Re: [Rats] [CoRIM] The use case for TDX- and SEV-SNP-measured virtual firmware

[Tom Jones <[e-mail]>]

I find it more interesting to discuss concrete use cases.

I create, inter alia, wallets.
Wallets send information about the holder to the verifier.
For some cases the information sent to the verifier includes presence
information created by the wallet.
It is important for many use cases the decision about granting access to
the holder needs to be made in real time.
We cannot assume that internet access is available during this transaction.
I use the TPM/TEE to hold private information like private keys.

now the interesting part:
Can the information packet to the verifier (in my business the RP is not
distinct from the verifier) include any of:

   1. The key is protected by the TPM/TEE
   2. The phone has not been jail-broken (we should assume that virtual
   computing is deployed)
   3. The wallet is trustworthy (including the o/s etc.)
   4. The attestation about the user by the wallet is valid (hardware
   attestation, real time image)

For confidential computing a similar set of tests would be appropriate for
a user to trust the assertion.

In general the question is whether any of the assertions are useful in the
real world.

..tom


On Wed, Jan 10, 2024 at 1:02 AM Henk Birkholz <
[e-mail]> wrote:

> Hi Tom,
>
> coming back to this assumption:
>
> > I am the guy that gets this attestation and needs to make the trust
> decisions.
>
> Well, in the RATS Architecture there are two types of policy at work:
> Appraisal policy for Evidence and Appraisal policy for Attestation
> Results. To some extend due to the various Evidence formats produced by
> different Attesters, but basically due to the intrinsic heterogeneity of
> Attesters or their operational state in general, the burden of appraisal
> of Evidence conducted by Verifiers is typically significant higher than
> the appraisal of Attestation Results conducted by Relying Parties.
>
> (The AR4SI I-D is a place where homogenization of Attestation Results is
> under construction in the RATS WG.)
>
> The key question here is: which role do you take on? If you are taking
> on the role of a Relying Party Owner, your trust decision making is
> hopefully limited to Verifier selection (and potentially implementation
> specific decisions added to that). If you are taking on the role of a
> Verifier Owner, the burden of checking some policy statements at least
> wrt some Endorsements (especially the mentioned RoT Endorsements, but
> also "TA Endorsements", sorry Carl! please correct me, if necessary) and
> Reference Integrity Manifests is on you. The easier these Conceptual
> Messages can be managed and processed, the burden of appraisal of
> Evidence is getting a lot lower - but it is always expected to be higher
> than that of a Relying Party, as it is literally off-loaded to the
> Verifier intentionally.
>
>
> Viele Grüße,
>
> Henk
>
> On 10.01.24 00:30, Tom Jones wrote:
> > This is the part that sounds like a hand wave
> >
> > its job right, such that you can take the chip's signature of a
> > virtual instance's boot state at face value, so long as the key
> > certificate roots back to the manufacturer's published root of trust.
> >
> > I am the guy that gets this attestation and needs to make the trust
> > decisions. How do I know what that means when I make the trust decision.
> > I hope that you are not going tell me to read some policy statement
> >
> > At least in tls we have the CA!B for a min set of policies.
> >
> > BTW I was the guy at Intel trying to build the very first of these back
> > in 1996 so I understand the problem.
> >
> > thx ..Tom (mobile)
> >
> > On Tue, Jan 9, 2024, 1:06 PM Henk Birkholz
> > <[e-mail]
> > <mailto:[e-mail]>> wrote:
> >
> >     Hi Dionna,
> >
> >     thank you for bringing the CVM goals here! I think they are a great
> >     addition to the mix. Let's try to figure out some answers to your
> >     questions step by step.
> >
> >     You are touching on a lot of topics, so I am focusing on adding
> context
> >     to the RATS side of things first and in the interest of the list's
> >     subscribers only point quickly to one recent SCITT activity up front:
> >
> >      >
> >
> https://github.com/ietf-wg-scitt/draft-ietf-scitt-architecture/pull/156 <
> https://github.com/ietf-wg-scitt/draft-ietf-scitt-architecture/pull/156>
> >
> >     Pending the approval of that PR, the initial attempt to facilitate
> DIDs
> >     as a first citizen identifier is a thing of the past.
> >
> >
> >     So, RATS: please let me try to add some additional context about
> >     in-toto
> >     attestations in the context of RATS & CoRIM to start with, in the way
> >     how I currently understand it.
> >
> >     The attestations you refer to are described here, I think:
> >
> >      > https://github.com/in-toto/attestation/tree/main/spec/v1
> >     <https://github.com/in-toto/attestation/tree/main/spec/v1>
> >
> >     In remote attestation land, the concept that can be found at that
> >     pointer is potentially best compared with a RATS Endorsement or
> NIST's
> >     3rd-Party Attestation and maybe also NIST's 1st-Party Attestation (a
> >     "self-attestation"), I think. It seems not to be RATS Evidence, I
> >     think,
> >     which is the input to a RATS Verifier, and I am happy to exchange
> more
> >     thoughts about that.
> >
> >     in-toto attestations' outer layer are in-toto Envelopes with a JSON
> >     encoding, which are signed using DSSE:
> >
> >      >
> >     https://github.com/secure-systems-lab/dsse/blob/v1.0.0/envelope.md
> >     <https://github.com/secure-systems-lab/dsse/blob/v1.0.0/envelope.md>
> >
> >     DSSE - Dead Simple Signing Envelope - is an alternative approach to
> >     JOSE's JWS. Some reasoning about why it is defined as it is can be
> >     found
> >     here:
> >
> >      > https://github.com/secure-systems-lab/dsse/#why-not
> >     <https://github.com/secure-systems-lab/dsse/#why-not>
> >
> >     In CoRIM work, we are also defining semantics that could be viewed
> as a
> >     type of pre-defined set of predicates as defined by in-toto:
> >
> >      > https://github.com/in-toto/attestation/tree/main/spec/predicates
> >     <https://github.com/in-toto/attestation/tree/main/spec/predicates>
> >
> >     I am an under the impression (maybe wrongfully so!) that the
> >     similarities seem to end there.
> >
> >     Two of CoRIM's goals - in a simplified nutshell - are compactness
> >     combined with standardized signing. The JSON encoding prescribed by
> >     in-toto seems to be going down a different path, but hypothetically
> it
> >     might be possible to transfer all semantics covered in CoRIM into
> >     in-toto predicates. The DSSE uses a signing scheme that seems to make
> >     some unique choices on flexibility and extensibility, of which I
> would
> >     be careful to assume that they can be simply adopted as is. I am
> happy
> >     to exchange more thoughts on these topics, too.
> >
> >     We definitely agree on the goal to not overly burden Verifiers with
> >     respect to their duty of appraisal of Evidence. There is a lot more
> in
> >     your email, but I am stopping here for now so that we can work
> through
> >     your illustrated goals and corresponding questions iteratively, if
> that
> >     is okay for you.
> >
> >
> >     Viele Grüße,
> >
> >     Henk
> >
> >     p.s. I started the email off with your reply to Tom instead of your
> >     initial email. Sorry!
> >
> >
> >     On 09.01.24 20:34, Dionna Amalie Glaze wrote:
> >      > On Mon, Jan 8, 2024 at 5:15 PM Tom Jones
> >     <[e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>>
> >     wrote:
> >      >>
> >      >> I don't understand the process that would allow a 3rd party
> >     attestor to make any assertion about what happened in the Google
> >     cloud (or any other cloud for that matter.)  Does anyone else
> >     understand the basis for virtual instances being attested as secure?
> >      >
> >      > The process is by transferring trust to a third party attester
> that
> >      > you do trust, and ensuring that the attested environment is
> heavily
> >      > protected from host tampering. This is the idea behind Trusted
> >      > Execution Environments, and is a very different threat model than
> >      > folks typically work with.
> >      > For AMD SEV-SNP or Intel TDX, you have to trust that the chip is
> >     doing
> >      > its job right, such that you can take the chip's signature of a
> >      > virtual instance's boot state at face value, so long as the key
> >      > certificate roots back to the manufacturer's published root of
> trust.
> >      > What Google then certifies is what the measurement of the boot
> means,
> >      > since we're providing the firmware. At first this will just be "we
> >      > signed the measurement", but then we'll add claims like, "this
> >      > measurement is producible through documented means on a binary
> that
> >      > was built from sources X and toolchain container Y"
> >      >   and then you can go further down the rabbit hole of if you
> >     trust the
> >      > builder, or if X + Y have the difficult-to-attain property that a
> >      > clean rebuild yields exactly the same bits. You can audit the
> sources
> >      > to establish trust in the firmware, and you can continue the "who
> >      > built the toolchain container and do I trust them?" unfathomably
> long
> >      > chain of builders building builders.
> >      >
> >      >> ..tom
> >      >>
> >      >>
> >      >> On Mon, Jan 8, 2024 at 4:33 PM Dionna Amalie Glaze
> >     <dionnaglaze=[e-mail]
> >     <mailto:[e-mail]>> wrote:
> >      >>>
> >      >>> Hi y'all, I've touched on the issue of confidential VMs (CVMs)
> >     a few times in my issues and emails to this list, but I'd like to
> >     lay out exactly what we'd like to be able to enable with RATS.
> >      >>>
> >      >>> # Goals
> >      >>>
> >      >>> Our goal is for CVM hardware attestations of Google-provided
> >     TCB to be linked to
> >      >>> 1. verifiable authenticity: signed corim measurements
> >      >>> 2. auditable measurements: the signed measurement also points
> >     to a supply chain transparency report for the measured binary. A
> >     document or software package we publish shows how to calculate the
> >     measurement from the binary, and the transparency report binds the
> >     binary to an auditable source tree at commit X built with toolchain
> >     container Y, signed by an organizationally endorsed builder key that
> >     the build follows SLSA L3 operational security requirements.
> >      >>>
> >      >>> and ephemeral claims, e.g.,
> >      >>> 3. vulnerability reporting: short-lived certificates of
> >     firmware status, like "has the most up to date security version
> >     number" or "is subject to CVE xyz. Restart your instance to get on
> >     the latest version". This could be modeled as a CoRIM endorsement of
> >     a claim like "uptodate as of TIMESTAMP".
> >      >>> 4. Platform security reporting: short-lived certificates of
> >     platform firmware status, like "you can be sure that an
> >     attestation's TCB is >= x anywhere in the fleet"
> >      >>>
> >      >>> # Supply chain standards
> >      >>>
> >      >>> There are further things you can do with the transparency
> >     report like non-repudiation through hosting the build attestation
> >     with a transparency service that has append-only logs after
> >     identity-proofing, but there seems to be a fundamental disagreement
> >     between the IETF SCITT workstream and the sigstore.dev
> >     <http://sigstore.dev> project on how to achieve that, since SCITT
> >     wants W3C DID identities, and sigstore.dev <http://sigstore.dev> is
> >     already built to use OIDC. I don't know how that all is supposed to
> >     be consonant with RATS, since there's nothing in the corim or eat
> >     documents about using DID for identities. There is EAT binding to
> >     OIDC tokens though. Is there anyone in the RATS group that is
> >     participating in the SCITT effort that can explain this to me?
> >      >>>
> >      >>> The SLSA provenance schema itself is defined in terms of a
> >     completely different attestation format called in-toto
> >     (https://in-toto.io <https://in-toto.io>), and communication I've
> >     had with them is that in-toto should be considered an alternative
> >     carrier format to CoRIM to fit into the RATS framework. If we want
> >     to link the reference measurement to an in-toto attestation, that
> >     seems like something verifier-specific that we'd need to say, "hey
> >     if you want to ensure the firmware measurement is not only signed,
> >     but built transparently, then download the SLSA attestation in
> >     dependent-rims. By the way if there's more than one thing in
> >     dependent-rims, you can understand any url with prefix X to be a
> >     firmware build attestation from Google" which is an unfortunate
> >     complexity.
> >      >>>
> >      >>> # Modeling CVM attestation
> >      >>>
> >      >>> I'm trying to understand how to fit all these goals into the
> >     RATS framework such that we can propose extensions to open source
> >     verifiers that aren't overly burdensome or highly specific to each
> >     particular package we want to provide reference values (and
> >     provenances) for.
> >      >>>
> >      >>> In terms of the firmware measurement, we can deliver a CoRIM
> >     through a UEFI variable pointed to by the NIST SP 800-155 unmeasured
> >     event, and we can give the AMD SEV-SNP VCEK certificate through
> >     extended guest request, but everything else seems to be up to the
> >     verifier to collect independently of the VM.
> >      >>>
> >      >>> ## Evidence collection
> >      >>>
> >      >>> The way we're collecting attestations at the moment is through
> >     a recommended software package
> >     https://github.com/google/go-tpms-tools
> >     <https://github.com/google/go-tpms-tools> that wraps up a vTPM quote
> >     with a TEE quote and supporting certificates as a protocol buffer.
> >     I'm not clear if this unsigned bundling process should be modeled as
> >     any particular thing in the RATS framework. I think we're working
> >     with the "passport model" of attestation.
> >      >>>
> >      >>> I don't have a sense of how the WG foresees how evidence should
> >     be bundled to give to a verifier. I'm working from a vendor-specific
> >     understanding at the moment that whatever verifier service you use,
> >     you need to use their format and API, but of course ideally I'd like
> >     this to be more of a federated arena where you can have n-of-k
> >     verifiers say some evidence matches policy, and the evidence is not
> >     too vendor-specific for that to be out of the question.
> >      >>>
> >      >>> ## CVM Profiles
> >      >>>
> >      >>> Whereas Google has an attestation verifier service that
> >     generates an EAT with its own claims bound to an OIDC token (for the
> >     Confidential Space product), we'd like to use more standard claims,
> >     like AMD SEV-SNP measurement, Intel TDX MRTD, etc. Azure's
> >     attestation service has their own x-ms-* extensions for this that
> >     will hopefully help AMD and Intel align on how claims should be
> >     proposed for the CoRIM format.
> >      >>>
> >      >>> Supposing we do get profiles from Intel and AMD for their CVM
> >     attesting environments (more below), those environments sign quotes
> >     / attestation reports that serve as evidence for the claims defined
> >     in those profiles.
> >      >>>
> >      >>> I as a Reference Value Provider want to be able to provide a
> >     document that says something that covers 1 and 2 up front like, "if
> >     your AMD measurement is contained in {x, ...} or your TDX
> >     measurement is contained in {y, ...}, then you're running
> >     Google-authentic virtual firmware with security version n. The
> >     firmware this measures can be found at z".
> >      >>>
> >      >>> My understanding of how to do this is for the firmware CoRIM to
> >     have a single CoMID tag and the SLSA provenance linked from
> >     dependent RIMs.
> >      >>> The CoMID tag will have lang: en-us, tag-identity: some-uuid we
> >     generate before signing, and triples-map containing some reference
> >     triples.
> >      >>> We have reference triples for both AMD and TDX by using
> >     different environment-maps with different class fields.
> >      >>> AMD SEV-SNP's class is up to AMD to profile, but let's just say
> >     it's a class-id for the VCEK extension oid prefix
> >     1.3.6.1.4.1.3704.1.1. The measurement-map for this can have an mkey
> >     or not. If we had one, I'm unsure if it's something that Google
> >     would define or if it's still up to AMD. If Google, we could use a
> >     uuid that stands for Google Compute Engine?
> >      >>> The mval as a measurement-values-map would then contain our AMD
> >     firmware svn, and AMD profile-specific claims, but I think we'd just
> >     give the measurements and some form of acceptable policy
> >     specification. We just have one guest policy we apply everywhere,
> >     but if that changes we probably need the AMD profile to have
> >     expressions like ranges, lower- and upper-bounds for policy
> components.
> >      >>> For Intel, they'd need a similar profile for the TDREPORT
> >     components as claims.
> >      >>>
> >      >>> I say measurements and not measurement even though we're
> >     talkabout about a single firmware binary because both AMD and TDX
> >     can have multiple measurements based on the VM construction, such as
> >     how many vCPUs it launched with (AMD has VMSAs and Intel has TDVPS).
> >      >>> For now our security version number matches what we measure as
> >     EV_S_CRTM_VERSION in PCR0, but that may change if there are
> >     technology-specific changes.
> >      >>>
> >      >>> As far as I understand, the Intel profile for CoRIM only
> >     supports the boot chain up to the quoting enclave (QE) in terms of
> >     its TCB version, but the profile does not describe the QE as its own
> >     attesting environment for SGX enclave or TDX VM. The attesting key
> >     is generated in the QE and is signed by the PCE's hold on the PCK,
> >     which is per-machine-per-TCB (ppid + pceid). The quote wraps around
> >     the attesting key's signature for verification against their
> >     non-x.509 format.
> >      >>>
> >      >>> AMD similarly does not have a profile for the SNP firmware as
> >     an attesting environment for an SEV-SNP VM.
> >      >>>
> >      >>> # Evidence Appraisal
> >      >>>
> >      >>> Setting aside evidence formats, I want to really understand how
> >     we go from a signed CoRIM and a CVM attestation to an attestation
> >     result (which I'll handwave is some JWT representation of the
> >     accepted claims).
> >      >>>
> >      >>> We somehow get the VCEK or PCK certificate and attestation
> >     report / quote, and the Google firmware CoRIM to the verifier. The
> >     verifier can verify the evidence back to the manufacturer with this
> >     forwarded (or cached) collateral and introduce every quote/report
> >     field as claims of the target environment.
> >      >>> Let's say Google's code signing root key is in the trust
> >     anchor, so any CoRIM we sign is trusted.
> >      >>>
> >      >>> If I read the CoRIM document about matching reference values
> >     against evidence, the document starts talking about conditional
> >     endorsements instead, which are a different triple from
> >     reference-value-triples. We discussed a little in the Github issues
> >     that reference values are a special kind of endorsement, but it's
> >     still jarring. It goes on to say that reference-value-triples is
> >     essentially redundant with the conditional-endorsement-triples, but
> >     you can use either. Then there's "In the reference-triple-record
> >     these are encoded together. In other triples multiple Reference
> >     Values are represented more compactly by letting one environment-map
> >     apply to multiple measurement-maps."
> >      >>>
> >      >>> It seems "Conditional Endorsement" is philosophical, and
> >     "conditional-endorsement-triples" is one implementation of the idea,
> >     and "Reference Value" is philosophical, but
> >     "reference-value-triples" is one implementation of the idea. Another
> >     implementation of "Reference Value" as an mkey of a
> >     "conditional-endorsement-triples", and the mval is more explicit
> >     about what claims are introduced. For "reference-value-triples", I
> >     don't see any explicit representation of a claim, rather,
> >     reference-value-triples lead to "authorized-by" getting added to
> >     fields of an Accepted Claim Set entry which itself is only a
> >     conceptual type to help understand appraisal, but not an actual
> >     claim itself–is this where a profile-defined claim needs to clarify
> >     meaning? I see this authorized-by as conceptually different from the
> >     optional field of a measurement-map, since that is from the CoRIM
> >     that I've signed and isn't part of an attestation result
> representation.
> >      >>>
> >      >>> If I'm looking at a JWT with an AMD profile claim about the
> >     measurement value, I'd like another claim that the measurement value
> >     is signed by Google, or a stronger claim that the measurement value
> >     was signed by a trusted source, and the build provenance is [some
> >     google URL to the SLSA provenance].
> >      >>> Again though, if at all possible these claims should appeal
> >     more broadly than just Google.
> >      >>>
> >      >>> --
> >      >>> -Dionna Glaze, PhD (she/her)
> >      >>> _______________________________________________
> >      >>> RATS mailing list
> >      >>> [e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>
> >      >>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rats
> >     <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rats>
> >      >
> >      >
> >      >
> >
>