[Rats] Out-of-band key material set up in architecture document

[Laurence Lundblade <[e-mail]>]

An issue I have with both the current architecture documents is that they do not discuss the need for some out of band key material set up to make verification work.

The manufacturer of the device must put some private key into each device so that the device can sign attestation evidence. Most likely the manufacturer also creates the verifying key material, but they may or may not be the verifier.  If they are not the verifier, somehow the verifier of attestation evidence must have corresponding key material to verify the signature.

This paragraph could be a start of the text. I think this is a critical part of the architecture because attestation doesn’t work without it. 

I do NOT want to specify any details for how this happens in the architecture doc. It needs to stay at a high level. It stays at a high level in other places. For example it discusses claims, but doesn’t defined individual claims.

I think there’s a large parallel with HTTPS. HTTPS wouldn’t work without some out-of-band distribution of certs/keys for verification.

Just like with HTTPS, there are a lot of different business models, protocols and end-end systems that this out-of-band set can be done. Here’s a few that are real today and publicly described:

- Intel EPID (no X.509, the ECDAA algorithm, a service run exclusively by Intel for Intel chips for fee)
- Android Attestation (buckets of keys distributed to phone makers, X.509, a verification service run exclusively by Google)
- FIDO Metadata service (a 3rd party doing X.509 certificate distribution for many FIDO vendors)

I also know of some that are not publicly described that do not use X.509, some even using symmetric key material.

I think business models will drive architecture in some cases. I also think the cost of putting keys into chips and devices is a another driver. A third driver is big IoT back-end service providers like Amazon and Google.

I mention all these only illustrate the variety and thus the futility of trying to come up with one standard way.

However, I think to help the world get their heads around how attestation works; leaving this out of the architecture would be leaving a critical part out.

LL