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Re: [Rats] Two types of secure attestation

Laurence Lundblade <lgl@island-resort.com> Sat, 23 November 2019 22:34 UTC

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From: Laurence Lundblade <lgl@island-resort.com>
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Date: Sat, 23 Nov 2019 14:34:56 -0800
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To: "Smith, Ned" <ned.smith@intel.com>
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Subject: Re: [Rats] Two types of secure attestation
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Hi Ned, (we missed seeing you in person)

Primarily the difference between TPM-style that doesn’t rely on secure boot and non-TPM-style that does rely on secure boot. 

You can and will implicit claims in either.

TPM-style is not going to have explicit claims unless you do TPM + EAT style. (Hmmm, should that be in the architecture and the YANG module?)

Makes sense, right?

LL



> On Nov 23, 2019, at 11:20 AM, Smith, Ned <ned.smith@intel.com> wrote:
> 
> @laurence - By “this” you mean the difference between implicit and explicit attestation?
>  
> From: RATS <rats-bounces@ietf.org <mailto:rats-bounces@ietf.org>> on behalf of Laurence Lundblade <lgl@island-resort.com <mailto:lgl@island-resort.com>>
> Date: Saturday, November 23, 2019 at 8:44 AM
> To: Henk Berkholz <henk.birkholz@sit.fraunhofer.de <mailto:henk.birkholz@sit.fraunhofer.de>>
> Cc: "rats@ietf.org <mailto:rats@ietf.org>" <rats@ietf.org <mailto:rats@ietf.org>>, Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com <mailto:kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com>>, "Smith, Ned" <ned.smith@intel.com <mailto:ned.smith@intel.com>>
> Subject: Re: [Rats] Two types of secure attestation
>  
>  
>> On Nov 21, 2019, at 6:26 PM, Henk Birkholz <henk.birkholz@sit.fraunhofer.de <mailto:henk.birkholz@sit.fraunhofer.de>> wrote:
>>  
>> There are no semantic difference between the "simple non-TPM EAT" scenario and the TPM-based implicit remote attestation scenario. They are if fact the "same types of secure attestation”.
>  
>  
> I don’t have any need to drive taxonomic distinction when unnecessary, but note that the YANG module has to have explicit different facilities to be able to handle both.
>  
> The verifier implementations for these two types are also very different. in the "non-TPM EAT” scenario no known-good-values for SW hashes are need to be supplied to the verifier.
>  
> I don’t think these are the only differences that we’ll encounter in real implementations. 
>  
> This should probably all be described the architecture document. Seems as significant as the passport vs background check distinction.
>  
> LL
>  
> 
> 
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