Re: [rtcweb] Security implications of host candidates

Justin Uberti <juberti@google.com> Mon, 09 July 2018 22:19 UTC

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From: Justin Uberti <juberti@google.com>
Date: Mon, 09 Jul 2018 15:19:17 -0700
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To: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
Cc: Tim Panton <thp@westhawk.co.uk>, RTCWeb IETF <rtcweb@ietf.org>, youenn fablet <yfablet@apple.com>
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Subject: Re: [rtcweb] Security implications of host candidates
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On Mon, Jul 9, 2018 at 2:48 PM Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
wrote:

> On Tue, Jul 10, 2018 at 7:38 AM Justin Uberti <juberti@google.com> wrote:
> > e) [new] RTT < 5ms (indicates "probably same machine")
>
> My thought was that this only creates a valid "same-network" signal.
> But the number of instances of one host per network is high enough
> that the distinction might be meaningless.  But that's not the point,
> the point was to avoid creating a new signal.
>
> One thing that I found helpful in thinking about this was the
> question: "What would Tor Browser do?"  And in that case, the proposed
> tweak does work: a hairpin over the Tor network expands the anonymity
> set considerably.
>

Well, Tor browser would really need all WebRTC traffic to flow through Tor,
to prevent linking sessions via the srflx IPs.

But let me get to the point. Adding the limitations discussed for .local
has minimal downside, but what, if anything, should we do with IPv6 host
candidates? If we decide that we want to prevent host-host IPv6
connections, there will be implications for datachannel applications.