Re: [saag] Section 2.9: was Re: AD review of draft-iab-crypto-alg-agility-06

Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com> Tue, 01 September 2015 21:24 UTC

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Date: Tue, 01 Sep 2015 17:24:08 -0400
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From: Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com>
To: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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Subject: Re: [saag] Section 2.9: was Re: AD review of draft-iab-crypto-alg-agility-06
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On Tue, Sep 1, 2015 at 4:58 PM, Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> wrote:
> I'm trying to pull together the things that I have heard on this thread over the last week regarding Section 2.9.  I think I have captured them.  Please let me know if I missed something?
>
> 2.9.  Opportunistic Security
>
>    Despite the guidance in Section 2.4, opportunistic security [RFC7435]
>    also deserves consideration, especially at the time a protocol
>    implementation is deployed and configured.  Using algorithms that are
>    weak against advanced attackers but sufficient against others is one
>    way to make pervasive surveillance significantly more difficult.  As
>    a result, algorithms that would not be acceptable in many negotiated
>    situations are acceptable for opportunistic security when legacy
>    systems are in use for unauthenticated encrypted sessions as
>    discussed in Section 3 of [RFC7435] as long as their use does not
>    facilitate downgrade attacks.  Similarly, weaker algorithms and
>    shorter key sizes are also acceptable for opportunistic security with
>    the same constraints.  That said, the use of strong algorithms is
>    always preferable.

Your additional edits look good to me, thank you!
Kathleen

>
> Russ
>
>
>
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-- 

Best regards,
Kathleen