[saag] IBAKE draft: draft-cakulev-ibake-00
"Cakulev, Violeta (Violeta)" <violeta.cakulev@alcatel-lucent.com> Tue, 08 December 2009 18:51 UTC
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From: "Cakulev, Violeta (Violeta)" <violeta.cakulev@alcatel-lucent.com>
To: "saag@ietf.org" <saag@ietf.org>
Date: Tue, 08 Dec 2009 12:50:48 -0600
Thread-Topic: IBAKE draft: draft-cakulev-ibake-00
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Subject: [saag] IBAKE draft: draft-cakulev-ibake-00
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Following our IBAKE presentation at the IETF75 SAAG meeting (http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/75/slides/saag-1/saag-1_files/frame.htm), we have written a draft specifying IBAKE. Below is the link to the draft. http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-cakulev-ibake-00.txt Comments and questions are welcome. Thanks, -Violeta -----Original Message----- From: IETF I-D Submission Tool [mailto:idsubmission@ietf.org] Sent: Monday, October 19, 2009 4:04 PM To: Cakulev, Violeta (Violeta) Cc: Sundaram, Ganapathy S (Ganesh) Subject: New Version Notification for draft-cakulev-ibake-00 A new version of I-D, draft-cakulev-ibake-00.txt has been successfuly submitted by Violeta Cakulev and posted to the IETF repository. Filename: draft-cakulev-ibake Revision: 00 Title: IBAKE: Identity-Based Authenticated Key Agreement Creation_date: 2009-10-19 WG ID: Independent Submission Number_of_pages: 16 Abstract: Cryptographic protocols based on public key methods are based on certificates and large scale public key infrastructure (PKI) to support certificate management. The emerging field of Identity Based Encryption protocols allows to simplify the infrastructure requirements via a Key Generation Function (KGF) while providing the same flexibility. However one significant limitation of Identity Based Encryption methods is that the KGF can end up being a de-facto key escrow server with undesirable consequences. Another observed deficiency is a lack of mutual authentication of communicating parties. Here, Identity Based Authenticated Key Exchange (IBAKE) Protocol is specified which does not suffer from the key escrow problem and in addition provides mutual authentication and a perfect forward and backwards secrecy. The IETF Secretariat.
- [saag] IBAKE draft: draft-cakulev-ibake-00 Cakulev, Violeta (Violeta)