Re: [rtcweb] BUNDLE: Attempting to resolve security consideration

[Magnus Westerlund <[e-mail]>]

Hi,

Please see inline.

Den 2017-03-06 kl. 14:36, skrev Eric Rescorla:
>
>     I think you are correct assuming that one is using SRTP. All the
>     IETF key-management scheme follows this, although a=mikey is
>     IDENTICAL. If one uses other security mechanisms, then this is still
>     relevant to capture.
>
>
> Which security mechanisms are you thinking of here?

I didn't have any specific security mechanism in mind. I simply want to 
make clear the requirements that arises due to the new mechanisms that 
BUNDLE creates. As you commented I can only think of mechanism that 
protects the whole packet.

>
>
>            To avoid the security risks associated with tracking of
>            implementations, there is RECOMMENDED algorithm for generating
>            identification-tags in Section 14.1.
>
>         See above.
>
>
>     16.  Security Considerations
>
>        The security considerations defined in [RFC3264] and [RFC5888] apply
>        to the BUNDLE extension.  Bundle does not change which information
>        flows over the network but only changes which addresses and ports
>        that information is flowing on and thus has very little impact on the
>        security of the RTP sessions.
>
>
> Is this precisely true? Do you ever use the MID extension w/o BUNDLE?
> It certainly changes which ICE checks you do.
>

So lets start with the question of MID without using BUNDLE. As MID is 
used in grouping of media lines use cases, i.e. RFC 5888 there are 
certainly uses. However, there exist no need to signal MIDs on RTP 
session level in those cases as there already exist a one to one mapping 
between the MID and the transport addresses used for that RTP session. 
Only with BUNDLE do the RTP streams from the different m= lines start 
sharing transport context.

So strictly the above is incorrect. What was multiple security context 
due to different RTP sessions, or other sessions are now moved into a 
single context. I think we could reformulate this to say:

    The security considerations defined in [RFC3264] and [RFC5888] apply
    to the BUNDLE extension.  Bundle does not change which information,
    e.g.  RTP streams, that flows over the network.  Primarily it changes
    which addresses and ports, and thus in which (RTP) sessions that the
    information is flowing in.  This affects the security contexts being
    used and can cause previously separated information flows to share
    security context.  This has very little impact on the performance of
    the security mechanism of the RTP sessions, however which actors that
    are present in a particular security context may require additional
    thoughts when applying Bundle.

Is this better?


>
>
>        When the BUNDLE extension is used, a single set of security
>        credentials might be used for all media streams specified by a BUNDLE
>        group.  When using SRTP this is further required at least for the
>        IETF defined key-management solutions due to their SDP attributes
>        (a=crypto, a=fingerprint, a=mikey) classification in
>        [I-D.ietf-mmusic-sdp-mux-attributes].  But for other security
>        solutions, this may require further consideration.
>
>        The identfication-tag, independent of transport, RTCP SDES packet or
>        RTP header extension, can expose the value to parties beyond the
>        signaling chain.  Therefore, the identification-tag values MUST be
>        generated in a fashion that does not leak user information, e.g.,
>        randomly or using a per-bundle group counter, and SHOULD be 3 bytes
>        or less, to allow them to efficiently fit into the MID RTP header
>        extension.  However, the implementation's method for generating
>        identification-tags could enable fingerprinting of the implementation
>        making it vulnerable to targeted attacks.
>
>
> I would say "Note that if implementations use different methods for
> generating
> ... this could..."
>

Yes, I will use this.

>
>       The identication-tag is
>
>
> Still misspelled.

Yes, there was actually two misspelled instances left, and I had 
corrected one.

Full section text after corrections:

16.  Security Considerations

    The security considerations defined in [RFC3264] and [RFC5888] apply
    to the BUNDLE extension.  Bundle does not change which information,
    e.g.  RTP streams, that flows over the network.  Primarily it changes
    which addresses and ports, and thus in which (RTP) sessions that the
    information is flowing in.  This affects the security contexts being
    used and can cause previously separated information flows to share
    security context.  This has very little impact on the performance of
    the security mechanism of the RTP sessions, however which actors that
    are present in a particular security context may require additional
    thoughts when applying Bundle.

    When the BUNDLE extension is used, a single set of security
    credentials might be used for all media streams specified by a BUNDLE
    group.  When using SRTP this is further required at least for the
    IETF defined key-management solutions due to their SDP attributes
    (a=crypto, a=fingerprint, a=mikey) classification in
    [I-D.ietf-mmusic-sdp-mux-attributes].  But for other security
    solutions, this may require further consideration.

    The identification-tag, independent of transport, RTCP SDES packet or
    RTP header extension, can expose the value to parties beyond the
    signaling chain.  Therefore, the identification-tag values MUST be
    generated in a fashion that does not leak user information, e.g.,
    randomly or using a per-bundle group counter, and SHOULD be 3 bytes
    or less, to allow them to efficiently fit into the MID RTP header
    extension.  Note that if implementations use different methods for
    generating identification-tags this could enable fingerprinting of
    the implementation making it vulnerable to targeted attacks.  The
    identification-tag is exposed on the RTP stream level when included
    in the RTP header extensions, however what it reveals of the RTP
    media stream structure of the endpoint and application was already
    possible to deduce from the RTP streams without the MID SDES header
    extensions.  As the identification-tag is also used to route the
    media stream to the right application functionality it is also
    important that the value received is the one intended by the sender,
    thus integrity and the authenticity of the source are important to
    prevent denial of service on the application.  Existing SRTP
    configurations requires integrity protection of both RTCP and RTP
    header extensions.

    "RTP Header Extension for the RTP Control Protocol (RTCP) Source
    Description Items" [RFC7941] security consideration requires that
    when RTCP is confidentiality protected that any SDES RTP header
    extension carrying an SDES item, like the MID RTP header extension,
    is also protected using commensurate strength algorithms.  However,
    assuming the above requirements and recommendations are followed
    there are no known significant security risks with leaving the MID
    RTP header extension without confidentiality protection.  Thus, the
    requirements in RFC 7941 MAY be ignored for the MID RTP header
    extension.  Security mechanisms for RTP/RTCP are discussed in Options
    for Securing RTP Sessions [RFC7201], for example SRTP [RFC3711] can
    provide the necessary security functions of ensuring the integrity
    and source authenticity.


-- 

Magnus Westerlund

----------------------------------------------------------------------
Services, Media and Network features, Ericsson Research EAB/TXM
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Ericsson AB                 | Phone  [phone]
Färögatan 6                 | Mobile [phone]
SE-164 80 Stockholm, Sweden | mailto: [e-mail]
----------------------------------------------------------------------