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Re: [saag] keys under doormats: is our doormat ok?

"Henry B (Hank) Hotz, CISSP" <hbhotz@oxy.edu> Mon, 20 July 2015 02:55 UTC

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From: "Henry B (Hank) Hotz, CISSP" <hbhotz@oxy.edu>
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Date: Sun, 19 Jul 2015 19:55:14 -0700
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To: Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@hallambaker.com>, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>, "saag@ietf.org" <saag@ietf.org>
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Cc: Dave Crocker <dcrocker@bbiw.net>
Subject: Re: [saag] keys under doormats: is our doormat ok?
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My $.02 is that this all sounds like a rerun of the clipper chip debates. The only problem is that the proposal is (so far) so abstract that it can’t end as quickly.

For those who don’t remember, it was a chip to encrypt digital cell phone conversations so only the two parties and the NSA could decrypt them. It all came to an abrupt halt when a Japanese mathematician cracked and published how to access the back door. Thankfully, that was before any mandate had been imposed.

I can’t believe that even the NSA can design a system where that won’t eventually happen for anything we put out there. I can’t believe that even the NSA can design a good enough doormat.

Why are we debating this all over again?

Sorry, I realize I should send this email to my congress-critters, and not here.

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