[Sandbox-mailoutput] [Django development] Internal WG Review: Oblivious HTTP (ohttp)

IETF Secretariat <ietf-secretariat-reply@ietf.org> Wed, 18 August 2021 21:00 UTC

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Subject: [Sandbox-mailoutput] [Django development] Internal WG Review: Oblivious HTTP (ohttp)
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--- Begin Message ---

A new charter for the Oblivious HTTP (ohttp) WG in the Security Area of the
IETF is being considered.  The draft charter for this WG is provided below
for your review and comment.

Review time is one week.

The IETF Secretariat

Oblivious HTTP (ohttp)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Current status: BOF WG

Chairs:
  Alexey Melnikov <alexey.melnikov@isode.com>
  Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>

Assigned Area Director:
  Francesca Palombini <francesca.palombini@ericsson.com>

Security Area Directors:
  Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
  Roman Danyliw <rdd@cert.org>

Mailing list:
  Address: ohttp@ietf.org
  To subscribe: https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ohttp
  Archive: https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/ohttp/

Charter: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/charter-ietf-ohttp/

In a number of different settings, interactions between clients and servers
involve information that could be sensitive when associated with client
identity.

Client-server protocols like HTTP reveal aspects of client identity to
servers through these interactions, especially source addresses.  Even
without client identity, a server might be able to build a profile of client
activity by correlating requests from the same client over time.

In a setting where the information included in requests does not need to be
correlated, the Oblivious HTTP protocol allows a server to accept requests
via a proxy.  The proxy ensures that the server cannot see source addressing
information for clients, which prevents servers linking requests to the same
client.  Encryption ensures that the proxy is unable to read requests or
responses.

The OHTTP working group will define the Oblivious HTTP protocol, a method of
encapsulating HTTP requests and responses that provides protected,
low-latency exchanges.  The working group will define any encryption scheme
necessary and supporting data formats for carrying encapsulated requests and
responses, plus any key configuration that might be needed to use the
protocol.

The OHTTP working group will include an applicability statement that
documents the limitations of this design and any usage constraints that are
necessary to ensure that the protocol is secure.  The working group will
consider the operational impact as part of the protocol design and document
operational considerations.

The working group will prioritize work on the core protocol elements as
identified.  In addition, the working group may work on other use cases and
deployment models, including those that involve discovery of OHTTP proxies or
servers.

The OHTTP working group will work closely with other groups that develop the
tools that Oblivious HTTP depends on (HTTPbis for HTTP, CFRG for HPKE) or
that might use Oblivious HTTP (DPRIVE for DNS over HTTPS).

The working group will use draft-thomson-http-oblivious as input.

Milestones:

  Jul 2022 - Submit the Oblivious HTTP Protocol draft to the IESG for
  publication


--- End Message ---