Re: DoS during the handshake
Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen <mikkelfj@gmail.com> Fri, 14 December 2018 12:02 UTC
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From: Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen <mikkelfj@gmail.com>
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Date: Fri, 14 Dec 2018 04:02:26 -0800
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Subject: Re: DoS during the handshake
To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>, Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
Cc: IETF QUIC WG <quic@ietf.org>
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On 14 December 2018 at 03.17.49, Eric Rescorla (ekr@rtfm.com) wrote: I can think of two major classes of weaker attacker: 1. Attackers who can't delete packets at all ("man on the side") 2. Attackers who are just trying to minimize resources and so would I very important class of attackers are those that might be powerful but wants to stay undetected and do selective interference. This could be to provide time for a worm to spread, or to collect intelligence, to subvert a specific target, or to suppress security alerts and defensive software updates. Such an attacker might look a lot like a man-on-the-side, but could selectively rewrite packets, e.g. changing source or target IP address.
- DoS during the handshake Martin Thomson
- Re: DoS during the handshake Kazuho Oku
- Re: DoS during the handshake Ian Swett
- Re: DoS during the handshake Jana Iyengar
- Re: DoS during the handshake Eric Rescorla
- Re: DoS during the handshake Martin Thomson
- Re: DoS during the handshake Eric Rescorla
- Re: DoS during the handshake Eric Rescorla
- Re: DoS during the handshake Martin Thomson
- Re: DoS during the handshake Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen