[Rats] 答复: 答复: 答复: use case document updates on Roots of Trust

["Xialiang (Frank, Network Standard & Patent Dept)" <[e-mail]>]

Do all these exemplar solutions include integrity measurement and verification functionalities in trust anchor, in addition to the certificate issuance and verification?

-----邮件原件-----
发件人: Carl Wallace [mailto:[e-mail]] 
发送时间: 2019年9月17日 10:45
收件人: Xialiang (Frank, Network Standard & Patent Dept) <[e-mail]>
抄送: Laurence Lundblade <[e-mail]>; Salz, Rich <[e-mail]>; Michael Richardson <[e-mail]>; [e-mail]
主题: Re: 答复: 答复: [Rats] use case document updates on Roots of Trust

Or more applicable here, many current attestations. Though these are formatted as certificates.

On 9/16/19, 10:36 PM, "Carl Wallace" <[e-mail]> wrote:

>TAMP messages are an example. But any signature could apply, whether a 
>public key is a trust anchor or not is not up to the verifier.
>
>On 9/16/19, 10:21 PM, "Xialiang (Frank, Network Standard & Patent Dept)"
><[e-mail]> wrote:
>
>>Can you give some other examples?
>>
>>-----邮件原件-----
>>发件人: Carl Wallace [mailto:[e-mail]]
>>发送时间: 2019年9月17日 10:19
>>收件人: Xialiang (Frank, Network Standard & Patent Dept) 
>><[e-mail]>
>>抄送: Laurence Lundblade <[e-mail]>; Salz, Rich 
>><[e-mail]>; Michael Richardson <[e-mail]>; 
>>[e-mail]
>>主题: Re: 答复: [Rats] use case document updates on Roots of Trust
>>
>>The definition of a trust anchor does not limit the scope to 
>>certificate chains.
>>
>>> On Sep 16, 2019, at 8:51 PM, Xialiang (Frank, Network Standard & 
>>>Patent
>>>Dept) <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>> 
>>> Hi Carl,
>>> The other big difference between them is the object they deal with:
>>>RoT
>>>is for integrity measurement value chain, CA is for certificate chain.
>>> 
>>> Hope it is helpful.
>>> 
>>> B.R.
>>> Frank
>>> 
>>> -----邮件原件-----
>>> 发件人: RATS [mailto:[e-mail]] 代表 Carl Wallace
>>> 发送时间: 2019年9月16日 20:26
>>> 收件人: Laurence Lundblade <[e-mail]>; Salz, Rich 
>>> <[e-mail]>
>>> 抄送: Michael Richardson <[e-mail]>; [e-mail]
>>> 主题: Re: [Rats] use case document updates on Roots of Trust
>>> 
>>> I took Rich's statement to be more from a relying party perspective 
>>>and your detail to be more what one might find in a policy describing 
>>>nature of the root of trust, which is not that different from how one 
>>>may describe a trust anchor/CA in a PKIX context in a policy that 
>>>describes how a CA are operated, etc. Two sides of the same coin.
>>> 
>>> On 9/15/19, 4:50 PM, "RATS on behalf of Laurence Lundblade"
>>> <[e-mail] on behalf of [e-mail]> wrote:
>>> 
>>>>> On Sep 12, 2019, at 3:31 PM, Salz, Rich <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>>> 
>>>>> I do not see a meaningful difference between "trust anchor" and 
>>>>> "trust root" and "root(s) of trust."  All of them:
>>>>>    - Are pieces of data (certificate or key is not meaningful)
>>>>>    - Used to verify something such as a certificate or signature
>>>>>    - Are trusted by the application, based on actions that are 
>>>>> "out of band" of the application itself
>>>> 
>>>> This is not how I understand a root of trust, nor how I think it is  
>>>>generally used in the TCG or TEE worlds. I think a root of trust  
>>>>involves a CPU, memory and SW that actively does something like boot  
>>>>and measure a device. There is usually a boundary around it so that  
>>>>other software on the device, like the high-level OS, can’t corrupt 
>>>>it.
>>>> When it is doing reporting as in RATS it will have a private key 
>>>>that can do some signing.
>>>> When it is doing trusted/secure boot, it will also have a public 
>>>>key  to verify the software it loads.
>>>> 
>>>> LL
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> RATS mailing list
>>>> [e-mail]
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rats
>>> 
>>> 
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> RATS mailing list
>>> [e-mail]
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rats