[saag] Re: Updating dkim standard to forbid rsa 1024 after deepmind paper on rsa ?
John Levine <johnl@ietf.email> Sun, 08 November 2026 16:13 UTC
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From: John Levine <johnl@ietf.email>
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Subject: [saag] Re: Updating dkim standard to forbid rsa 1024 after deepmind paper on rsa ?
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>>Im wondering if dkim standard should have a bis or a deprecation for >>rsa 1024 ? tl;dr No. The DKIM WG is developing a follow-on to DKIM, currently called DKIM2. It uses the same keys as DKIM and its predecessort Domain Keys. In DKIM2, the currently optional Ed25519 signature is made mandatory and we'll add a PQC scheme. Nobody is working on the existing DKIM spec which we expect to be obsolete in a few years. We are not the Network Police and telling DKIM users to stop using 1K keys will have zero efffect. (They don't use Ed25519 keys either, not even me and I wrote the RFC.) Mail operators who are paying attention are aware that 1K keys are too weak and have moved to 2K. Mail operators who are not paying attention will continue not to pay attention. Before someone says stop accepting 1K signatures, nope. They're signing real mail, and the definite loss of valid mail with weak keys far outweighs the hypothetical threat that someone might forge a few short lived DKIM keys. R's, John
- [saag] Re: Updating dkim standard to forbid rsa 1… S Moonesamy
- [saag] Re: Updating dkim standard to forbid rsa 1… Phillip Hallam-Baker
- [saag] Re: Updating dkim standard to forbid rsa 1… S Moonesamy
- [saag] Re: Updating dkim standard to forbid rsa 1… Peter Gutmann
- [saag] Re: Updating dkim standard to forbid rsa 1… Viktor Dukhovni
- [saag] Re: Updating dkim standard to forbid rsa 1… John Levine
- [saag] Re: Updating dkim standard to forbid rsa 1… Loganaden Velvindron
- [saag] Re: Updating dkim standard to forbid rsa 1… John R Levine