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[radext] FW: New Version Notification for draft-xue-radext-key-management-01.txt

Xueli <xueli@huawei.com> Fri, 12 July 2013 03:23 UTC

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From: Xueli <xueli@huawei.com>
To: "radext@ietf.org" <radext@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: New Version Notification for draft-xue-radext-key-management-01.txt
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Date: Fri, 12 Jul 2013 03:22:32 +0000
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Subject: [radext] FW: New Version Notification for draft-xue-radext-key-management-01.txt
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Hi,

There is a new version for RADIUS Extensions for Key Management in WLAN network.


It is a general case that authenticator is deployed on gateway instead of AC. So In this scenario, 
the encryption/decryption node  can't obtain Pairwise Master Key (PMK) information during Extensible
Authentication Protocol (EAP) procedure, it is not sufficient to
achieve traffic encryption/decryption requirement in Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) network.

This document analyzes the requirement and issue for key management
that has arisen so far during authentication process in WLAN network.
Meanwhile, the control messages for key management are defined.

This drat is updated with China-telecom as co-author.
Your comments are appreciated. 

BR
Li

>-----Original Message-----
>From: internet-drafts@ietf.org [mailto:internet-drafts@ietf.org]
>Sent: Friday, July 12, 2013 11:16 AM
>To: Xueli; Bo Gao
>Subject: New Version Notification for draft-xue-radext-key-management-01.txt
>
>
>A new version of I-D, draft-xue-radext-key-management-01.txt
>has been successfully submitted by Li Xue and posted to the
>IETF repository.
>
>Filename:	 draft-xue-radext-key-management
>Revision:	 01
>Title:		 RADIUS Extensions for Key Management in WLAN network
>Creation date:	 2013-07-12
>Group:		 Individual Submission
>Number of pages: 12
>URL:
>http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-xue-radext-key-management-01.txt
>Status:
>http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-xue-radext-key-management
>Htmlized:
>http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-xue-radext-key-management-01
>Diff:
>http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-xue-radext-key-management-01
>
>Abstract:
>   It is a general case in operators networks that Authenticator is
>   deployed on Service Gateway (SGW) to avoid overload on the Access
>   Controller (AC).  In this scenario, the encryption/decryption node
>   can't obtain Pairwise Master Key (PMK) information during Extensible
>   Authentication Protocol (EAP) procedure, it is not sufficent to
>   achieve traffic encryption/decryption requirement in Wireless Local
>   Area Network (WLAN) network.
>
>   This document analyzes the requirement and issue for key management
>   that has arisen so far during authentication process in WLAN network.
>   Meanwhile, the control messages for key management are defined.
>
>
>
>
>The IETF Secretariat

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