Re: [Roll] [roll] #124: draft-ietf-roll-security-threats-01.txt --- Include further explanation

"roll issue tracker" <trac+roll@trac.tools.ietf.org> Mon, 21 October 2013 03:21 UTC

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Subject: Re: [Roll] [roll] #124: draft-ietf-roll-security-threats-01.txt --- Include further explanation
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#124: draft-ietf-roll-security-threats-01.txt --- Include further explanation


Comment (by mcr@sandelman.ca):

 >
 > === Section 6.5.1[[BR]]
 > *This draft boils down to this paragraph if I'm not mistaken:
 >
 >    A ROLL protocol MUST be made flexible by a design that offers the
 >    configuration facility so that the user (network administrator) can
 >    choose the security settings that match the application's needs.
 >    Furthermore, in the case of LLNs, that flexibility SHOULD extend to
 >    allowing the routing protocol security requirements to be met by
 >    measures applied at different protocol layers, provided the
 >    identified requirements are collectively met.
 >
 > I'm absolutely fine with the first sentence.  I'm even okay with the
 second
 > sentence it gets done at the application layer all the time, but at the
 > application layer they can all point to something that's all specified
 up and
 > has MTI etc (think TLS).  If we end up doing that here then something
 similar
 > needs to end up happening.  If use cases are so broad that they can't
 possibly
 > pick an underlying security mechanism then you need to try again but
 with a
 > smaller net. -- by ST

 Needs further discussion over beer.

-- 
-------------------------------------+-------------------------------------
 Reporter:                           |       Owner:
  mariainesrobles@gmail.com          |  tzeta.tsao@cooperindustries.com
     Type:  defect                   |      Status:  new
 Priority:  major                    |   Milestone:
Component:  security-threats         |     Version:
 Severity:  Active WG Document       |  Resolution:
 Keywords:                           |
-------------------------------------+-------------------------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/roll/trac/ticket/124#comment:11>
roll <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/roll/>