[radext] radiusdtls-bis-09 - Assorted notes

Heikki Vatiainen <hvn@radiatorsoftware.com> Fri, 03 October 2025 20:36 UTC

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From: Heikki Vatiainen <hvn@radiatorsoftware.com>
Date: Fri, 03 Oct 2025 23:35:44 +0300
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Subject: [radext] radiusdtls-bis-09 - Assorted notes
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Here are the remaining notes I have for the draft. I hope Janfred doesn't
despair of all the text in this and my previous messages. Most of what I
wrote should should not change the speficiation, only clarify the document.
The renegotiation suggestion below is a change, but I'd say it's not a big
change in practice.

If needed, I can create a pull request in GitHub with all the changes in
this and other message from today.


First, section 3. 'Changes to RADIUS' subsection 3.1. 'Packet format' 3rd
and 2nd last paragraphs talk changes in general and could go directly
within section 3. In my opinion the paragraphs describe changes in general
and are therefore good to have directly within the main section 3.

In any case, section 3.1. 'Packet format' could be shortened to its first
sentence: 'The RADIUS packet format is unchanged from [RFC2865], [RFC2866]
and [RFC5176].'.

Currently section 3.1 starts with the aforementioned sentence and then goes
on to list a number of things that are not changed. This is a bit
misleading. If the reader is not familiar with Radsec, it can be confusing
to understand what the changes are. Perhaps they are things that are not
listed and discussed?


Second, section 4.2. 'Mutual authentication' forbids post-handshake
certificate-based client authentication. This is good. However, in section
4.2.1. 'Authentication using X.509 certificates with PKIX trust model
(TLS-X.509-PKIX)', bullet 'When the configured trust based changes ...' the
text permits renegotiation. In practice the TLS libraries may not support
renegotiation at all (e.g. rustls) or when renegotiation is desired, it
needs to be enabled separately for client (disabled by default in OpenSSL)
with the an extra twist that renegotiation can also do session resumption.
Here's a list of OpenSSL options that control renegotiation:

    SSL_OP_ALLOW_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATION
    Client-initiated renegotiation is disabled by default. Use this option
to enable it.

    SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION
    Disable all renegotiation in TLSv1.2 and earlier. Do not send
HelloRequest messages, and ignore renegotiation requests via ClientHello.

    SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
    When performing renegotiation as a server, always start a new session
(i.e., session resumption requests are only accepted in the initial
handshake). This option is not needed for clients.

I'd say allowing renegotiation in any case could simply be denied. This
helps interoperability by doing away possible discussions about why some
implementations support it and others don't. Client renegotiation seems
also be seldom used, and likely less tested too. Controlling session
resumption during renegotiation may also be plenty of work for little gain.

The bullet in question without renegotiation could then read like this. If
this is an acceptable change, should it also add a MUST NOT for
renegotiation?

    When the configured trust base changes (e.g., removal of a CA from the
trust anchor; issuance of a new CRL for a given CA), implementations SHOULD
reassess all connected peer's continued validity of the certificate path.
This can either be done by caching the peer's certificate for the duration
of the connection and re-evaluating the cached certificate or by opening a
new (D)TLS connection and closing the old one.


Third, section 4.8. 'Session limits and timeouts' 4th paragraph ends with
this sentence:

    These scenarios could be related to monitoring the infrastructure or to
allow the server to proactively send packets to the clients without a
preceding request.

Does 'proactively send' here mean reverse CoA? If not, what does this mean?


Fourth, section 4.9. 'Behavior on session closure of incoming sessions'.
The last paragraph says:

    A home server which receives other kinds of packets (for example
Accounting-Request, CoA-Request, Disconnect-Request) MAY finish processing
outstanding requests, and then discard any response.

Should it say CoA-NAK and Disconnect-NAK?

-- 
Heikki Vatiainen
hvn@radiatorsoftware.com