Fwd: Post Quantum & Previous Network optimisation & security for the next age : More Info https://is.gd/LEDSource
Duke Abbaddon <duke.abbaddon@gmail.com> Wed, 22 February 2023 15:13 UTC
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From: Duke Abbaddon <duke.abbaddon@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 22 Feb 2023 15:13:27 +0000
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Subject: Fwd: Post Quantum & Previous Network optimisation & security for the next age : More Info https://is.gd/LEDSource
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Post Quantum & Previous Network optimisation & security for the next age : More Info https://is.gd/LEDSource * Combined Network QOS Routing Table Tree-Swarm : CNetQSRT-Tree-Sw : Rupert S 2023-02 More Info https://is.gd/LEDSource Swarm:ML (Known Receiver : Known Sender) QOS NTP DNS Global Submit Network Tunnelling, For example: Torado, Large Download Acceleration Secure Network Tunnelling, For example: VPN, VPS, Ethernet, 3G, 4G LTE, Volt, 5G Volt, Telecommunications Networking & GPS) Defined routing with QOS Network optimisation (Localised) & Data bandwidth data (Localised) Global Zone routing through tables... Statistic Enhanced Routing & Delivery We then send data with a packet listing preferred routes [QOS][Origin : Target][Preferred route list forward sent][Network Performance Metric Packet] [Origin : Target][Preferred route list forward sent][Semi Static Route Tunnel] [Packet ID][Origin : Target][Data Packet] Searching for a route with every packet costs processor Cycles; So preferred routes need to be tunnelled & Secured with TLS https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/congress More Info https://is.gd/LEDSource ***** You know you talk about S-Matrix in https://home.web.cern.ch/events/bridging-positivity-and-s-matrix-bootstrap-bounds relevant : Model & Create S-Box (AES & ARIA & CLEFIA S-Box Modeling) AES & ARIA & CLEFIA S-Box Modeling - Advanced Crypto Algorithms - Modeling for Large S-boxes Oriented to Differential Probabilities and Linear Correlations (Long Paper) 2023-109 https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/109.pdf ***** ICE-SSRTP GEA Replacement 2022 + (c)RS "GEA-1 and GEA-2, which are very similar (GEA-2 is just an extension of GEA-1 with a higher amount of processing, and apparently not weakened) are bit-oriented stream ciphers." GEA-2 > GEA-3 is therefor 64Bit Safe (Mobile calls) & 128Bit Safe (Reasonable security) SHA2, SHA3therefor 128Bit Safe (Reasonable security Mobile) ++ AES & PolyChaCha both provide a premise of 128Bit++ So by reason alone GEA has a place in our hearts. * ICE-SSRTP GEA Replacement 2022 + (c)RS https://is.gd/CryptographicProves ICE-SSRTP constitutes 2 parts: The nonce: Time Value Inverted Nonce Packet: Obfuscation The Main Cypher: AES, CHACHA20-POLY1305, GEA, 3DES & Other RTP Classifications * In the case of Audio & Video; The Nonce is transmitted per frame group & displaces the content in the correct manner In the case of Data; Per group of packets * ICE-SSRTP : Network Protocol Main Cypher Package is a recommended Cypher; for example AES, Aria, Clefia & hardware Decrypted & Encrypted where possible, The containment is a Tunnel; Such as maintained by a video streaming service & GSM voice call (on reception of call & Arrangement of reception), The tunnel is a security certificates main job & is from source to end & routed, Normally 128Bit to 512Bit RSA,EEC: AES, GEA, ARIA, CLEFIA Nonces are used for Identification & Verification, Special perposes & Small packet carrying (with me) Nonces can arrange data & offer order garentees under routing protocols. Cases of nonce Encryption: Ideally due to internet traffic protocols (examples): NTP 73bits, DNS 53Bits, Rout Mapping 50bits to 370bits estimated. due to these main protocols being small they almost exclusively advise use as nonce encryption; most probably 64bit enclosed in a tunnel, To & From the DNS & NTP if used regularly & due to NTP being specialised low traffic workload in most cases & DNS being regular traffic... Containment on encrypted tunnel is recommended in the case of main traffic & therefore, Can use 64Bit EEC NONCE & because larger encryption blocks are not recommended & they clog the internet with larger bandwidth requirements, We can use 64Bit Ciphers with packets like DNS & With NTP (A Single QUICC protocol delivery with a EEC/RSA Delivery) * Nonce ICE-SSRTP: Time Value Inverted ICE-SSRTP (c)Rupert S The Nonce Variable Needed content list Time inverted : Value T: Consisting of T(time) Tick(How many seconds), Variable Inversion of content though FFT & Variable reversal of nonce & main Enciphered package Encryption methods: Bit length Nonce : 16Bit & 32Bit (SiMD decrypt) Bit length Main Encryption Packet : 32Bit, 48Bit, 64Bit (SiMD decrypt) Bit length Main Encryption Packet H : 64Bit, 96Bit, 128Bit (TPM/Security unit/SiMD decrypt) Methods of obfuscation: Packet swap (order) Inversion (Data & band, Data Band order(High/Low) Time Variable addition to Nonce &or Data Compression of packet with nonce decompression list: BZip, GZip, LHZ Main Core Accelerated Encryption Blocks: GEA (all version) & bit depth CHACHA20-POLY1305 AES GCM : CCM : CBC Value T : Nonce { Packet A : Packet B : Packet C } T = Inversion of 1 = { Nonce : Packet Order : Content } Value of Nonce = { Noise Removal (wavelet) : Bit Addition : Byte Order } ***** Nonce reasoning : Dual Cypher : RS Larger packets (Hardware Decrypt), Smaller Encrypted nonce (CPU Processed) By the nonce we can therefor obfuscate the content of the Cryptic packet For examples: Nonce = Elliptic Noise Packets are noisy Nonce = Swap Packets are swapped in order Nonce = Bit addition / Byte swap We do maths on the solved packets Nonce = Banding arrangements We swap bands in the Audio & Video Data Nonce = Inversion We invert the packets before or after processing * Main Cipher Package : ICE-SSRTP The Main Cypher: AES, CHACHA20-POLY1305, GEA, 3DES & Other RTP Classifications Encryption methods: Bit length Nonce : 16Bit & 32Bit (SiMD decrypt) Bit length Main Encryption Packet : 32Bit, 48Bit, 64Bit (SiMD decrypt) Bit length Main Encryption Packet H : 64Bit, 96Bit, 128Bit (TPM/Security unit/SiMD decrypt) Refer to Nonce ICE-SSRTP for packet dual Decryption/Encryption Main Cipher Package is a recommended Cipher; for example AES, Aria, Clefia & hardware Decrypted & Encrypted where possible, The containment is a Tunnel; Such as maintained by a video streaming service & GSM voice call (on reception of call & Arrangement of reception), The tunnel is a security certificates main job & is from source to end & routed, Normally 128Bit to 512Bit RSA,EEC: AES, GEA, ARIA, CLEFIA Nonce are used for Identification & Verification, Special purposes & Small packet carrying (with me) Nonce can arrange data & offer order guarantees under routing protocols. * ICE-SSRTP Block Compressed Encipher ICE-SSRTP Encryption uses 2 Attributes & on the whole compression does not affect security of the Encipher. Nonce 16Bit/32Bit AES/GEA Compression header (Encrypted) Main Block (Block compressed with header & then lightly Encipher) (*3 or 4) The header keeps the Data compressed a secret & is useful for EXE & DLL because headers auto load exe's in the right order. Refer to Code-Speed & ICE-SSRTP * Correct Time : EEC Elliptic & Nonce timer function: "The thing about random unique nonce with :dev/rng is that verifying the nonce's uniqueness is an issue, with SSRTP nonce, Time intrinsics allow only one play time https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc8954/ So what about if they have a reset phone & have not got the correct time ? mine wouldn't do NTP until i set it to pools.ntp.org, the telephone network would not change the time!" So the nonce may need a seconds from arrival timer; So that it is from the time it arrives (in your terms) & additionally a sent and arrival time so that when you get the correct time; It still works! In essence TLS & OSCP need a time from arrival (to verify link/Security CRT), It does not matter if that NTP timer is off by 5 Minutes... You can use the Time related EEC Elliptic curve & as long as it is timed from arrival & sends back a sample with a from time & until... That EEC Elliptic & Nonce will work. RS * TLS key sharing agreement : RS I have regarded the tls key sharing agreement & it occurs to me that all modes may be improved with combination of a Nonce-PSK-Type-Key, For example held by the verifying certificate agency such as lets encrypt & SafeSSL & Cloudflare, Submitting a lightly cyphered PSK Key would take milliseconds & consume only 10000th of a second on GB/S Ethernet & therefor be unnoticeable and thus secure for the initiation encounter, So the proposal is TLS combine an additional initiation: Changing Nonce:PSK (from secure source) + verification TLS Main initiation : ECDHE FFDHE DHE P256>P384 etcetera (under PSK) Key exchange > Final EEC Key with variable updates, So PSK can find a use that does not involve directly divulging the PSK to over use & secures the PSK by hour & variance. PSK https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc9258/ https://datatracker.ietf.org/group/tls/about/ (c)Rupert S * PSK AnonyCRT (c)RS PSK & AnonySecureCERT & TPM Client CRT & Anonymous Identity Email/Site Cert Identity (Replace PSK with one of them) PSK is usable for initial Key exchange if the PSK ID is loaded from the certificate provider, The cloud Provider or the Source Server; If the initial PSK is for example 8 Characters sent compressed & encoded with an Open EEC Certificate that the Browser or application uses.... One may be thinking; what the hell? Well the idea is to provide a list of PSK's with a time function &or a message count (so the next PSK can be loaded.. The reasoning is, We can use the PSK from the Client/Server side to guarantee & Secure sent data, So essentially if a PSK is regarded as an elliptic curve initiator code; We can use any EEC we like from a PSK, We can for example use a certificate-less TLS by initiating 2 PSK per round (segment of time), We can check NTP Sync with Time Protocol on send & receive of PSK/CERT/EEC 1 PSK is EEC Curve 2 PSK is CERT HASH (EEC, RSA, AES, PolySHA, GEA) This provides a time limited window to decode & anonymity. PSK AnonySecureCERT TPM Client CRT Anonymous Identity Email/Site Cert The idea being the Server can verify the correct receiver of TDP / UDP / DNS / NTP & other internet protocols such as Ethernet routing Subject: Re: [TLS] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tls-rfc8447bis-02.txt - Space & Aviation & Shipping & GSM https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-mattsson-tls-psk-ke-dont-dont-dont/ I would like to point out that : PSK_PSK could use Elliptic PSK for PSK1(encapsulation : EEC, AES, GCM) & PSK as a certificate replacement (the PSK would have to be a HASH:RSA, AES For example) There are two fundamental uses for PSK; Voyager is an example (NASA); Where a long voyage in space does not allow a long range high latency connection to verify certificate chain & Certificate verification is not recommended (7Years)! Shipping Radio and GSM & Global positioning : Open PSK from space The use of Registered Certificates for these jobs helps; When making a Sub-Certificate verify depends on reliable certificate verification & distance counts in Aviation (can work though but must not verify with an offsite server for secrecy) Static (Self updated by firmware) Certificates work for the ECDHE_CERT pairing or the PSK_DHE/ECDHE (certificate) pairing, However verification on first initiation is Local (c)Rupert S * https://science.n-helix.com/2022/03/ice-ssrtp.html Code Speed https://science.n-helix.com/2022/08/simd.html https://science.n-helix.com/2022/09/ovccans.html Chaos https://science.n-helix.com/2022/02/interrupt-entropy.html https://science.n-helix.com/2022/02/rdseed.html https://science.n-helix.com/2020/06/cryptoseed.html sRTP Chaos Nonce: Certificate transactions; TLS & OCSP Security Protocols https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc8954/ RSA-PSS RSASSA-PSS is a probabilistic signature scheme (PSS) with appendix RSAES-OAEP (Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding) https://www.cryptosys.net/pki/manpki/pki_rsaschemes.html https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8017 https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5756 PSK: Pre-Shared Key Cipher Suites for TLS with SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5487/ https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc8442/ https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc9258/ Nonce & Plaintext, Token & SequenceID (Bearing in mind that ICE-SSRTP Nonce is compatible) https://www.ietf.org/id/draft-howard-gssapi-aead-01.txt AES-GCM-SIV: Nonce Misuse-Resistant Authenticated Encryption https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc8452/ Adding the nonce to GMAC makes GMAC's unique : ICE-ssRTP https://www.zerotier.com/2019/09/04/aes-gmac-ctr-siv/ https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5297#page-15 AES-GCM SRTP https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc7714/ AES-CCM https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc6655/ Lightweight Cryptography https://www.cryptrec.go.jp/report/cryptrec-gl-2003-2016en.pdf https://www.scitepress.org/papers/2014/49006/49006.pdf Performance Evaluation Comparison LIGHTWEIGHT CIPHERS NIST LightWeight Cryptography Requirements https://scholarworks.calstate.edu/downloads/k0698968b TLS 1.3 on Lightweight Crypto https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/095.pdf Computation of Hilbert class polynomials and modular polynomials from super-singular elliptic curves https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/064.pdf Super-singular Elliptic Curves for ECDHE EEC PQC - Deuring for the People - Supersingular Elliptic Curves with Prescribed Endomorphism Ring in General Characteristic - 2023-106 https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/106.pdf The Security of ChaCha20-Poly1305 in the Multi-user Setting https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/085.pdf Verification ECDHE ECDHE Grotto, framework & C++ library for space- & time-efficient -party piecewise polynomial 'i.e, spline' evaluation on secrets additively shared over, Grotto improves on the state-of-the-art approaches of DCF 2023-108 https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/108.pdf AES-NI Compatible Ciphers : AES, ARIA, CLEFIA https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-cipher-catalog-01#page-3 CLEFIA : Large size table, Pure function https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6114 ARIA : Random is a big+ to anonymity bit 128Bit's of data https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5794 ARIA is conformant https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6209 ARIA SRTP https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8269#page-14 Post Quantum: Verification of Correctness and Security Properties for CRYSTALS-KYBER https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/087.pdf Verification of the (1–δ)-Correctness Proof of CRYSTALS-KYBER with Number Theoretic Transform https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/027.pdf A Practical Template Attack on CRYSTALS-Dilithium https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/050.pdf NTRU, Kyber Hardware Acceleration - Gate-Level Masking of Streamlined NTRU Prime Decapsulation in Hardware 2023-105 https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/105.pdf Compact TLS 1.3 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-ctls/ DTLS 2023 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tsvwg-dtls-over-sctp-bis/ TLS 1.2 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5246/ https://datatracker.ietf.org/group/tls/about/ https://blog.cloudflare.com/post-quantum-for-all/ Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms Specification https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5905/ https://science.n-helix.com/2022/01/ntp.html Securing TLS https://is.gd/SecurityHSM https://is.gd/WebPKI Crypto Libraries https://github.com/miracl/core https://github.com/jedisct1/libsodium About Circl library https://github.com/cloudflare/circl https://blog.cloudflare.com/inside-geo-key-manager-v2/ FPGA & ASIC Libraries https://si2.org/open-cell-library/ Model & Create S-Box (AES & ARIA & CLEFIA S-Box Modeling) AES & ARIA & CLEFIA S-Box Modeling - Advanced Crypto Algorithms - Modeling for Large S-boxes Oriented to Differential Probabilities and Linear Correlations (Long Paper) 2023-109 https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/109.pdf * AES-SIV & ARIA & CLEFIA the merits of 2023-01 RS As documentation shows ARIA uses a Random noise input in the encryption, I believe this is so that it is hard to pick up the signals... On the other hand it has a max data size of 192bit (AES does not), I feel that ARIA has merits in WiFi & Telecoms. CLEFIA has a large data pathway; So could be good for large transfers & Drive Storage. As i say : ARIA, The Random element is about Stealth AES-SIV has merits like AES-GCM, fast and relatively Safe. RS * ICE-SSRTP is relatively simple & involves a Dual Cypher of many classifications AES, CHACHA20-POLY1305, GEA, 3DES & Other RTP Classifications such as UDP & TCP & GRE ICE-SSRTP is useful for: TV & Satellite encoding & decryption Messaging applications; Video & Call Encoding Improved AES, CHACHA20-POLY1305, GEA, 3DES & Other RTP Classifications such as UDP & TCP & GRE 3G, 4G LTE & 5G Encoding Radio & Telecoms * In terms of lightweight security (Bluetooth ear-buds & other tiny things) : 64Bit AES/3DES/GEA with ICE-SSRTP Nonce makes perfect sense. In Terms of heavier (in terms of ARM Core Phones & Network-boxes) : Both the 64Bit Instruction-set & the 32Bit SiMD/NANO + AES-NE + Advance Crypto Instruction ACI, 96Bit/128Bit AES/3DES/GEA * 3 Packets per nonce ICE-SSRTP In Terms of larger demands: With 64Bit/128Bit Instruction-set & the 32Bit SiMD/NANO/AVX128Bit+, + AES-NE + Advance Crypto Instruction ACI 96Bit * 5 /128Bit/256Bit/384Bit *3 AES/3DES/GEA * 3 Packets per nonce ICE-SSRTP * When it comes to pure security, We are grateful https://is.gd/SecurityHSM https://is.gd/WebPKI TLS Optimised https://drive.google.com/file/d/10XL19eGjxdCGj0tK8MULKlgWhHa9_5v9/view?usp=share_link Ethernet Security https://drive.google.com/file/d/18LNDcRSbqN7ubEzaO0pCsWaJHX68xCxf/view?usp=share_link These are the addresses directly of some good ones; DNS & NTP & PTP 2600:c05:3010:50:47::1 2607:fca8:b000:1::3 2607:fca8:b000:1::4 2a06:98c1:54::c12b 142.202.190.19 172.64.36.1 172.64.36.2 38.17.55.196 38.17.55.111 * #FreeRAND #Proverbs Random is made to be free, to be as free as a bird, it becomes the certificate of our freedom and is cherished as born free, As free as Random is! Born to be free; But Born forth freely by the angels of our seed. JN dev-rnd windows Nothing like leaching Rand from ubuntu! no not at all! but you can build pollinate and pollen for windows I would be greatful! thank you bill gates (as apps because windows update does not work for me & I built a dev/rnd for windows with a friend from a defence group before he disappeared!, be a hero bill) DiHARD This *Random* for your /dev/rnd *file* Entropy / Chaos for /dev/rnd available whenever you like from https://pollinate2.n-helix.com/ https://pollinate.n-helix.com/ Constantly active rings if you do not know about Pollen & Pollinate ubuntu, google it! https://science.n-helix.com/2018/12/rng.html https://science.n-helix.com/2017/04/rng-and-random-web.html https://science.n-helix.com/2020/06/cryptoseed.html https://science.n-helix.com/2022/02/rdseed.html
- Fwd: Post Quantum & Previous Network optimisation… Duke Abbaddon