Re: [saag] Roughtime (Was: software update for teeny-weeny devices)

Tony Finch <dot@dotat.at> Tue, 18 October 2016 09:40 UTC

Return-Path: <dot@dotat.at>
X-Original-To: saag@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: saag@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 184171295CC for <saag@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 18 Oct 2016 02:40:41 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -4.221
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.221 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-2.3, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H3=-0.01, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_WL=-0.01, SPF_HELO_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id LdjWzo1M39yz for <saag@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 18 Oct 2016 02:40:39 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from ppsw-41.csi.cam.ac.uk (ppsw-41.csi.cam.ac.uk [131.111.8.141]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 6FAF9129565 for <saag@ietf.org>; Tue, 18 Oct 2016 02:40:39 -0700 (PDT)
X-Cam-AntiVirus: no malware found
X-Cam-ScannerInfo: http://www.cam.ac.uk/cs/email/scanner/
Received: from grey.csi.cam.ac.uk ([131.111.57.57]:37656) by ppsw-41.csi.cam.ac.uk (ppsw.cam.ac.uk [131.111.8.139]:25) with esmtps (TLSv1:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:256) id 1bwQsv-00016w-RP (Exim 4.86_36-e07b163) (return-path <dot@dotat.at>); Tue, 18 Oct 2016 10:40:37 +0100
Date: Tue, 18 Oct 2016 10:40:37 +0100
From: Tony Finch <dot@dotat.at>
To: Jeffrey Walton <noloader@gmail.com>
In-Reply-To: <CAH8yC8k39251SehL9UDgiszK-NTCSW4xUQYXLo2+3t-zS71M1Q@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <alpine.DEB.2.11.1610181030490.31786@grey.csi.cam.ac.uk>
References: <CAH8yC8k39251SehL9UDgiszK-NTCSW4xUQYXLo2+3t-zS71M1Q@mail.gmail.com>
User-Agent: Alpine 2.11 (DEB 23 2013-08-11)
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset="US-ASCII"
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/saag/JDugNmf552_O4mH6Dd4XtlKlMRw>
Cc: "saag@ietf.org" <saag@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [saag] Roughtime (Was: software update for teeny-weeny devices)
X-BeenThere: saag@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.17
Precedence: list
List-Id: Security Area Advisory Group <saag.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/saag>, <mailto:saag-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/saag/>
List-Post: <mailto:saag@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:saag-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/saag>, <mailto:saag-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 18 Oct 2016 09:40:41 -0000

Jeffrey Walton <noloader@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> If I am on a train with 100 other people or a stadium with 500 people
> around me, then it seems like a gossip protocol would be able to
> provide the correct time also.
>
> The crowd always seems to converge on the right answer regardless of
> how wrong one sampling is. I've been looking for a paper that explains
> it for a couple of years now.

I did some brief and sketchy experiments along these lines a few years
ago, but instead of a gossip protocol I was looking for consensus of
opinion across many authenticated (but not individually trusted) time
sources. Basically, a wrapper around tlsdate that samples several servers
and looks for the mode.

http://fanf.livejournal.com/128861.html
http://fanf.livejournal.com/129371.html

I am interested if anyone has properly analysed how much security we can
expect to get from this kind of consensus.

Tony.
-- 
f.anthony.n.finch  <dot@dotat.at>  http://dotat.at/  -  I xn--zr8h punycode
North Fitzroy, Sole: Northwesterly 4 or 5, occasionally 6 in Sole, becoming
variable 3 or 4. Moderate or rough. Fair. Good.