Re: [RTG-DIR] RtgDir review: draft-ietf-karp-bfd-analysis-04.txt

manav bhatia <manav@ionosnetworks.com> Thu, 31 July 2014 12:22 UTC

Return-Path: <manav@ionosnetworks.com>
X-Original-To: rtg-dir@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: rtg-dir@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0FF911ADDB5 for <rtg-dir@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 31 Jul 2014 05:22:27 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.978
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.978 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, FM_FORGED_GMAIL=0.622, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-0.7, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id NtsFKTkY5Ae4 for <rtg-dir@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 31 Jul 2014 05:22:19 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail-lb0-f182.google.com (mail-lb0-f182.google.com [209.85.217.182]) (using TLSv1 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-RC4-SHA (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B88751ABB90 for <rtg-dir@ietf.org>; Thu, 31 Jul 2014 05:22:18 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by mail-lb0-f182.google.com with SMTP id z11so1984593lbi.13 for <rtg-dir@ietf.org>; Thu, 31 Jul 2014 05:22:17 -0700 (PDT)
X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20130820; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date :message-id:subject:from:to:cc:content-type; bh=D8nrMxsaIgPLjVbOcAi7MeVHO4k0OWeeabk9jG1aObs=; b=WjmJX4qr45N45W7ADQ9zw5QkzmM+VeennL9P/V9I2c2RopLo83yTKPa5qlrXoU2V66 BIQvVDgh+ClkepfmQfAZdeMmXV1/P4YokbQxzGNdV5I1HDDD+nodXIbd5er6BlZZBG1Q sv0hRhi+VTXCnWbrwzvc3z2NYFgQJtzf06fVRoSMzee6orvU3LtH/lyVWAQtS6Kswq3L Y5tF5kkV0xXUipJbEdqlHXpaCX6OJMCX4o5WRokQzQqB0lGN11LeX43j42/S8Qrg2K9r WOrMVbWXWx83U9IaqZWKLUwxHndEA6Xp3rGQNkCrO0HNj6KrvUghg6F7NIJZvWp8Xm8j qR4w==
X-Gm-Message-State: ALoCoQmdXj3B27vUNvEoIpBcYx0mkYwhzUETwaEihvaVazBB2sFqG4FzaxzGDAZj04ei3YRgqz82
MIME-Version: 1.0
X-Received: by 10.152.27.66 with SMTP id r2mr11805842lag.34.1406809336574; Thu, 31 Jul 2014 05:22:16 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by 10.112.8.4 with HTTP; Thu, 31 Jul 2014 05:22:16 -0700 (PDT)
In-Reply-To: <F3ADE4747C9E124B89F0ED2180CC814F23E88A19@xmb-aln-x02.cisco.com>
References: <F3ADE4747C9E124B89F0ED2180CC814F23E88A19@xmb-aln-x02.cisco.com>
Date: Thu, 31 Jul 2014 17:52:16 +0530
Message-ID: <CAGS6MpBU=3+JwsNCFK=-3JYSknKSHhktpqUhtGrgpuQoQHRP8Q@mail.gmail.com>
From: manav bhatia <manav@ionosnetworks.com>
To: "Les Ginsberg (ginsberg)" <ginsberg@cisco.com>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="089e0158c070c6090f04ff7c5261"
Archived-At: http://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rtg-dir/IbRZ6tqbu7b-HppC8hLwX4GvATs
Cc: "rtg-dir@ietf.org" <rtg-dir@ietf.org>, "draft-ietf-karp-bfd-analysis@tools.ietf.org" <draft-ietf-karp-bfd-analysis@tools.ietf.org>, "zhangdacheng@huawei.com" <zhangdacheng@huawei.com>, "all@tools.ietf.org" <all@tools.ietf.org>, "rtg-ads@tools.ietf.org" <rtg-ads@tools.ietf.org>, "mjethanandani@gmail.com" <mjethanandani@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [RTG-DIR] RtgDir review: draft-ietf-karp-bfd-analysis-04.txt
X-BeenThere: rtg-dir@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15
Precedence: list
List-Id: Routing Area Directorate <rtg-dir.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/rtg-dir>, <mailto:rtg-dir-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/rtg-dir/>
List-Post: <mailto:rtg-dir@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:rtg-dir-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rtg-dir>, <mailto:rtg-dir-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 31 Jul 2014 12:22:27 -0000

Hi Les,

Thanks for the comments.

>
>
> Minor Issues: I am a little surprised that the use of UTC is emphasized as
> a means of preventing replay attacks. While this is certainly a viable
> solution what has been more commonly used by a number of other protocols is
> reserving a portion of the sequence number for a boot count. In fact this
> is the way that
> http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-bfd-generic-crypto-auth-06.txt  has
> chosen. Yet this document chooses to emphasize UTC encoding.
>
>
>
I am the author of the standards that started using the boot count
initially as a way to preserve the crypto sequence count. I am not a big
fan of UTC and this was suggested as a plausible mechanism that did not
appear to be outright loony (especially when you have increased the seq
space to 64 bits). Let me put it this way - I wouldnt be baying for blood
if the directorate believes that this is a retrogressive step and we need
to snip out that section.

 Nits:
>
>
>
> 1)The affiliation for one of the authors (Manav) is inconsistent in the
> header vs the authors addresses section.
>

Will fix this. For the record, i now work for Ionos Networks.


>
>
> 2)In the Introduction the last sentence of the second paragraph reads:
>
>
>
> "Moving the routing protocols to a stronger
>
>    algorithm while using weaker algorithm for BFD would require the
>
>    attacker to bring down BFD in order to bring down the routing
>
>    protocol. "
>
>  I think what is meant is that if the BFD authentication algorithm is
> weaker than that used by the routing protocols it is more likely to be the
> target of an attack. The phrase "require the attacker..." seems
> inappropriate.
>

Gotcha. Will fix this.


>
>
> 3)Section 3 last sentence of the penultimate paragraph:
>
>
>
> s/reply/replay
>

.. and this.


>
>
> 4)Section 6 Second paragraph second sentence
>
>
>
> s/notion/the notion
>

.. and this as well.

Thanks,

Manav

>
>
> Thanx.
>
>
>
>    Les
>
>
>