RE: AD review of draft-ietf-bfd-intervals

Marc Binderberger <marc@sniff.de> Thu, 14 August 2014 03:14 UTC

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Date: Wed, 13 Aug 2014 20:14:39 -0700
From: Marc Binderberger <marc@sniff.de>
To: Nobo Akiya <nobo@cisco.com>, "adrian@olddog.co.uk" <adrian@olddog.co.uk>
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Subject: RE: AD review of draft-ietf-bfd-intervals
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Hello Adrian,

attached the (side-by-side) changes we plan to add to a new draft version, 
based on your comments. And I hope the replies we have provided are 
satisfactory for you - otherwise we need another round of discussion ;-)


Thanks & Regards,
Marc




On Tue, 12 Aug 2014 16:57:36 +0000, Nobo Akiya (nobo) wrote:
> Hi Marc, Adrian,
> 
>>> This is rally to check with you. Can influencing the interval value used
>>> by a BFD session be used as part of an attack? For example, can forcing
>>> the transmission time to be slower make it harder to detect naughtiness?
>>> And can forcing the interval to be faster help cause DoS? If so, does
>>> limiting the set of available values make attacks easier?
>> 
>> okay, the sentence in section 5 is short I admit :-) But this draft is not
>> introducing any new mechanism how to negotiate the interval; it only
>> shows
>> how the mechanism of RFC5880 can be used to build a negotiation-
>> sequence.
>> We do not force faster intervals, the adjustment is to slower intervals 
>> when
>> the negotiation fails.
>> There is a risk - although I don't see an attack vector - with the fact 
>> that
>> the final interval may be slower than the initial request, i.e.you don't 
>> get
>> the service requested. What the draft contributes is it helps to find a
>> common interval and sessions go up where otherwise they may stay down.
> 
> I've spent some time thinking about this, but my conclusion is still the 
> same: this document does not introduce any new security concerns. Attackers 
> knowing or not knowing the common intervals won't result in any additional 
> security concerns to devices implementing the common intervals. Perhaps we 
> can expand the Security Considerations section a bit to make it more 
> obvious on what we mean.
> 
>    This document does not introduce any additional security concerns.
>    The security considerations described in the BFD documents, [RFC5880]
>    and others, apply to devices implementing the BFD protocol,
>    regardless of whether or not the common interval set is implemented.
> 
>  Thanks!
> 
> -Nobo
>