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Re: New Version Notification for draft-mahesh-bfd-authentication-01.txt

Mahesh Jethanandani <mjethanandani@gmail.com> Fri, 02 October 2015 20:54 UTC

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Subject: Re: New Version Notification for draft-mahesh-bfd-authentication-01.txt
From: Mahesh Jethanandani <mjethanandani@gmail.com>
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Date: Fri, 02 Oct 2015 13:54:19 -0700
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To: Jeffrey Haas <jhaas@pfrc.org>
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> On Oct 2, 2015, at 10:39 AM, Jeffrey Haas <jhaas@pfrc.org> wrote:
> 
> Mahesh,
> 
> Thanks for the update to the document.  Here are a few comments on it.
> 
> On Tue, Sep 29, 2015 at 11:09:46PM -0700, Mahesh Jethanandani wrote:
>> This version of the draft addresses concerns that were raised in IETF 92.
>> The change is to carry a sequence number in every packet of BFD. Carrying
>> a sequence number for authentication reasons is not new, but with
>> selective authentication it helps detect MITM attack and has the benefit
>> of detecting lost BFD frames.
> 
> The NULL auth carries overlap with draft-ashesh-bfd-stability.  The contents
> and semantics are a bit different.  The two documents will have to be
> reconciled with each other.

That is correct. Let me work with the authors  of both the drafts to reconcile the format for NULL auth in a way that works for everyone. Santosh, this will not impact draft-ashesh-bfd-stability, as the NULL auth definition in this draft should reflect the format that exists in the stability draft.

> 
> FWIW, I think the idea of supporting the session with null-auth is a good
> one.
> 
> A place where I think the document needs to be more proscriptive is about
> *when* you use the more aggressive crypto.  As I was working through the
> possible modes, it almost seems as if anything that is intended to alter the
> BFD Control packet prior to the Authentication section is a good idea.

That is also correct. Would it help to state exactly the state transitions that will be covered by authentication?

There is a question of keys that are being used for authentication and how often they are rolled over. But that is out-of-band and was (supposed to be) covered by KARP WG, and therefore out of scope of this draft.

> 
> I suspect Poll sequences are the most impacted by such logic.

Those and diagnostic frames that bring the session down.

> 
> At some point if the generic crypto draft resurrects we'll also have to
> accommodate this proposal in it.
> 
> What's your intention for the document?  Time to ask for adoption?

Yes, we would like a call for WG adoption of the draft. I can post an updated draft.

Thanks.

> 
> -- Jeff

Mahesh Jethanandani
mjethanandani@gmail.com

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