[saag] Re: The state of QUIC (Re: Re: [radext] Cyber Official Speaks Out, Reveals Mobile Network Attacks in U.S.)
Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> Sat, 18 May 2024 12:28 UTC
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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 18 May 2024 08:28:28 -0400
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To: John Mattsson <john.mattsson@ericsson.com>
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Subject: [saag] Re: The state of QUIC (Re: Re: [radext] Cyber Official Speaks Out, Reveals Mobile Network Attacks in U.S.)
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On Fri, May 17, 2024 at 1:41 PM John Mattsson <john.mattsson@ericsson.com> wrote: > > Watson Ladd: > > >Their implementation efforts will take years to bear fruit > > > > I remember the controversy you talk about, but reading the OpenSSL blog it seems like OpenSSL 3.4 which will release no later than 31 October 2024 will more or less complete the implementation of QUIC in OpenSSL. Do you think that implementation will have significant problems? I think a new, relatively untested implementation of a very complex protocol (and an incomplete one at that: no H/3) will have issues. I'm not sure I've been impressed OpenSSL's quality code and thoughtful API design, but that's besides the main point: Even if the implementation had no issues, QUIC (on Unix systems) changes the relation between the kernel visible objects (sockets), and requests and connections. While you could write an HTTP/1.1 server that has one process do accept, then fork a worker that drives TLS and blocks to handle requests, QUIC makes that (very limited) implementation strategy no longer viable. Instead the server has to concurrently accept new requests, manage internal connection state, and answer requests that exist while getting packets on one UDP socket. Writing concurrent programs in C is hard. Adapting existing ones to be concurrent is even harder. Sincerely, Watson Ladd
- [saag] Cyber Official Speaks Out, Reveals Mobile … Alan DeKok
- [saag] Re: [radext] Re: Cyber Official Speaks Out… Alexander Clouter
- [saag] Re: [radext] Cyber Official Speaks Out, Re… Alan DeKok
- [saag] Re: [radext] Cyber Official Speaks Out, Re… Bernard Aboba
- [saag] The state of QUIC (Re: Re: [radext] Cyber … Watson Ladd
- [saag] Re: [radext] Re: Cyber Official Speaks Out… John Mattsson
- [saag] Re: Cyber Official Speaks Out, Reveals Mob… John Mattsson
- [saag] Re: The state of QUIC (Re: Re: [radext] Cy… Gergely Buday
- [saag] Re: The state of QUIC (Re: Re: [radext] Cy… John Mattsson
- [saag] Re: The state of QUIC (Re: Re: [radext] Cy… Watson Ladd
- [saag] Re: The state of QUIC (Re: Re: [radext] Cy… Salz, Rich
- [saag] Re: The state of QUIC (Re: Re: [radext] Cy… John Mattsson