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Re: [RPSEC] [secdir] [OSPF] [sidr] Authentication for OSPFv3

Sam Hartman <hartmans-ietf@mit.edu> Wed, 01 October 2008 15:57 UTC

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From: Sam Hartman <hartmans-ietf@mit.edu>
To: Acee Lindem <acee@redback.com>
References: <48D96507.4000207@sri.com> <20080929200231.3E5DD3F443@pecan.tislabs.com> <77ead0ec0809291853t63940339xc826b13cf5515176@mail.gmail.com> <C50382B8-74EB-4157-9043-56CB1D3F8594@cisco.com> <BAD965BE-053F-4296-B0F7-CF0F2C9C0779@redback.com>
Date: Tue, 30 Sep 2008 12:05:28 -0400
In-Reply-To: <BAD965BE-053F-4296-B0F7-CF0F2C9C0779@redback.com> (Acee Lindem's message of "Tue, 30 Sep 2008 11:08:15 -0400")
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Cc: OSPF List <ospf@ietf.org>, secdir@mit.edu, rpsec@ietf.org, David Ward <dward@cisco.com>, sidr@ietf.org, Ross Callon <rcallon@juniper.net>
Subject: Re: [RPSEC] [secdir] [OSPF] [sidr] Authentication for OSPFv3
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>>>>> "Acee" == Acee Lindem <acee@redback.com> writes:

    Acee> One thing to take into consideration is that the outcome of
    Acee> our KMART BOF was that nobody deploying networks wanted
    Acee> routing infra-structure based on a third-part verified
    Acee> certificates.  Thanks, Acee
    Acee> On Sep 30, 2008, at 10:57 AM, David Ward wrote:

Hmm.  I actually did not get a strong sense of any particular
conclusions from that BOF.  People made it clear  that having the routing infrastructure fail because some security-related third party was unavailable was an operational non-starter.


It's certainly true that some people in the room spoke out against
certificates.  At least some of the reasons given did not actually
inherently apply to certificates as a whole although they did create
some significant constraints for what would not create operational
problems.

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