Re: [sacm] Component Communication Sequence (Was - Re: Components for Vulnerability Assessment)
Adam Montville <adam.w.montville@gmail.com> Wed, 03 May 2017 20:47 UTC
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From: Adam Montville <adam.w.montville@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 03 May 2017 20:45:52 +0000
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To: Jerome Athias <jerome.athias@protonmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [sacm] Component Communication Sequence (Was - Re: Components for Vulnerability Assessment)
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That seems like it could be a reasonable optimization, provide the VDI had enough information and structure. I'm not sure they always do and I would suspect that some organizations just take a look at what's been defined in, say, the OVAL repository (a VDD source) and work optimizations from there. Other thoughts? On Wed, May 3, 2017 at 2:06 AM Jerome Athias <jerome.athias@protonmail.com> wrote: > Hi, > > For now what is unclear for me is when/where it is determined that a > VDI/VDD is interesting for me (applies to my endpoints). > > For example: > I am retrieving everyday the latest CVE content from NVD. > Option 1: (apparently the current one) each new CVE/VDI is transformed and > inserted in the VDD repository, which will trigger the flow. So for each > and every CVE, I would enter the flow, and it will get/evaluate if I have > endpoints that need to be evaluated before the assessment. - not optimized > because they are more vulnerabilities released -not- affecting my endpoints > than applicable ones > > Option 2: (the one I'm using) each new CVE/VDI is evaluated by my Endpoint > Manager (assets inventory/portfolio/cmdb) and ONLY IF it is relevant, it > will be transformed and inserted in the VDD repository, which will trigger > the flow. - more optimized, I will just assess what is relevant > > Note that #2 could be assumed to be done up front, but imho would be nice > to mention it. > > > Would this make sense? > > Best regards > > -------- Original Message -------- > Subject: [sacm] Component Communication Sequence (Was - Re: Components for > Vulnerability Assessment) > Local Time: May 3, 2017 12:42 AM > UTC Time: May 2, 2017 9:42 PM > From: adam.w.montville@gmail.com > To: sacm@ietf.org <sacm@ietf.org> > > Has anyone had time to take a look at the communication sequence here? I > know we've not yet completely settled on goals, but I feel like we should > still be able to have this discussion as well. > > Thanks for your time. > > Adam > > On Fri, Apr 21, 2017 at 8:00 AM Adam Montville <adam.w.montville@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> Hello Everyone, >> >> After some discussion on this topic, I feel like we've got no real >> objection to this proposed list of components. As such, this brings us back >> to the second version of the sequence diagram that some of us were working >> with not too long ago (see attached PDF vector diagram). >> >> Given that set of components, we can now start talking about the expected >> communications between them in an ideal case through the system. Remember >> that the VDI (vulnerability information) is assumed to have been >> transformed and placed into the VDD (vulnerability detection) Repository. >> I've numbered the flows in the attached sequence diagram to show the >> proposed order and so that we can talk about each flow by that number. >> >> Does this flow feel right to everyone on the list? What needs to be >> different? What alternate flows may exist for the basic case of checking >> inventory against a new vulnerability? >> >> Let's carry this discussion on for a week or so. (Do we need longer?) >> >> Kind regards, >> >> Adam >> >> On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 8:03 AM Adam Montville < >> adam.w.montville@gmail.com> wrote: >> >>> Hi All: >>> >>> We've got a list of components we think we care about for our >>> vulnerability assessment scenario (focusing on the narrowest "ideal case" >>> through the scenario for the time being. >>> >>> These are: >>> >>> * Vulnerability Detection Data Repository >>> * Vulnerability Assessor >>> * Endpoint Repository >>> * Collector >>> * Target Endpoint >>> * Assessment Results Repository >>> >>> For reference, see our wiki [1] and/or the slides from IETF 98 [2] >>> and/or the minutes from IETF 98 [3] >>> >>> Question to the WG: Is this an appropriate initial list of components? >>> >>> Please opine within the next few days (say by end of your day on >>> Thursday, wherever you may be), so that we can generate some momentum on >>> this effort. >>> >>> Kind regards, >>> >>> Adam >>> >>> [1] >>> https://trac.ietf.org/trac/sacm/wiki/SacmVulnerabilityAssessmentScenario >>> >>> [2] >>> https://www.ietf.org/proceedings/98/slides/slides-98-sacm-vulnerability-scenario-discussion-00.pdf >>> >>> [3] https://www.ietf.org/proceedings/98/minutes/minutes-98-sacm-00.txt >>> >>> >>> >
- Re: [sacm] Components for Vulnerability Assessment Henk Birkholz
- [sacm] Components for Vulnerability Assessment Adam Montville
- Re: [sacm] Components for Vulnerability Assessment Haynes, Dan
- Re: [sacm] Components for Vulnerability Assessment Haynes, Dan
- Re: [sacm] Components for Vulnerability Assessment Adam Montville
- Re: [sacm] Components for Vulnerability Assessment Carl-Heinz Genzel
- Re: [sacm] Components for Vulnerability Assessment Muhammad Nasir Mumtaz Bhutta
- Re: [sacm] Components for Vulnerability Assessment Haynes, Dan
- Re: [sacm] Components for Vulnerability Assessment Haynes, Dan
- Re: [sacm] Components for Vulnerability Assessment Adam Montville
- Re: [sacm] Components for Vulnerability Assessment Adam Montville
- Re: [sacm] Components for Vulnerability Assessment Adam Montville
- [sacm] Component Communication Sequence (Was - Re… Adam Montville
- Re: [sacm] Component Communication Sequence (Was … Jerome Athias
- Re: [sacm] Component Communication Sequence (Was … Adam Montville
- Re: [sacm] Component Communication Sequence (Was … Haynes, Dan
- Re: [sacm] Component Communication Sequence (Was … Adam Montville
- Re: [sacm] Component Communication Sequence (Was … Haynes, Dan
- Re: [sacm] Component Communication Sequence (Was … Haynes, Dan
- Re: [sacm] Component Communication Sequence (Was … Jerome Athias
- Re: [sacm] Component Communication Sequence (Was … Adam Montville