Re: Security of coalesced packets

Kazuho Oku <kazuhooku@gmail.com> Thu, 12 July 2018 08:32 UTC

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From: Kazuho Oku <kazuhooku@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: Security of coalesced packets
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Date: Thu, 12 Jul 2018 17:32:14 +0900
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To: Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen <mikkelfj@gmail.com>
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2018/07/12 16:52、Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen <mikkelfj@gmail.com>のメール:

> 
>> On 12 July 2018 at 09.50.51, Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen (mikkelfj@gmail.com) wrote:
>> 
>> To me the situation seems indifferent to on-path devices sending 
>> additional packet using the 5-tuple when it sees a packet belonging to 
>> the QUIC connection. 
> 
> 
> It is different because if the source is a NAT home router, or a compromised mobile phone, it does not matter how you migrate, or change connection ID, you would still end the same cookie. 
> 

Thank you for elaborating.

I think that the attacks you describe can be mounted *without* using coalesced packets.

A malicious device (could be a router or a compromised mobile phone) can observe the TCP/UDP packets being transmitted, craft a new packet that has the same 5-tuple (and possibly also the first few octets that contain the packet header) and emit them. An observer will observe those crafted packets to track the connection.