[regext] review of draft-ietf-regext-login-security-03

Martin Casanova <martin.casanova@switch.ch> Tue, 26 March 2019 17:56 UTC

Return-Path: <martin.casanova@switch.ch>
X-Original-To: regext@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: regext@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id C37E7120798 for <regext@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 26 Mar 2019 10:56:39 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.899
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.899 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-5, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id utfFauUXzqmd for <regext@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 26 Mar 2019 10:56:35 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from edge20.ethz.ch (edge20.ethz.ch [82.130.99.26]) (using TLSv1 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4FD921207B0 for <regext@ietf.org>; Tue, 26 Mar 2019 10:56:23 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mailm117.d.ethz.ch (129.132.139.9) by edge20.ethz.ch (82.130.99.26) with Microsoft SMTP Server (TLS) id 14.3.439.0; Tue, 26 Mar 2019 18:55:13 +0100
Received: from [130.59.196.2] (130.59.196.2) by mailm117.d.ethz.ch (2001:67c:10ec:5602::29) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) id 15.1.1713.5; Tue, 26 Mar 2019 18:55:02 +0100
References: <afac0d26-e054-54a3-306b-5ec5a49fd489@switch.ch>
From: Martin Casanova <martin.casanova@switch.ch>
To: regext@ietf.org
X-Forwarded-Message-Id: <afac0d26-e054-54a3-306b-5ec5a49fd489@switch.ch>
Message-ID: <7597ff38-29ba-77e3-e093-524c5cb7123a@switch.ch>
Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2019 18:55:01 +0100
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:60.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/60.5.1
MIME-Version: 1.0
In-Reply-To: <afac0d26-e054-54a3-306b-5ec5a49fd489@switch.ch>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="------------10710CD172DAD947D9D6F4BC"
Content-Language: en-US
X-Originating-IP: [130.59.196.2]
X-ClientProxiedBy: mailm112.d.ethz.ch (2001:67c:10ec:5602::24) To mailm117.d.ethz.ch (2001:67c:10ec:5602::29)
X-TM-SNTS-SMTP: 6784FB127F464C3D2A5EC11826052DAD67E4EC82B9A1752D4BD5D99B69F58A1B2000:8
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/regext/waY5KdNMTCLivJsP7eJ6WYpEUHs>
Subject: [regext] review of draft-ietf-regext-login-security-03
X-BeenThere: regext@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
Precedence: list
List-Id: Registration Protocols Extensions <regext.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/regext>, <mailto:regext-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/regext/>
List-Post: <mailto:regext@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:regext-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/regext>, <mailto:regext-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2019 17:56:40 -0000

Jim

Since we support that draft I started implementing and read it again 
more carefully. I have the following comments / feedback

1. (comment) Event type "cipher" or "tlsProtocol" :

In case the client uses deprecated protocol or cipher we currently hang 
up the TLS connection immediately so there is no possibility to send a 
type "error" security event.
At chapter 3.1 near "exDate" is written that "At expiry there MAY be an 
error to connect or MAY be an error to login." So in case of an error to 
connect you run in the same situation and will not be able to send back 
a "error" level event but thats OK. However it is useful to warn the 
client during a transition period when we know that we are going to 
disable a certain cipher or TLS protocol on a specific day in the future.


2 . (comment) Event type "newPw":
Here we currently use  2306 "Parameter value policy error" and write in 
the <reason> of <extValue> element that the new password was too weak.
I guess we would use the loginSec Event in the future in case the 
extension was specified at login whether the pw was changed via 
login-security extension or not.

I know that you have foreseen draft-gould-regext-login-security-policy 
to query about password complexity but I think for convenience of the 
registrar it would still be nice to somehow include the password 
requirement in the response even if it is redundant. Otherwise one has 
to implement draft-gould-regext-login-security-policy  at the same time 
or communicate the requirement out of band.

maybe like that

    S:        <loginSec:event
    S:          type="newPW"
    S:          value="expression: (?=.*\d)(?=.*[a-zA-Z])(?=.*[\x21-\x2F\x3A-\x40\x5B-\x60\x7B-\x7E]) (?!^\s+) (?!.*\s+$)(?!.*\s{2,})^[\x20-\x7e]{16,128}$"
    S:          level="error">
    S:          New password does not meet complexity requirements
    S:        </loginSec:event>
Page 10:

    S:    <result code="2200">
    S:      <msg>Authentication error</msg>


Are you sure you want to return a 2200 and not a 2306 Parameter value 
policy error in this case (page 10). I don't see a reason why this 
should be another return code with or without extension.


3. (question) Event type "stat" :

How often would you send back this event

    <loginSec:event
      type="stat"
      name="failedLogins"
      level="warning"
      value="100"
      duration="P1D">
      Excessive invalid daily logins
    </loginSec:event>

Only once with first successful login after the series of failed ones or 
for a whole day ? I suggest one time with first successful login.


4. (question) In chapter 4.1 EPP <login> Command is written

..

internal contiguous
        whitespace that includes #x9 (tab), #xA (linefeed), #xD (carriage
        return), and #x20 (space) is replaced with a single #x20 (space).
..

Since this is "normal" XML parsing behavior should there not be 
reference to where this is described for general XML processing. (I 
don't know where that would be though)


5.  (suggestion) The element  <loginSec:userAgent> could be more 
structured to make it easier for the registry to parse the different 
fields and to give a hint to the registrar what information should be 
provided.

Therefore I suggest  child elements for example

<os>           Operating System
<client>      Client technology (eg. java)
<version> Client software version (eg. 1.8.0) etc.

Thanks


Martin Casanova


-- 
---
SWITCH
Martin Casanova, Domain Applications
Werdstrasse 2, P.O. Box, 8021 Zurich, Switzerland
phone +41 44 268 15 55, direct +41 44 268 16 25
martin.casanova@switch.ch,www.switch.ch  
  
Working for a better digital world