[RTG-DIR] Rtgdir last call review of draft-ietf-sidrops-lta-use-cases-05

Stewart Bryant via Datatracker <noreply@ietf.org> Thu, 18 April 2019 21:48 UTC

Return-Path: <noreply@ietf.org>
X-Original-To: rtg-dir@ietf.org
Delivered-To: rtg-dir@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from ietfa.amsl.com (localhost [IPv6:::1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5F35F12040A; Thu, 18 Apr 2019 14:48:17 -0700 (PDT)
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
From: Stewart Bryant via Datatracker <noreply@ietf.org>
To: <rtg-dir@ietf.org>
Cc: sidrops@ietf.org, ietf@ietf.org, draft-ietf-sidrops-lta-use-cases.all@ietf.org
X-Test-IDTracker: no
X-IETF-IDTracker: 6.95.0
Auto-Submitted: auto-generated
Precedence: bulk
Reply-To: Stewart Bryant <stewart.bryant@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <155562409732.25526.1571500373372550686@ietfa.amsl.com>
Date: Thu, 18 Apr 2019 14:48:17 -0700
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rtg-dir/X8j8QCvM863bOWD3qmryD9q7ZyA>
Subject: [RTG-DIR] Rtgdir last call review of draft-ietf-sidrops-lta-use-cases-05
X-BeenThere: rtg-dir@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
List-Id: Routing Area Directorate <rtg-dir.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/rtg-dir>, <mailto:rtg-dir-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/rtg-dir/>
List-Post: <mailto:rtg-dir@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:rtg-dir-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rtg-dir>, <mailto:rtg-dir-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 18 Apr 2019 21:48:18 -0000

Reviewer: Stewart Bryant
Review result: Has Nits

This is a well written document.

There are a couple of nits that need addressing but otherwise it is ready to publish.

============

6.  Security Considerations

   Though the above use cases are all constrained to local contexts,
   they violate the model of a single global PKI, albeit to meet real
   operational needs.  Hence they MUST be implemented to assure the
   local constraint.

SB> I can see why RFC2119 language is used, and it seems correct to use it,
however Nits is complaining that there is no RFC2119 boilerplate.

=========

   [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview]
              Lepinski, M. and S. Turner, "An Overview of BGPSEC",
              draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview-02 (work in progress), May
              2012.

SB> Nits asks if you mean this version or -08?