles
> spent by a QUIC stack as a whole.
>
>
>
> Looking at the profile, the overhead consists of three operations that
> each consumes comparable CPU cycles: core AES operation (using AES-NI), CTR
> operation overhead, CTR initialization. Note that picotls at the moment
> provides access to CTR crypto beneath the AEAD interface, which is to be
> used by the QUIC stacks.
>
>
>
> I would assume that we can cut down the overhead to somewhere between 2%
> to 4%, but it might be hard to go down to somewhere near 1%, because we
> cannot parallelize the AES operation of PNE with that of AEAD (see
> https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/OpenSSL_1_1_0h/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86_64.pl#L24-L39
> <https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2Fopenssl%2Fopenssl%2Fblob%2FOpenSSL_1_1_0h%2Fcrypto%2Faes%2Fasm%2Faesni-x86_64.pl%23L24-L39&data=02%7C01%7Cnibanks%40microsoft.com%7C11d55f17333e4a795d7008d5d7e6d93c%7C72f988bf86f141af91ab2d7cd011db47%7C1%7C0%7C636652308843994134&sdata=kqMz4SsN%2F2ErGK06Qz8Z0vUzpl4MiipnNE2wAMUb46c%3D&reserved=0>
> about the impact of parallelization).
>
>
>
> I do not think that 2% to 4% of additional overhead to the crypto is an
> issue for QUIC/HTTP, but current overhead of 10% is something that we might
> want to decrease. I am glad to be able to learn that now.
>
>
>
>
>
> 2018-06-22 5:48 GMT+09:00 Nick Banks <
> nibanks=40microsoft.com@dmarc.ietf.org>:
>
> Hello QUIC WG,
>
>
>
> I recently implemented PNE for WinQuic (using bcrypt APIs) and I decided
> to get some performance numbers to see what the overhead of PNE was. I
> figured the rest of the WG might be interested.
>
>
>
> My test just encrypts the same buffer (size dependent on the test case)
> 10,000,000 times and measured the time it took. The test then did the same
> thing, but also encrypted the packet number as well. I ran all that 10
> times in total. I then collected the best times for each category to
> produce the following graphs and tables (full excel doc attached):
>
>
>
> [image: cid:image003.png@01D40966.7655B6B0]
>
>
>
> *Time (ms)*
>
> *Rate (Mbps)*
>
> *Bytes*
>
> *NO PNE*
>
> *PNE*
>
> *PNE Overhead*
>
> *No PNE*
>
> *PNE*
>
> *4*
>
> 2284.671
>
> 3027.657
>
> 33%
>
> 140.064
>
> 105.692
>
> *16*
>
> 2102.402
>
> 2828.204
>
> 35%
>
> 608.827
>
> 452.584
>
> *64*
>
> 2198.883
>
> 2907.577
>
> 32%
>
> 2328.45
>
> 1760.92
>
> *256*
>
> 2758.3
>
> 3490.28
>
> 27%
>
> 7424.86
>
> 5867.72
>
> *600*
>
> 4669.283
>
> 5424.539
>
> 16%
>
> 10280
>
> 8848.68
>
> *1000*
>
> 6130.139
>
> 6907.805
>
> 13%
>
> 13050.3
>
> 11581.1
>
> *1200*
>
> 6458.679
>
> 7229.672
>
> 12%
>
> 14863.7
>
> 13278.6
>
> *1450*
>
> 7876.312
>
> 8670.16
>
> 10%
>
> 14727.7
>
> 13379.2
>
>
>
> I used a server grade lab machine I had at my disposal, running the latest
> Windows 10 Server DataCenter build. Again, these numbers are for crypto
> only. No QUIC or UDP is included.
>
>
>
> Thanks,
>
> - Nick
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> --
>
> Kazuho Oku
>
>
>
>
>
> --
>
> Kazuho Oku
>
>
>
>
>
> --
>
> Kazuho Oku
>
>