Re: [rtcweb] Security implications of host candidates
Justin Uberti <juberti@google.com> Tue, 03 July 2018 00:32 UTC
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From: Justin Uberti <juberti@google.com>
Date: Mon, 02 Jul 2018 17:32:35 -0700
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To: youenn fablet <youennf@gmail.com>
Cc: youenn fablet <yfablet@apple.com>, RTCWeb IETF <rtcweb@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [rtcweb] Security implications of host candidates
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On Mon, Jul 2, 2018 at 5:05 PM youenn fablet <youennf@gmail.com> wrote: > > > Le lun. 2 juil. 2018 à 16:04, Justin Uberti <juberti= > 40google.com@dmarc.ietf.org> a écrit : > >> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-mdns-ice-candidates-00 has a section >> where it talks about the privacy implications of being able to determine >> that two browser contexts are running on the same machine by making a >> host-host connection and analyzing the connection RTT: >> >> A successful WebRTC connection between two peers is also a potential >> thread to user privacy. When a WebRTC connection latency is close to >> zero, the probability is high that the two peers are running on the >> same device. Browsers often isolate contexts one from the other. >> Private browsing mode contexts usually do not share any information >> with regular browsing contexts. The WebKit engine isolates third- >> party iframes in various ways (cookies, ITP) to prevent user >> tracking. Enabling a web application to determine that two contexts >> run in the same device would defeat some of the protections provided >> by modern browsers. >> >> >> I would think that this concern would still exist even without host candidates, through either >> >> a) IP matching + user-agent fingerprinting >> >> > It is true that one can probably try breaking this protection using > fingerprinting, and public IP is a great way to converge more quickly. > That said, this is something we should try to fight against. > > b) srflx-srflx connections and NAT hairpinning >> >> > Aren't the packets supposed to go through the router? In such a case, I > would hope the latency to be roughly the same, no matter whether the > devices are the same or not. That is indeed something that should be tested. > Maybe I don't understand the attack well enough, but if a page running in a private browsing context tried to communicate with a page not running in a private browsing context, they would probably see < 1ms RTTs for both host-host and srflx-srflx candidates in many cases (including cases where the contexts are on different machines).
- Re: [rtcweb] Security implications of host candid… westhawk
- Re: [rtcweb] Security implications of host candid… Harald Alvestrand
- Re: [rtcweb] Security implications of host candid… Justin Uberti
- Re: [rtcweb] Security implications of host candid… Justin Uberti
- Re: [rtcweb] Security implications of host candid… Martin Thomson
- Re: [rtcweb] Security implications of host candid… Justin Uberti
- Re: [rtcweb] Security implications of host candid… Justin Uberti
- Re: [rtcweb] Security implications of host candid… youenn fablet
- Re: [rtcweb] Security implications of host candid… Justin Uberti
- Re: [rtcweb] Security implications of host candid… Martin Thomson
- Re: [rtcweb] Security implications of host candid… Justin Uberti
- Re: [rtcweb] Security implications of host candid… Martin Thomson
- Re: [rtcweb] Security implications of host candid… Feross Aboukhadijeh
- [rtcweb] Security implications of host candidates Justin Uberti
- Re: [rtcweb] Security implications of host candid… Justin Uberti
- Re: [rtcweb] Security implications of host candid… youenn fablet
- Re: [rtcweb] Security implications of host candid… youenn fablet
- Re: [rtcweb] Security implications of host candid… Justin Uberti
- Re: [rtcweb] Security implications of host candid… Justin Uberti
- Re: [rtcweb] Security implications of host candid… Justin Uberti
- Re: [rtcweb] Security implications of host candid… youenn fablet
- Re: [rtcweb] Security implications of host candid… Lennart Grahl
- Re: [rtcweb] Security implications of host candid… Justin Uberti
- Re: [rtcweb] Security implications of host candid… Harald Alvestrand
- Re: [rtcweb] Security implications of host candid… youenn fablet
- Re: [rtcweb] Security implications of host candid… Justin Uberti
- Re: [rtcweb] Security implications of host candid… Manuel Kasper
- Re: [rtcweb] Security implications of host candid… Nils Ohlmeier
- Re: [rtcweb] Security implications of host candid… Justin Uberti