[saag] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-ietf-dhc-sedhcpv6-12.txt

Lishan Li <lilishan48@gmail.com> Tue, 26 April 2016 14:03 UTC

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Date: Tue, 26 Apr 2016 22:03:44 +0800
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From: Lishan Li <lilishan48@gmail.com>
To: saag@ietf.org
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Subject: [saag] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-ietf-dhc-sedhcpv6-12.txt
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Dear all,

We have submitted a new version of secure DHCPv6, which describes
authentication and encryption mechanisms for DHCPv6.
Compared with the before version, we mainly made the following change:
1. we merge DHCPv6 authentication draft and DHCPv6 encryption draft
together.
2. For the deployment issues, we just scope secure DHCPv6 to where we can
actually use it, such as the desktops in enterprise network. In such
networks it will be easier to manage client hosts. One trivial deployment
scenario is therefore to manually pre-configure client with the trusted
servers' public key and manually register clients' public keys for the
server.

In IETF95, the DHC WG suggests us to obtain some comments from some secure
experts. Could you please review the draft and give some comments? I am
really looking forward to your guidance/suggestions! Thanks in advance!

Best Regards,
Lishan
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: <internet-drafts@ietf.org>
Date: 2016-04-24 22:32 GMT+08:00
Subject: New Version Notification for draft-ietf-dhc-sedhcpv6-12.txt
To: Ted Lemon <ted.lemon@nominum.com>, Tatuya Jinmei <jinmei@wide.ad.jp>,
Sheng Jiang <jiangsheng@huawei.com>, Dacheng Zhang <dacheng.zhang@gmail.com>,
Lishan Li <lilishan48@gmail.com>, Yong Cui <yong@csnet1.cs.tsinghua.edu.cn>,
Ted Lemon <Ted.Lemon@nominum.com>



A new version of I-D, draft-ietf-dhc-sedhcpv6-12.txt
has been successfully submitted by Lishan Li and posted to the
IETF repository.

Name:           draft-ietf-dhc-sedhcpv6
Revision:       12
Title:          Secure DHCPv6
Document date:  2016-04-24
Group:          dhc
Pages:          28
URL:
https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dhc-sedhcpv6-12.txt
Status:         https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dhc-sedhcpv6/
Htmlized:       https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dhc-sedhcpv6-12
Diff:           https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-dhc-sedhcpv6-12

Abstract:
   The Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6) enables
   DHCPv6 servers to pass configuration parameters.  It offers
   configuration flexibility.  If not secured, DHCPv6 is vulnerable to
   various attacks.  This document analyzes the security issues of
   DHCPv6 and specifies the secure DHCPv6 mechanism for authentication
   and encryption of messages between a DHCPv6 client and a DHCPv6
   server.




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