Re: [radext] New draft: RFC6614bis (RADIUS/TLS)

Alan DeKok <aland@deployingradius.com> Sat, 29 October 2022 12:15 UTC

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From: Alan DeKok <aland@deployingradius.com>
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Date: Sat, 29 Oct 2022 08:15:46 -0400
Cc: Jan-Frederik Rieckers <rieckers@dfn.de>, Peter Deacon <peterd@iea-software.com>, radext@ietf.org
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To: Bernard Aboba <bernard.aboba@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [radext] New draft: RFC6614bis (RADIUS/TLS)
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On Oct 28, 2022, at 12:34 PM, Bernard Aboba <bernard.aboba@gmail.com> wrote:
> [BA]  The problem would still raise its head again when TLS 1.4 comes out. 

  Yes, true.

> One way to not force operators to configuration multiple PSKs would be to hash a configured "RADIUS over (D)TLS" PSK with the TLS version number to produce a PSK unique for each TLS version number.

  That may work.  I'm not familiar enough with the TLS state machine to say if the PSK identity / value is checked before version negotiation is complete.

  I'm also a little wary of defining some kind of "ad hoc" hashing around the PSK.  I'd much prefer to push that kind of work onto OpenSSL.

  If this issue is too hard, I'd just add a note saying "make sure that the PSKs are large and derived from a secure source".  After that... if the underlying cryptographic protocols have issues, well... we can't fix them in RADEXT.

  Alan DeKok.