Re: [saag] keys under doormats: is our doormat ok?

[Stephen Farrell <[e-mail]>]

Hiya,

On 12/07/15 23:28, Dave Crocker wrote:
> 
> I will also suggest that we ought to have the IETF review of the draft
> RFC for this include a segment at an IETF plenary. 

Just as a point of information for those who're considering there
may be external-to-the-IETF benefits in some form of renewal of
the relevant content from RFC 1984...

One reason I figured RFC 1984 is still ok is that the IAB have quite
recently weighed in with an even stronger recommendation "that
encryption be deployed throughout the protocol stack." [1] And while
that's an IAB statement and hasn't been through the IETF consensus
process, and while that doesn't directly touch on mandated-key-escrow-
silliness, it does refer back to RFC 1984, as well as going further.

So I reckon that from a non-IETF perspective, [1] probably achieves
as much as we'd achieve with any easy method of "renewing" RFC 1984.
(I'm also not sure what "renewing" 1984 might mean exactly but I'm
sure we could figure some mechanics that'd work and if it turns out
I'm wrong above and folks do want some such thing, I'll of course
try help get that done.)

Now, if we wanted to consider putting some equivalent to [1] through
the IETF consensus process then that would have a substantive effect
on IETF work and wouldn't just be something done for appearance's sake.
But that's a different day's work. That'd be more fun maybe, but also
more controversial I'm sure, and would probably take a while to get
right since we'd arguably need more clarity on the effects of having
much more ciphertext in the network. Anyway, I was thinking we might
want to start work on something like that after the MARNEW workshop
in September. [2] (And speaking of which: tomorrow's the deadline for
initial submissions for that workshop).

Cheers,
S.

[1]
https://www.iab.org/documents/correspondence-reports-documents/2014-2/iab-statement-on-internet-confidentiality/
[2] https://www.iab.org/activities/workshops/marnew/