[Rats] Re: [New I-D] Attestation of Hardware Components
Carl Wallace <carl@redhoundsoftware.com> Mon, 06 April 2026 11:21 UTC
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Date: Mon, 06 Apr 2026 07:21:42 -0400
From: Carl Wallace <carl@redhoundsoftware.com>
To: Antoine POULAIN <antoine.poulain=40secure-ic.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, "rats@ietf.org" <rats@ietf.org>
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Thread-Topic: [Rats] [New I-D] Attestation of Hardware Components
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Subject: [Rats] Re: [New I-D] Attestation of Hardware Components
List-Id: Remote ATtestation procedureS <rats.ietf.org>
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I only skimmed the draft but have a couple of questions/comments: 1) The introduction states "(e)xisting attestation mechanisms primarily rely on manufacturer endorsements" but then the draft goes on to use existing data structures to achieve its ends. What are the mechanisms that primarily rely on endorsements? 2) Given the document states the examples "are informational only" and the document "focuses on defining abstract interfaces and a data model", I tend to think it should be Informational, not Standards Track. 3) Regarding triggers, how would you contrast this work with RFC9684 and draft-ietf-rats-network-device-subscription? 4) How do you propose to reduce "reliance on static trust anchors" while verifying evidence of actual runtime state? Reduction of reliance on trust anchors is only mentioned in the introduction. On 3/31/26, 10:20 AM, "Antoine POULAIN" <antoine.poulain=40secure-ic.com@dmarc.ietf.org <mailto:40secure-ic.com@dmarc.ietf.org>> wrote: Hello, We would like to draw your attention to a new Internet-Draft, Title: Attestation of Hardware Components Draft: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-paka-rats-hardware-component-attestation/ <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-paka-rats-hardware-component-attestation/> Latest (github): https://github.com/antoinepoulain/hardware-component-attestation/blob/main/draft-paka-rats-hardware-component-attestation.txt <https://github.com/antoinepoulain/hardware-component-attestation/blob/main/draft-paka-rats-hardware-component-attestation.txt> This draft proposes a model for including runtime measurements of hardware components as attestation Evidence, complementing the existing Endorsement-based approach. The objective is to improve visibility into the actual runtime state of hardware by capturing effects such as aging, environmental conditions, and physical attacks. This is particularly relevant for systems with strong safety and/or reliability requirements. We included many practical examples (section 7) so you can understand the intent of the document and how we envision it to fit in the RATS ecosystem. Feedback is very welcome, particularly we would like your comments on: - Alignment with the RATS architecture and use of Conceptual Messages, - Pertinence of the proposed abstract Attester model, - Missing content related to RATS ecosystem. Thank you, Regards, Antoine Poulain and Abdellah Kaci, Secure-IC -----Message d'origine----- De : internet-drafts@ietf.org <mailto:internet-drafts@ietf.org> <internet-drafts@ietf.org <mailto:internet-drafts@ietf.org>> Envoyé : mardi 31 mars 2026 15:53 À : Abdellah KACI <abdellah.kaci@secure-ic.com <mailto:abdellah.kaci@secure-ic.com>>; Antoine POULAIN <antoine.poulain@secure-ic.com <mailto:antoine.poulain@secure-ic.com>> Objet : New Version Notification for draft-paka-rats-hardware-component-attestation-00.txt A new version of Internet-Draft draft-paka-rats-hardware-component-attestation-00.txt has been successfully submitted by Antoine Poulain and posted to the IETF repository. Name: draft-paka-rats-hardware-component-attestation Revision: 00 Title: Attestation of Hardware Components Date: 2026-03-31 Group: Individual Submission Pages: 35 URL: https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-paka-rats-hardware-component-attestation-00.txt <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-paka-rats-hardware-component-attestation-00.txt> Status: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-paka-rats-hardware-component-attestation/ <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-paka-rats-hardware-component-attestation/> HTML: https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-paka-rats-hardware-component-attestation-00.html <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-paka-rats-hardware-component-attestation-00.html> HTMLized: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-paka-rats-hardware-component-attestation <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-paka-rats-hardware-component-attestation> Abstract: Hardware components constitute the foundation of all computations and therefore play a critical role in system integrity and reliability. Existing attestation mechanisms primarily rely on manufacturer endorsements, which provide limited visibility into the runtime behavior of hardware. This document extends the Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS) architecture by defining a data model and guidelines for including measurements of hardware components in attestation Evidence. These measurements may represent physical properties, results of self-tests, or behavioral observations. The document considers a threat model that includes both adversarial actions and physical phenomena such as environmental variations and aging. It proposes abstract interfaces for collecting measurements, enabling interoperability while remaining agnostic to implementation mechanisms, and outlines a security model for their use in appraisal. The IETF Secretariat _______________________________________________ RATS mailing list -- rats@ietf.org <mailto:rats@ietf.org> To unsubscribe send an email to rats-leave@ietf.org <mailto:rats-leave@ietf.org>
- [Rats] [New I-D] Attestation of Hardware Componen… Antoine POULAIN
- [Rats] Re: [New I-D] Attestation of Hardware Comp… Muhammad Usama Sardar
- [Rats] Re: [New I-D] Attestation of Hardware Comp… Antoine POULAIN
- [Rats] Re: [New I-D] Attestation of Hardware Comp… Muhammad Usama Sardar
- [Rats] Re: [New I-D] Attestation of Hardware Comp… Carl Wallace
- [Rats] Re: [New I-D] Attestation of Hardware Comp… Antoine POULAIN
- [Rats] Re: [New I-D] Attestation of Hardware Comp… ned.smith.ietf@gmail.com
- [Rats] Re: [New I-D] Attestation of Hardware Comp… Muhammad Usama Sardar
- [Rats] Re: [New I-D] Attestation of Hardware Comp… Antoine POULAIN