Re: [saag] Fw:Fw:New Version Notification for draft-cui-dhc-dhcpv6-encryption-02.txt

Randy Bush <randy@psg.com> Wed, 29 July 2015 11:40 UTC

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Date: Wed, 29 Jul 2015 20:40:28 +0900
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From: Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>
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Subject: Re: [saag] Fw:Fw:New Version Notification for draft-cui-dhc-dhcpv6-encryption-02.txt
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TOFU is a bit oxymoronic, or certainly abuses 'trust'.  it is more like
You Undergo Big Attack.  it just gives you some assurance the attacker
is reproducible.  

but this is a tangent.  the point is that protocols which rely on
keying really need to nail the key distribution model(s).  

while tofu may be one, is it really one that security folk think the
ietf should advocate for set-up authenticity?  it's not how i want to
make the wsj; and coffee shop mitm will be in the wsj soon enough.

randy