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[RPSEC] Re: Using IPSec for Routing Protocols

Stephane Bortzmeyer <bortzmeyer@nic.fr> Fri, 05 May 2006 08:56 UTC

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Date: Fri, 05 May 2006 10:55:57 +0200
From: Stephane Bortzmeyer <bortzmeyer@nic.fr>
To: Lakshminath Dondeti <ldondeti@qualcomm.com>
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Subject: [RPSEC] Re: Using IPSec for Routing Protocols
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On Thu, May 04, 2006 at 11:50:50AM -0700,
 Lakshminath Dondeti <ldondeti@qualcomm.com> wrote 
 a message of 77 lines which said:

> So, Sandhya, are you saying that integrity protection in transit is
> the only requirement?  And, are you saying that there is no need for
> the recipient to be able to verify whether the claimed route or
> reachability information is in fact correct?

The charter of the WG does not mention it but the ID
draft-ietf-rpsec-routing-threats-07.txt is very clear that
falsification of routes by a router, even authentified, is a
problem. Therefore, IPsec cannot be the only approach in this WG.

See section 4.5


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