sasl-rfc2222bis review notes [long]

["Kurt D. Zeilenga" <[e-mail]>]

Here are my review notes....

>Network Working Group                                        A. Melnikov
>Internet Draft                                                    Editor
>Document: draft-ietf-sasl-rfc2222bis-06.txt                February 2004
>Obsoletes: RFC 2222                                Expires in six months
>
>
>            Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL)
>
>Status of this Memo
>
>   This document is an Internet Draft and is in full conformance with
>   all provisions of Section 10 of RFC 2026.
>
>   Internet Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
>   Task Force (IETF), its Areas, and its Working Groups.  Note that
>   other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet
>   Drafts. Internet Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of
>   six months.  Internet Drafts may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted
>   by other documents at any time.  It is not appropriate to use
>   Internet Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as
>   ``work in progress''.
>
>   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
>   http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt
>
>   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
>   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
>
>   A revised version of this draft document will be submitted to the RFC
>   editor as a Standards Track RFC for the Internet Community.
>   Discussion and suggestions for improvement are requested.
>   Distribution of this draft is unlimited.
>
>   When published as an RFC this document will obsolete RFC 2222.


This statement needs to be moved into the body of the document.
That is, the body of the document needs to explicitly state:

    This document replaces RFC 2222.

(see below)

>
>
>1.    Abstract

The abstract need not be numbered.

>   The Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) provides a method
>   for adding authentication support with an optional security layer to
>   connection-based protocols.

As used here, the word "optional" implies that protocols MAY
include security layer support.

Suggest this be reworded

	The Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) is a
	framework for providing authentication and data security
	services in connection-based protocols.

>                                It also describes a structure for
>   authentication mechanisms.  The result is an abstraction layer
>   between protocols and authentication mechanisms such that any SASL-
>   compatible authentication mechanism can be used with any SASL-
>   compatible protocol.
>
>   This document describes how a SASL authentication mechanism is
>   structured, describes how a protocol adds support for SASL, defines
>   the protocol for carrying a security layer over a connection, and
>   defines the EXTERNAL SASL authentication mechanism.

It might be better to transpose EXTERNAL and SASL here.

>2.    Organization of this document
>
>2.1.  How to read this document
>
>   This document is written to serve several different audiences,
>   protocol designers using this specification to support authentication
>   in their protocol, mechanism designers that define new SASL
>   mechanisms, and implementors of clients or servers for those
>   protocols using this specification.

I suggest using a bullet list for the above.

>   The sections "Overview", "Authentication Mechanisms", "Protocol
>   Profile Requirements", "Specific Issues", and "Security
>   Considerations" cover issues that protocol designers need to
>   understand and address in profiling this specification for use in a
>   specific protocol.
>
>   The sections "Overview", "Authentication Mechanisms", "Mechanism
>   Profile Requirements" and "Security Considerations" cover issues that
>   mechanism designers need to understand and address in designing new
>   SASL mechanisms.
>
>   Implementors of a protocol using this specification need the
>   protocol-specific profiling information in addition to the
>   information in this document.

This implies implementors need to understand all of this document.
They should not need to read the protocol and mechanism profiling
requirements.

>2.2.  Conventions used in this document
>
>   In examples, "C:" and "S:" indicate lines sent by the client and
>   server respectively.
>
>   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", and "MAY"
>   in this document are to be interpreted as defined in "Key words for
>   use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels" [KEYWORDS].
>
>   Character names in this document use the notation for code points and
>   names from the Unicode Standard [Unicode].  For example, the letter
>   "a" may be represented as either <U+0061> or <LATIN SMALL LETTER A>.
>
>   This document uses terms "integrity protection" and "confidentiality
>   protection".  The former references to a security layer that is able
>   to detect data modification by using some kind of hash.  However,

I suggest the "by using some kind of hash" qualification be dropped.   
The term "integrity protection" applies to any layer which is capable
of detecting data modification (regardless of whether it using some
kind of hash or not).  I suggest:

    The term "integrity protection" refers to a security layer         
    designed to detect unauthorized data modification.               

>   integrity protection doesn't make the data unreadable to an attacker.

Suggest instead:
    However, integrity protection does not (by itself) prevent         
    unauthorized disclose of the data.

>   Confidentiality protection is a security layer that is able to make
>   the data unreadable to an attacker by using encryption.

Suggest:
    Confidentiality protection is a security layer which is designed
    to prevent unauthorized disclose of the data (generally through
    use of encryption).


>   Confidentiality protection usually implies integrity protection.

Suggest:              
    Confidentiality protection usually (but not necessarily) implies
    integrity protections.

Alteratively,  replace this and the above "However, .." with
	Both integrity protection and confidentiality are needed to
	achieve data security.

Note that this is a paraphrased of [RFC 2828] "data security"].
Which brings up the question, why don't we just use "data integrity
service" and 'data confidentiality service" as defined in RFC 2828?
I think it best to avoid defining SASL-specific security terminology.

Also, some note to the effect:   
    Security layers may offer other kinds of security services.

>
>3.    Overview

I suggest this section be moved to immediately follow the Abstract
and be retitled "Introduction".  I then suggest the section 2
subsections be incorporated into this section.

>   The Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) is a method for
>   adding authentication support to connection-based protocols.
>
>   The SASL specification has three layers, as indicated in the diagram
>   below.

I'm not sure I like how SASL is described in terms of protocol
profiles (which is a technical specification or document) and a
mechanism definition (which is a technical specification or document).
Also, it seems odd to say "specifies a profile" as a profile is a
specification.  And the phrase "mechanism definition specifies an
authentication mechanism" seems a bit circular.

>           At the top, a protocol definition using SASL specifies a
>   profile, including a command for identifying and authenticating a
>   user to a server and for optionally negotiating a security layer for
>   subsequent protocol interactions.  At the bottom, a SASL mechanism
>   definition specifies an authentication mechanism.  The SASL
>   framework, specified by this document, constrains the behavior of
>   protocol profiles and mechanisms, separating protocol from mechanism
>   and defining how they interact.
>
>                SMTP Protocol     LDAP Protocol          Etc
>                   Profile           Profile            . . .
>                          \-----        |       -----/
>                                \       |      /
>                                 SASL framework
>                                /       |      \
>                          /-----        |       -----\
>                   EXTERNAL         DIGEST-MD5           Etc
>                SASL mechanism    SASL mechanism        . . .
>
>   This separation between the definition of protocols and the
>   definition of authentication mechanisms is crucial.  It permits an

I think it is the separation between (application-level) protocols
and mechanisms, not their definitions, that is crucial. 

>   authentication mechanism to be defined once, making it usable by any
>   SASL protocol profile.  In many implementations, the same SASL
>   mechanism code is used for multiple protocols.

Add another (see above) subsection which

X.Y. Relationship to other documents

    This document obsoletes RFC 2222.  It replaces all portions of
    RFC 2222 excepting sections 7.1 (Kerberos version 4 mechanism),
    7.2 (GSSAPI mechanism), 7.3 (S/Key mechanism).  The Kerberos
    version 4 (KERBEROS_IV) and S/Key (SKEY) mechanisms are now        
    viewed as obsolete.  The GSSAPI mechanism is now separately 
    specified [SASL-GSSAPI].

    Appendix B. details changes since RFC 2222.

>4.    Authentication mechanisms
>
>   SASL mechanisms are named by strings, from 1 to 20 characters in
>   length, consisting of ASCII [ASCII] upper-case letters, digits,
>   hyphens, and/or underscores.  SASL mechanism names must be registered
>   with the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA). IETF standards
>   track documents may direct the IANA to reserve a portion of the SASL
>   mechanism namespace and may specify different registration criteria
>   for the reserved portion; the GSSAPI mechanism specification
>   [SASL-GSSAPI] does this.

The above sentence should be moved in IANA considerations section.

>   Procedures for registering new SASL mechanisms are given in section 8.
>
>   The "sasl-mech" production below defines the syntax of a SASL
>   mechanism name.  This uses the Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF)
>   notation as specified in [ABNF] and the ABNF core rules as specified
>   in Appendix A of the ABNF specification [ABNF].
>
>   sasl-mech    = 1*20mech-char
>   mech-char    = %x41-5A / DIGIT / "-" / "_"
>                  ; mech names restricted to ASCII uppercase letters,
>                  ; digits, "-" and "_"
>

I suggest this comment be replaced with:
        ; mech-char is restricted to "A"-"Z", "0"-"9", "-", and "_"
        : from ASCII character set.

In the ABNF, I suggest (for consistency) replacing DIGIT, "-", and  
"_" with %x30-39, %x2D, and %x5F, respectively.  This also avoids
unnecessary reliance on a core rule (which would require the      
implementor to look up meaning of DIGIT).                           

>
>4.1.  Authentication protocol exchange
>
>   A SASL mechanism is responsible for conducting an authentication
>   protocol exchange.  This consists of a series of server challenges
>   and client responses, the contents of which are specific to and
>   defined by the mechanism.  To the protocol, the challenges and
>   responses are opaque binary tokens of arbitrary length.  The
>   protocol's profile then specifies how these binary tokens are then
>   encoded for transfer over the connection.

I suggest replacing binary tokens with octet string because:    
 1) the challedge and responses must be aligned on 8-bit boundries and 
 2) what (in IP) isn't binary?
 3) the challedge and responses seem not to be "tokens".

>   After receiving an authentication command or any client response, a
>   server mechanism may issue a challenge, indicate failure, or indicate
>   completion.  The server mechanism may return additional data with a
>   completion indication.  The protocol's profile specifies how each of
>   these is then represented over the connection.
>
>   After receiving a challenge, a client mechanism may issue a response
>   or abort the exchange.  The protocol's profile specifies how each of
>   these is then represented over the connection.
>
>   During the authentication protocol exchange, the mechanism performs
>   authentication, transmits an authorization identity (frequently known
>   as a userid) from the client to server, and negotiates the use of a
>   mechanism-specific security layer.  If the use of a security layer is
>   agreed upon, then the mechanism must also define or negotiate the
>   maximum security layer buffer size that each side is able to receive.
>
>
>4.2.  Authorization and authentication identities
>
>   SASL authentication deals with two identities: the authorization
>   identity and the authentication identity.

I suggest the "authorization identity" and "authentication identity"  
be defined here (move the below def'ns to here).   I suggest defining
"authentication identity" first.  Doing so, I also suggest swapping
the order of the terms in the section title and first sentence.

>                                             The transmitted
>   authorization identity may be an empty string (zero length), but the
>   transmitted authentication identity may not be an empty string.

I think the latter ("but ...") part should be deleted.  Nothing   
says a mechanism has a "transmitted authentication identity", and   
nothing (in RFC 2222) prevented a mechanism from transmitting an
empty authentication identity.  Whether or not such is permissible
should be left to the mechanisms to decide.  In fact, whether or
not an authentication identity is explicitly transferred between    
the SASL client and server should be left the mechanism.  It may      
simply be implied by the client's credentials (as noted below). 

>   A mechanisms which are incapable of transmitting an authorization
>   identity must be treated as if it always transmits an authorization
>   identity of an empty string.
>
>   Authentication identity is the identity derived from the client's
>   authentication credentials.
>
>   The authorization identity is used by the server as the primary
>   identity for making access policy decisions.
>
>4.2.1.  Authorization identities and proxy authentication
>
>   With any mechanism, transmitting an authorization identity of the
>   empty string directs the server to derive the authorization identity
>   from the client's authentication identity.
>
>   If the authorization identity transmitted during the authentication
>   protocol exchange is not the empty string, this is typically referred
>   to as "proxy authentication".  This feature permits agents such as
>   proxy servers to authenticate using their own credentials, yet
>   request the access privileges of the identity for which they are
>   proxying.
>
>   The server makes an implementation defined policy decision as to
>   whether the authentication identity is permitted to have the access
>   privileges of the authorization identity and whether the
>   authorization identity is permitted to receive service.  If it is
>   not, the server indicates failure of the authentication protocol
>   exchange.
>
>   As a client might not have the same information as the server,
>   clients SHOULD NOT derive authorization identities from
>   authentication identities. Instead, clients SHOULD provide no (or
>   empty) authorization identity when the user has not provided an
>   authorization identity.
>
>   The server SHOULD verify that a received authorization identity is in
>   the correct form.

Why isn't this a MUST?  That is, how are servers to compare or    
otherwise handle authorization identities which are not in correct
form?

>                      Profiles whose authorization identities are simple
>   user names (e.g. IMAP [RFC 3501]) SHOULD use "SASLprep" profile
>   [SASLprep] of the "stringprep" algorithm [StringPrep] to prepare
>   these names for matching. The profiles MAY use a stringprep profile
>   that is more strict than "SASLprep". If the preparation of the
>   authorization identity fails or results in an empty string, the
>   server MUST fail the authentication exchange. The only exception to
>   this rule is when the received authorization identity is already the
>   empty string.

"profile" should be qualified above to refer to the protocol profile.

I think it mostly states a protocol profile requirement.  But then
it includes an implementation imperative.  But this is odd in that
server may not actually be required to do any preparation (the
profile might place that burden on the client).

I think the "If the preparation..." part should be reworded as
a profile requirement.  That is, it should state that profiles
should detail how implementations are to behave when required
preparation fails.

Given that, I think this can and should be moved to Section 5.

>4.2.2.  Authorization Identity Format
>
>   An authorization identity is a string of zero or more Unicode
>   [Unicode] coded characters.  The NUL <U+0000> character is not
>   permitted in authorization identities.
>
>   The character encoding scheme used for transmitting an authorization
>   identity over the protocol is specified in each authentication
>   mechanism.  All IETF-defined mechanisms MUST, and all other
>   mechanisms SHOULD, use UTF-8 [UTF-8]. (See [CHARSET-POLICY] for IETF
>   policy regarding character sets and encoding schemes.)
>
>   Mechanisms are expected to be capable of carrying the entire Unicode
>   repertoire (with the exception of the NUL character). An
>   authorization identity of the empty string and an absent
>   authorization identity MUST be treated as equivalent. A mechanism
>   which provides an optional field for an authorization identity,
>   SHOULD NOT allow that field, when present, to be empty.  The meaning
>   of the empty string as an authorization identity is described in the
>   previous section.
>
>4.3.  Security layers
>
>   If use of a security layer is negotiated by the authentication
>   protocol exchange, the security layer is applied to all subsequent
>   data sent over the connection (until another security layer is
>   negotiated; see also section 6.3). The security layer takes effect
>   immediately following the last response of the authentication
>   exchange for data sent by the client and the completion indication
>   for data sent by the server.
>
>   Note that all SASL mechanisms that are unable to negotiate a security
>   layer automatically select no security layer.
>
>   Once the security layer is in effect the protocol stream is processed
>   by the security layer into buffers of security encoded data.  Each
>   buffer of security encoded data is transferred over the connection as
>   a stream of octets prepended with a four octet field in network byte
>   order that represents the length of the following buffer.  The length
>   of the security encoded data buffer MUST be no larger than the
>   maximum size that was either defined in the mechanism specification
>   or negotiated by the other side during the authentication protocol
>   exchange.  Upon the receipt of a data buffer which is larger than the
>   defined/negotiated maximal buffer size the receiver SHOULD close the
>   connection.  This might be a sign of an attack or a buggy
>   implementation.
>
>5.    Protocol and mechanism profiles
>
>5.1.  Protocol profile requirements
>
>   In order to use this specification, a protocol definition MUST supply
>   the following information:
>
>   1) A service name, to be selected from the IANA registry of "service"
>   elements for the GSSAPI host-based service name form [GSSAPI]. This
>   service name is made available to the authentication mechanism.
>
>   The registry is available at the URL
>   <http://www.iana.org/assignments/gssapi-service-names>.
>
>   2) A definition of the command to initiate the authentication
>   protocol exchange.  This command must have as a parameter the name of
>   the mechanism being selected by the client.
>
>   The command SHOULD have an optional parameter giving an initial
>   response.  If the protocol allows for the initial response, the
>   protocol profile SHOULD also describe how an empty initial response
>   is encoded.  This optional parameter allows the client to avoid a
>   round trip when using a mechanism which is defined to have the client
>   send data first.  When this initial response is sent by the client
>   and the selected mechanism is defined to have the server start with
>   an initial challenge, the command fails.  See section 6.1 of this
>   document for further information.
>
>   3) A definition of the method by which the authentication protocol
>   exchange is carried out, including how the challenges and responses
>   are encoded, how the server indicates completion or failure of the
>   exchange, how the client aborts an exchange, and how the exchange
>   method interacts with any line length limits in the protocol.
>
>   The exchange method SHOULD allow the server to include an optional
>   data ("optional challenge") with a success notification.  This allows
>   the server to avoid a round trip when using a mechanism which is
>   defined to have the server send additional data along with the
>   indication of successful completion.  See section 6.2 of this
>   document for further information.
>
>   4) A protocol profile SHOULD specify a mechanism through which a
>   client may obtain the names of the SASL mechanisms available to it.
>   This is typically done through the protocol's extensions or
>   capabilities mechanism.
>
>   5) Identification of the octet where any negotiated security layer
>   starts to take effect, in both directions.
>
>   6) Specify if the protocol profile supports "multiple
>   authentications" (see section 6.3).
>
>   7) If both TLS and SASL security layer are allowed to be negotiated
>   by the protocol, the protocol profile MUST define in which order they
>   are applied to a cleartext data sent over the connection.

Spell TLS out on first use.

>   8) A protocol profile MAY further refine the definition of an
>   authorization identity by adding additional syntactic restrictions
>   and protocol-specific semantics. A protocol profile MUST specify the
>   form of the authorization identity (since it is protocol specific, as
>   opposed to the authentication identity, which is mechanism specific)
>   and how authorization identities are to be compared. Profiles whose
>   authorization identities are simple user names (e.g. IMAP [RFC 3501])
>   SHOULD use "SASLprep" profile [SASLprep] of the "stringprep"
>   algorithm [StringPrep] to prepare these names for matching. The
>   profiles MAY use a stringprep profile that is more strict than
>   SASLprep.
>
>   A protocol profile SHOULD NOT attempt to amend the definition of
>   mechanisms or make mechanism-specific encodings.  This breaks the
>   separation between protocol and mechanism that is fundamental to the
>   design of SASL. Likewise, SASL mechanisms SHOULD be profile neutral.
>
>5.2.  Mechanism profile guidelines
>
>   Designers of new SASL mechanism should be aware of the following
>   issues:
>
>   1) Authorization identity.

Remove the "."

>   While some legacy mechanisms are incapable of transmitting an
>   authorization identity (which means that for these mechanisms the
>   authorization identity is always the empty string), newly defined
>   mechanisms SHOULD be capable of transmitting a non-empty
>   authorization identity. See also section 4.2.
>
>   2) Character string issues
>
>   Authentication mechanisms SHOULD encode character strings in UTF-8
>   [UTF-8] (see [CHARSET-POLICY] for IETF policy regarding character
>   sets in IETF protocols).  In order to avoid interoperability problems
>   due to differing normalizations, when a mechanisms specifies that
>   character data is to be used as input to a cryptographic and/or
>   comparison function, the mechanism specification MUST detail how the
>   data is to be represented, including any normalizations or other
>   preparations, to ensure proper function.  Designers of mechanisms
>   SHOULD use the "SASLprep" profile [SASLprep] of the "stringprep"
>   algorithm [StringPrep] where applicable.

excepting authzid

>   The preparation can be potentially performed on the client end (upon
>   getting user input or retrieving a value from configuration) or on
>   the server end (upon receiving the value from the client, retrieving
>   a value from its authentication database or generating a new value in
>   order to store in in the authentication database).  SASL mechanisms
>   must define which entity (or entities) must perform the preparation.
>   If preparation fails or results in an empty string, the entity doing
>   the preparation SHALL fail the authentication exchange.
>
>   Implementation note: A server end can be represented by multiple
>   processes. For example, it may consist of the server process itself
>   that communicated with a client, and a command line utility (a server
>   agent) that is able to store passwords/hashes in a database that can
>   be later used by the server. For the server agent the requirement to
>   "fail the authentication exchange" should be interpreted as a
>   requirement to refuse to store the data in the database.
>
>6.    Specific issues
>
>6.1.  Client sends data first
>
>   Some mechanisms specify that the first data sent in the
>   authentication protocol exchange is from the client to the server.
>
>   If a protocol's profile permits the command which initiates an
>   authentication protocol exchange to contain an initial client
>   response, this parameter SHOULD be used with such mechanisms.
>
>   If the initial client response parameter is not given, or if a
>   protocol's profile does not permit the command which initiates an
>   authentication protocol exchange to contain an initial client
>   response, then the server issues a challenge with no data.  The
>   client's response to this challenge is then used as the initial
>   client response.  (The server then proceeds to send the next
>   challenge, indicates completion, or indicates failure.)
>
>6.1.1.  Client sends data first examples
>
>   The following are two examples of an SECURID authentication [SASL-
>   SECURID] in the SMTP protocol [SMTP].  In the first example below,
>   the client is trying fast reauthentication by sending the initial
>   response:
>
>      S: 220-smtp.example.com ESMTP Server
>      C: EHLO client.example.com
>      S: 250-smtp.example.com Hello client.example.com, pleased to meet you

This line is too long.  Suggest you s/Hello.*/Welcome client.example.com/

>      S: 250-AUTH GSSAPI SECURID
>      S: 250 DSN
>      C: AUTH SECURID AG1hZ251cwAxMjM0NTY3OAA=
>      S: 235 Authentication successful
>
>   The example below is almost identical to the previous, but here the
>   client chooses not to use the initial response parameter.
>
>      S: 220-smtp.example.com ESMTP Server
>      C: EHLO client.example.com
>      S: 250-smtp.example.com Hello client.example.com, pleased to meet you

This line is too long.

>      S: 250-AUTH GSSAPI SECURID
>      S: 250 DSN
>      C: AUTH SECURID
>      S: 334
>      C: AG1hZ251cwAxMjM0NTY3OAA=
>      S: 235 Authentication successful
>
>      Section 7.2 contains an additional example.

Indention is off here.
Also note that 7.2 provides two examples as does 6.2.1.
So, this should read:
	Additonal examples can be found in sections 6.2.1 and 7.2.

>6.2.  Server returns success with additional data
>
>   Some mechanisms may specify that additional data be sent to the
>   client along with an indication of successful completion of the
>   exchange.  This data would, for example, authenticate the server to
>   the client.
>
>   If a protocol's profile does not permit this additional data to be
>   returned with a success indication, then the server issues the data
>   as a server challenge, without an indication of successful
>   completion.  The client then responds with no data.  After receiving
>   this empty response, the server then indicates successful completion
>   (with no additional data).
>
>   Client implementors should be aware of an additional failure case
>   that might occur when the profile supports sending the additional
>   data with success. Imagine that an active attacker is trying to
>   impersonate the server and sends faked data, which should be used to
>   authenticate the server to the client, with success.  (A similar
>   situation can happen when either the server and/or the client has a
>   bug and they calculate different responses.) After checking the data,
>   the client will think that the authentication exchange has failed,
>   however the server will think that the authentication exchange has
>   completed successfully.  At this point the client can not abort the
>   authentication exchange; it SHOULD close the connection instead.
>   However, if the profile did not support sending of additional data
>   with success, the client could have aborted the exchange at the very
>   last step of the authentication exchange.
>
>6.2.1.  Server returns success with additional data examples
>
>   The following are two examples of a DIGEST-MD5 authentication [SASL-
>   DIGEST] in the XMPP protocol [XMPP]. In the first example below, the
>   server is sending mutual authentication data with success.

spell XMPP out on first use.

>
>      C: <stream:stream
>          xmlns='jabber:client'
>          xmlns:stream='http://etherx.jabber.org/streams'
>          to='example.com'
>          version='1.0'>
>      S: <stream:stream
>          xmlns='jabber:client'
>          xmlns:stream='http://etherx.jabber.org/streams'
>          id='c2s_234'
>          from='example.com'
>          version='1.0'>
>      S: <stream:features>
>           <mechanisms xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'>
>             <mechanism>DIGEST-MD5</mechanism>
>             <mechanism>CRAM-MD5</mechanism>
>           </mechanisms>
>         </stream:features>
>      C: <auth xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'
>               mechanism='DIGEST-MD5'/>
>      S: <challenge xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'>
>         cmVhbG09InNvbWVyZWFsbSIsbm9uY2U9Ik9BNk1HOXRFUUdtMmhoIixxb3A9ImF1dGgi

This line is too long...

>         LGNoYXJzZXQ9dXRmLTgsYWxnb3JpdGhtPW1kNS1zZXNzCg==
>         </challenge>
>      C: <response xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'>
>         dXNlcm5hbWU9InNvbWVub2RlIixyZWFsbT0ic29tZXJlYWxtIixub25jZT0i
>         T0E2TUc5dEVRR20yaGgiLGNub25jZT0iT0E2TUhYaDZWcVRyUmsiLG5jPTAw
>         MDAwMDAxLHFvcD1hdXRoLGRpZ2VzdC11cmk9InhtcHAvZXhhbXBsZS5jb20i
>         LHJlc3BvbnNlPWQzODhkYWQ5MGQ0YmJkNzYwYTE1MjMyMWYyMTQzYWY3LGNo
>         YXJzZXQ9dXRmLTgK
>         </response>
>      S: <success xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'>
>         cnNwYXV0aD1lYTQwZjYwMzM1YzQyN2I1NTI3Yjg0ZGJhYmNkZmZmZAo=
>         </success>
>
>      The example below is almost identical to the previous, but here
>      the server chooses not to use the additional data with success.
>
>      C: <stream:stream
>          xmlns='jabber:client'
>          xmlns:stream='http://etherx.jabber.org/streams'
>          to='example.com'
>          version='1.0'>
>      S: <stream:stream
>          xmlns='jabber:client'
>          xmlns:stream='http://etherx.jabber.org/streams'
>          id='c2s_234'
>          from='example.com'
>          version='1.0'>
>      S: <stream:features>
>           <mechanisms xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'>
>             <mechanism>DIGEST-MD5</mechanism>
>             <mechanism>CRAM-MD5</mechanism>
>           </mechanisms>
>         </stream:features>
>      C: <auth xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'
>               mechanism='DIGEST-MD5'/>
>      S: <challenge xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'>
>         cmVhbG09InNvbWVyZWFsbSIsbm9uY2U9Ik9BNk1HOXRFUUdtMmhoIixxb3A9ImF1dGgi

This line is too long.

>         LGNoYXJzZXQ9dXRmLTgsYWxnb3JpdGhtPW1kNS1zZXNzCg==
>         </challenge>
>      C: <response xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'>
>         dXNlcm5hbWU9InNvbWVub2RlIixyZWFsbT0ic29tZXJlYWxtIixub25jZT0i
>         T0E2TUc5dEVRR20yaGgiLGNub25jZT0iT0E2TUhYaDZWcVRyUmsiLG5jPTAw
>         MDAwMDAxLHFvcD1hdXRoLGRpZ2VzdC11cmk9InhtcHAvZXhhbXBsZS5jb20i
>         LHJlc3BvbnNlPWQzODhkYWQ5MGQ0YmJkNzYwYTE1MjMyMWYyMTQzYWY3LGNo
>         YXJzZXQ9dXRmLTgK
>         </response>
>      S: <challenge xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'>
>         cnNwYXV0aD1lYTQwZjYwMzM1YzQyN2I1NTI3Yjg0ZGJhYmNkZmZmZAo=
>         </challenge>
>      C: <response xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'/>
>      S: <success xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'/>
>
>6.3.  Multiple authentications
>
>   Unless otherwise stated by the protocol's profile, only one
>   successful SASL negotiation may occur in a protocol session.  In this
>   case, once an authentication protocol exchange has successfully
>   completed, further attempts to initiate an authentication protocol
>   exchange fail.

>   If a profile explicitly permits multiple successful SASL negotiations
>   to occur, then in no case may multiple security layers be
>   simultaneously in effect.  If a security layer is in effect and a
>   subsequent SASL negotiation selects a second security layer, then the
>   second security layer replaces the first. If a security layer is in
>   effect and a subsequent SASL negotiation selects no security layer,
>   the original security layer remains in effect.
>
>   Note that keeping the original security layer is a subject to a class
>   of security attack described in section 6.3.1.

I think this note should be deleted.  We haven't inserted notes for
other security attacks.  And we've covered this with a far more
general security consideration.   The description itself, which I
don't think is terrible useful (have such a long description over
such a minor security issue distracts attention from major security
issues which have little to no description).  I think section 6.3.1
(and this paragraph, especially given the need to further detail
the limited effectiveness of the below SHOULD) should be deleted.

>                                                   However, at the time
>   of the writing of this document the Working Group consensus is not to
>   change SASL handling of security layers, as the risk of such attacks
>   is considered to be low and specific to only certain classes of
>   implementations.  The protocol profiles that allow for
>   reauthentication SHOULD recommend that another security layer is
>   negotiated once a security layer was installed.

I don't believe there is sufficient reason to state this as a SHOULD
upon protocols profiles.   As noted, it is only specific to a certain
class of implementations.  As previously discussed in the WG, this
can and should be addressed through a security consideration stating
that implementations within this class takes steps, such as enforcing
a local policy disallowing subsequent authentication, to mitigate
this risk.  The security consideration description seems to be
sufficiently address this risk.  I suggest we focus discussion
on this (the stated security consideration).

(Also, note that simply reauthenticating with another security layer
does fully mitigate the risk as the subsequent authentication is
operating over the old layers.  If we state this SHOULD, then we'd
have to also state a security consideration noting that it
ineffective in some cases.)

>   Also note, that if a subsequent authentication fails, the protocol
>   profile MAY allow the connection state to return to non-
>   authenticated, however the previously negotiated security layer MUST
>   NOT be removed. Only a successful reauthentication is able
>   replace/remove the previously negotiated security layer.

I suggest this be replaced with:
	Where a protocol profile does permit multiple successful
	SASL negotiations, the profile MUST detail the effect of a
	failed SASL negotiation upon the previously established
	authentication state.   In particular, it MUST state whether
	the previously established authenticated state remain in
	force or whether the connection is to revert to an
	non-authenticated state.  Regardless of the specified
	effect upon authentication state, the previously negotiated
	security layer remains in effect.


>6.3.1.  Description of Multiple Authentication attack
>
>   Let's assume that the protected resources on a server are partitioned
>   into a set of protection spaces, each with its own authentication
>   mechanisms and/or authorization database. Let's use the term
>   "partition" to reference any such protected space. An example of a
>   partition might be an HTTP "realm".  Also a proxy/frontend can use
>   different partitions for different servers/backends it represents.
>
>   Now consider the following scenario. A client has already
>   authenticated and established a security layer with "Partition A"
>   which is managed by the server AA.  Now the same client authenticates
>   to "Partition B" (managed by the server BB) without negotiating a new
>   security layer, while the security layer negotiated with "Partition
>   A" remains in effect. The server BB is now able to observe how known
>   cleartext is encrypted. This scenario enables the server BB to make
>   guesses about previously observed ciphertext between the client and
>   the server AA using the server's SASL engine as an oracle.  This
>   scenario is illustrated below:
>
>
>              +---------+                   +---------+
>              |         |                   |         |
>              |Partition|                   |Partition|
>              |    B    |                   |    A    |
>              +---------+                   +---------+
>                  |  ^                           |
>                  |  :      +-----------+        |
>     Traffic from |  :      | Encryption|        | Traffic from A
>      B to client +-------->| end point |<-------+ to client
>                     :      | (SSL/SASL)|
>                     :      +-----------+
>                     :            |
>                     :            |
>                     :          +---+
>                     :          |   |
>                     :          |   |
>                     :          |   | Encryption tunnel, e.g. SASL or SSL,
>                     :          |   | between the server
>       (1) Recording +---------:|   | and a single client only.
>           encrypted            |   | Separate tunnels to different
>           traffic between      |   | clients.
>       Partition A and client   +---+
>                                  |
>                                  |
>                                  +-----------> Traffic to clients
>
>   <<Some text about trust relationship here.
>
>
>   Where this situation cannot be managed through trust relationship, it
>   may be appropriate for the server implementation to not support
>   multiple authentications.  >>
>
>
>
>7.    The EXTERNAL mechanism
>
>   The mechanism name associated with external authentication is
>   "EXTERNAL".
>
>   The client sends an initial response with the UTF-8 encoding of the
>   authorization identity. The form of the authorization identity is
>   further restricted by the application-level protocol's SASL profile.
>
>   The server uses information, external to SASL, to determine whether
>   the client is authorized to authenticate as the authorization
>   identity.  If the client is so authorized, the server indicates
>   successful completion of the authentication exchange; otherwise the
>
>
>
>A. Melnikov                                            FORMFEED[Page 14]
>
>
>
>
>
>Internet DRAFT                    SASL                  14 February 2004
>
>
>   server indicates failure.
>
>   The system providing this external information may be, for example,
>   IPSec or TLS.

Spell IPsec out on first use.

>                  However, the client can make no assumptions as to what
>   information the server can use in determining client authorization.
>   For example, just because TLS was established, doesn't mean that the
>   server will use the information provided by TLS.
>
>   If the client sends the empty string as the authorization identity,
>   the authorization identity is to be derived from authentication
>   credentials which exist in the system that is providing the external
>   authentication.
>
>7.1.  Formal syntax
>
>   The following syntax specification uses the augmented Backus-Naur
>   Form (BNF) notation as specified in [ABNF].  This uses the ABNF core
>   rules as specified in Appendix A of the ABNF specification [ABNF].

I don't believe any Appendix A core rules are used here.

>   Non-terminals referenced but not defined below are as defined by
>   [UTF-8].

I suggest the non-terminal productions be directly incorporated
into this document.

>   The "extern-init-resp" rule below defines the initial response sent
>   from client to server.
>
>   extern-init-resp  = *( UTF8-char-no-nul )
>
>   UTF8-char-no-nul  = UTF8-1-no-nul / UTF8-2 / UTF8-3 / UTF8-4
>
>   UTF8-1-no-nul     = %x01-7F
>
>
>7.2.  Example
>
>   The following is an example of an EXTERNAL authentication in the SMTP
>   protocol [SMTP].  In this example, the client is proxy
>   authenticating, sending the authorization identity "fred" using in
>   the (optional) initial response.  The server has determined the
>   client's identity through IPsec and has a security policy that
>   permits that identity to proxy authenticate as any other identity.

An informative reference for IPsec seems appropriate here as
presently worded.  Suggest it be reworded,
	The server has obtained the client's (authentication) identity
	from an external service, such as IPsec, and has a security
	policy that permits that identity to assume the identity of
	the asserted authorization identity.

>   To the protocol profile, the four octet sequence "fred" is an opaque
>   binary data. The SASL protocol profile for SMTP [SMTP-AUTH] specifies
>   that server challenges and client responses are encoded in BASE64
>   [BASE64]; the BASE64 encoding of "fred" is "ZnJlZA==".
>
>      S: 220 smtp.example.com ESMTP server ready
>      C: EHLO jgm.example.com
>      S: 250-smtp.example.com
>
>
>
>A. Melnikov                                            FORMFEED[Page 15]
>
>
>
>
>
>Internet DRAFT                    SASL                  14 February 2004
>
>
>      S: 250 AUTH DIGEST-MD5 EXTERNAL
>      C: AUTH EXTERNAL ZnJlZA==
>      S: 235 Authentication successful.
>
>   The following example is almost identical to the one above, but the
>   client doesn't use proxy authentication.

s/use/request/

>      S: 220 smtp.example.com ESMTP server ready
>      C: EHLO jgm.example.com
>      S: 250-smtp.example.com
>      S: 250 AUTH DIGEST-MD5 EXTERNAL
>      C: AUTH EXTERNAL
>      S: 235 Authentication successful.
>
>
>8.    IANA Considerations
>
>8.1.  Guidelines for IANA
>
>   It is requested that IANA updates the SASL mechanisms registry as
>   follows:
>
>      Change the "Intended usage" of the KERBEROS_V4 and SKEY mechanism
>      registrations to OBSOLETE.  Change the "Published specification"
>      of the EXTERNAL mechanism to this document. Updated registration
>      is provided in Section 8.6.

s/registration/registration information/

>
>8.2.  Registration procedure
>
>
>   Registration of a SASL mechanism is done by filling in the template
>   in section 8.5 and sending it via electronic mail to <[e-mail]>.
>   IANA has the right to reject obviously bogus registrations, but will
>   perform no review of claims made in the registration form.  SASL
>   mechanism registrations are currently available at the URL
>   <http://www.iana.org/assignments/sasl-mechanisms>.
>
>   There is no naming convention for SASL mechanisms; any name that
>   conforms to the syntax of a SASL mechanism name can be registered.
>   An IETF Standards Track document may reserve a portion of the SASL
>   mechanism namespace ("family of SASL mechanisms") for its own use,
>   amending the registration rules for that portion of the namespace.
>   Each family of SASL mechanisms MUST be identified by a prefix.
>
>   While the registration procedures do not require it, authors of SASL
>
>
>
>A. Melnikov                                            FORMFEED[Page 16]
>
>
>
>
>
>Internet DRAFT                    SASL                  14 February 2004
>
>
>   mechanisms are encouraged to seek community review and comment
>   whenever that is feasible.  Authors may seek community review by
>   posting a specification of their proposed mechanism as an Internet-
>   Draft.  SASL mechanisms intended for widespread use should be
>   standardized through the normal IETF process, when appropriate.
>
>8.3.  Comments on SASL mechanism registrations
>
>   Comments on registered SASL mechanisms should first be sent to the
>   "owner" of the mechanism and/or to the SASL WG mailing list.
>   Submitters of comments may, after a reasonable attempt to contact the
>   owner, request IANA to attach their comment to the SASL mechanism
>   registration itself.  If IANA approves of this, the comment will be
>   made accessible in conjunction with the SASL mechanism registration
>   itself.
>
>8.4.  Change control
>
>   Once a SASL mechanism registration has been published by IANA, the
>   author may request a change to its definition.  The change request
>   follows the same procedure as the registration request.
>
>   The owner of a SASL mechanism may pass responsibility for the SASL
>   mechanism to another person or agency by informing IANA; this can be
>   done without discussion or review.
>
>   The IESG may reassign responsibility for a SASL mechanism. The most
>   common case of this will be to enable changes to be made to
>   mechanisms where the author of the registration has died, moved out
>   of contact or is otherwise unable to make changes that are important
>   to the community.
>
>   SASL mechanism registrations may not be deleted; mechanisms which are
>   no longer believed appropriate for use can be declared OBSOLETE by a
>   change to their "intended use" field; such SASL mechanisms will be
>   clearly marked in the lists published by IANA.
>
>   The IESG is considered to be the owner of all SASL mechanisms which
>   are on the IETF standards track.
>
>8.5.  Registration template
>
>
>     Subject: Registration of SASL mechanism X
>
>     Family of SASL mechanisms: (YES or NO)
>
>     SASL mechanism name (or prefix for the family):
>
>
>
>A. Melnikov                                            FORMFEED[Page 17]
>
>
>
>
>
>Internet DRAFT                    SASL                  14 February 2004
>
>
>     Security considerations:
>
>     Published specification (optional, recommended):
>
>     Person & email address to contact for further information:
>
>     Intended usage:
>
>     (One of COMMON, LIMITED USE or OBSOLETE)
>
>     Owner/Change controller:
>
>     (Any other information that the author deems interesting may be
>     added below this line.)
>
>
>8.6.  The EXTERNAL mechanism registration
>
>   It is requested that the SASL Mechanism registry [IANA-SASL] entry
>   for the EXTERNAL mechanism be updated to reflect that this document
>   now provides its technical specification.
>
>
>      Subject: Updated Registration of SASL mechanism EXTERNAL
>
>      Family of SASL mechanisms: NO
>
>      SASL mechanism name: EXTERNAL
>
>      Security considerations: See RFC XXXX, section 9.
>
>      Published specification (optional, recommended): RFC XXXX
>
>      Person & email address to contact for further information:
>        Alexey Melnikov <[e-mail]>
>
>      Intended usage: COMMON
>
>      Owner/Change controller: IESG <[e-mail]>
>
>      Note: Updates existing entry for EXTERNAL
>
>9.   Security considerations
>
>   Security issues are discussed throughout this memo.
>
>   The mechanisms that support integrity protection are designed such
>   that the negotiation of the security layer and authorization identity
>   is integrity protected.

This statement seems a bit circular.

Also, "integrity protection" was defined as providing the capability
to detection unauthorized changes to data transfered by the security
layer.  However this uses the term implies that the authentication
exchange, including layer negotiation is protected.  This is problematic.

If we look at DIGEST-MD5, which does offer a security layer
with "integrity protection", we find a mechanism which does
provide full integrity protection over the authentication
exchange itself.

I think we need to a bit more precise with our terminology.  To
avoid having to define a SASL-specific terminology, I strongly
recommend we try to use RFC 2828 based terminology.

                             When the client selects a security layer
>   with at least integrity protection, this protects against an active
>   attacker hijacking the connection and modifying the authentication
>   exchange to negotiate a plaintext connection.
>
>   When a server or client supports multiple authentication mechanisms,
>   each of which has a different security strength, it is possible for
>   an active attacker to cause a party to use the least secure mechanism
>   supported.  To protect against this sort of attack, a client or
>   server which supports mechanisms of different strengths should have a
>   configurable minimum strength that it will use.  It is not sufficient
>   for this minimum strength check to only be on the server, since an
>   active attacker can change which mechanisms the client sees as being
>   supported, causing the client to send authentication credentials for
>   its weakest supported mechanism.
>
>   The client's selection of a SASL mechanism is done in the clear and
>   may be modified by an active attacker.  It is important for any new
>   SASL mechanisms to be designed such that an active attacker cannot
>   obtain an authentication with weaker security properties by modifying
>   the SASL mechanism name and/or the challenges and responses.
>
>   In order to detect Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks the client MAY
>   list available SASL mechanisms both before and after the SASL
>   security layer is negotiated.  This allows the client to detect
>   active attacks that remove mechanisms from the server's list of
>   supported mechanisms, and allows the client to ensure that it is
>   using the best mechanism supported by both client and server.  New
>   protocol profiles SHOULD require servers to make the list of SASL
>   mechanisms available for the initial authentication available to the
>   client after security layers are established.  Some older protocols
>   do not require this (or don't support listing of SASL mechanisms once
>   authentication is complete); for these protocols clients MUST NOT
>   treat an empty list of SASL mechanisms after authentication as a MITM
>   attack.
>
>   Any protocol interactions prior to authentication are performed in
>   the clear and may be modified by an active attacker.  In the case
>   where a client selects integrity protection, it is important that any
>   security-sensitive protocol negotiations be performed after
>   authentication is complete.  Protocols should be designed such that
>   negotiations performed prior to authentication should be either
>   ignored or revalidated once authentication is complete.
>
>   When use of a security layer is negotiated by the authentication
>   protocol exchange, the receiver should handle gracefully any security
>   encoded data buffer larger than the defined/negotiated maximal size.
>   In particular, it must not blindly allocate the amount of memory
>   specified in the buffer size field, as this might cause the "out of
>   memory" condition. If the receiver detects a large block, it SHOULD
>   close the connection.
>
>   Distributed server implementations need to be careful in how they
>   trust other parties and, in particular, authentication secrets should
>   only be disclosed to other parties that are trusted to manage and use
>   those secrets in manner acceptable to disclosing party.  It should be
>   noted that, where those secrets are used to provide data
>   confidentiality protections, if a third party (other than the
>   discloser/disclosee) has knowledge of some portion of the protected
>   information, it can use this knowledge in an attack upon other
>   portions of the protected information.
>
>   Section 6.3.1 contains a description of a potential class of attack
>   on a distributed server implementation. The section also gives some
>   recommendations about mitigating such attacks.

Replace with (and append to preceding paragraph):
    It may be appropriate for a server to disallow all
    re-authentication, or re-authentications which do not result
    in new security layers being established, involving non-
    (or insufficiently) trusted parties.  In some cases, it may
    be appropriate for the server to require separate connections
    to access information in different protected information spaces.

>   "stringprep" and Unicode security considerations apply to
>   authentication identities, authorization identities and passwords.
>
>   The EXTERNAL mechanism provides no security protection; it is
>   vulnerable to spoofing by either client or server, active attack, and
>   eavesdropping.  It should only be used when external security
>   mechanisms are present and have sufficient strength.
>
>10.    References
>
>10.1.  Normative References
>
>   [ABNF] Crocker, D. (Ed.), Overell, P., "Augmented BNF for Syntax
>   Specifications: ABNF", RFC 2234, November 1997
>
>   [ASCII] American National Standards Institute, "Code Extension
>   Techniques for Use with the 7-bit Coded Character Set of American
>   National Standard Code (ASCII) for Information Interchange", FIPS PUB
>   35, 1974
>
>   [CHARSET-POLICY] Alvestrand, H., "IETF Policy on Character Sets and
>   Languages", RFC 2277, BCP 18, January 1998
>
>   [GSSAPI] Linn, J., "Generic Security Service Application Program
>   Interface, Version 2, Update 1", RFC 2743, January 2000
>
>   [ISO-10646] "Universal Multiple-Octet Coded Character Set (UCS) -
>   Architecture and Basic Multilingual Plane", ISO/IEC 10646-1 : 1993.

This reference is never used and hence should be deleted.

>   [KEYWORDS] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
>   Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, BCP 19, March 1997
>
>   [Unicode] The Unicode Consortium, "The Unicode Standard, Version
>   3.2.0" is defined by "The Unicode Standard, Version 3.0" (Reading,
>   MA, Addison-Wesley, 2000. ISBN 0-201-61633-5), as amended by the
>   "Unicode Standard Annex #27: Unicode 3.1"
>   (http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr27/) and by the "Unicode Standard
>   Annex #28: Unicode 3.2" (http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr28/).
>
>   [Stringprep] Hoffman, P., Blanchet, M., "Preparation of
>   Internationalized Strings ("stringprep")", RFC 3454, December 2002.
>
>   [SASLprep] Zeilenga, K., "SASLprep: Stringprep profile for user names
>   and passwords", Work in progress, draft-ietf-sasl-saslprep-XX.txt.
>
>   [UTF-8] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646",
>   RFC 3629, STD 63, November 2003.
>
>10.2.  Informative References
>
>   [SASL-GSSAPI] Melnikov, A., "SASL GSSAPI mechanisms", work in
>   progress, draft-ietf-sasl-gssapi-XX.txt, November 2003
>
>   [SASL-DIGEST] Leach, P., Newman, C., Melnikov, A., "Using Digest
>   Authentication as a SASL Mechanism", work in progress, draft-ietf-
>   sasl-rfc2831bis-XX.txt, replaces RFC 2831
>
>   [SASL-OTP] Newman, C., "The One-Time-Password SASL Mechanism", RFC
>   2444, October 1998.
>
>   [SASL-SECURID] Nystrom, M., "The SecurID(r) SASL Mechanism", RFC
>   2808, April 2000.
>
>   [SMTP] Klensin, J., "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol", RFC 2821, April
>   2001.
>
>   [SMTP-AUTH] Myers, J., "SMTP Service Extension for Authentication",
>   RFC 2554, March 1999.
>
>   Being revised by Siemborski, R., "SMTP Service Extension for
>   Authentication", work in progress, draft-siemborski-rfc2554bis-
>   XX.txt.

This reference should be put into proper form.
>
>   [XMPP] Saint-Andre, P., "Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol
>   (XMPP): Core", work in progress, draft-ietf-xmpp-core-XX.txt.
>
>   [BASE64] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
>
>
>
>A. Melnikov                                            FORMFEED[Page 21]
>
>
>
>
>
>Internet DRAFT                    SASL                  14 February 2004
>
>
>   Encodings", RFC 3548, July 2003.
>
>   [RFC-INSTRUCTIONS] Postel, J., Reynolds, J., "Instructions to RFC
>   Authors", RFC 2223, October 1997.
>
>   [IANA-SASL]  IANA, "SIMPLE AUTHENTICATION AND SECURITY LAYER (SASL)
>   MECHANISMS", http://www.iana.org/assignments/sasl-mechanisms.
>
>11.   Editor's Address
>
>     Alexey Melnikov
>     Isode Limited
>
>     Email: [e-mail]
>
>12.   Acknowledgments
>
>   This document is a revision of RFC 2222 written by John G. Myers.  He
>   also contributed significantly to this revision.
>
>   Magnus Nystrom provided the ASCII art used in Section 6.3.
>
>   Definition of partition was extracted from RFC 2617 ("HTTP
>   Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication").
>
>   Contributions of many members of the SASL mailing list are gratefully
>   acknowledged, in particular Kurt D. Zeilenga, Peter Saint-Andre, Rob
>   Siemborski, Jeffrey Hutzelman, Hallvard B Furuseth, Tony Hansen and
>   Abhijit Menon-Sen for proofreading the document and various editorial
>   suggestions.

Suggest you drop middle initials.



Needs IPR notice.

>
>13.   Full Copyright Statement
>
>   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004).  All Rights Reserved.
>
>   This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
>   others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
>   or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published
>   and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any
>   kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
>   included on all such copies and derivative works.  However, this
>   document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing
>   the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other
>   Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of
>   developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for
>   copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be
>   followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than
>   English.
>
>   The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
>   revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.
>
>   This document and the information contained herein is provided on an
>   "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING
>   TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING
>   BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION
>   HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
>   MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
>
>Acknowledgement
>
>   Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
>   Internet Society.
>
>Appendix A. Relation of SASL to transport security
>
>   Questions have been raised about the relationship between SASL and
>   various services (such as IPsec and TLS) which provide a secured
>   connection.
>
>   Two of the key features of SASL are:
>
>      The separation of the authorization identity from the identity in
>      the client's credentials.  This permits agents such as proxy
>      servers to authenticate using their own credentials, yet request
>      the access privileges of the identity for which they are proxying.
>
>      Upon successful completion of an authentication exchange, the
>      server knows the authorization identity the client wishes to use.
>      This allows servers to move to a "user is authenticated" state in
>      the protocol.
>
>   These features are extremely important to some application protocols,
>   yet Transport Security services do not always provide them.  To
>   define SASL mechanisms based on these services would be a very messy
>   task, as the framing of these services would be redundant with the
>   framing of SASL and some method of providing these important SASL
>   features would have to be devised.
>
>   Sometimes it is desired to enable within an existing connection the
>   use of a security service which does not fit the SASL model.  (TLS is
>   an example of such a service.)  This can be done by adding a command,
>   for example "STARTTLS", to the protocol.  Such a command is outside
>   the scope of SASL, and should be different from the command which
>   starts a SASL authentication protocol exchange.
>
>   In certain situations, it is reasonable to use SASL underneath one of
>   these Transport Security services.  The transport service would
>   secure the connection, either service would authenticate the client,
>   and SASL would negotiate the authorization identity.  The SASL
>   negotiation would be what moves the protocol from "unauthenticated"
>   to "authenticated" state.  The "EXTERNAL" SASL mechanism is
>   explicitly intended to handle the case where the transport service
>   secures the connection and authenticates the client and SASL
>   negotiates the authorization identity.
>
>Appendix B. Changes since RFC 2222
>
>   The GSSAPI mechanism was removed.  It is now specified in a separate
>   document [SASL-GSSAPI].
>
>   The "KERBEROS_V4" mechanism defined in RFC 2222 is obsolete and has
>   been removed.
>
>   The "SKEY" mechanism described in RFC 2222 is obsolete and has been
>   removed.  It has been replaced by the OTP mechanism [SASL-OTP].
>
>   The overview has been substantially reorganized and clarified.
>
>   Clarified the definition and semantics of the authorization identity.
>
>   Prohibited the NUL character in authorization identities.
>
>   Added a section on character string issues.
>
>   The word "must" in the first paragraph of the "Protocol profile
>   requirements" section was changed to "MUST".
>
>   Specified that protocol profiles SHOULD provide a way for clients to
>   discover available SASL mechanisms.
>
>   Made the requirement that protocol profiles specify the semantics of
>   the authorization identity optional to the protocol profile.
>   Clarified that such a specification is a refinement of the definition
>   in the base SASL spec.
>
>   Added a requirement discouraging protocol profiles from breaking the
>   separation between protocol and mechanism.
>
>   Mentioned that standards track documents may carve out their own
>   portions of the SASL mechanism namespace and may amend registration
>   rules for the portion. However registration of individual SASL
>   mechanisms is still required.
>
>   Specified that the authorization identity in the EXTERNAL mechanism
>   is encoded in UTF-8.
>
>   Added a statement that a protocol profile SHOULD allow challenge data
>   to be sent with a success indication.
>
>   Added a security consideration for the EXTERNAL mechanism.
>
>   Clarified sections concerning success with additional data.
>
>   Cleaned up IANA considerations/registrations and assembled them in
>   one place.
>
>   Updated references and split them into Informative and Normative.
>
>   Added text to the Security Considerations section regarding handling
>   of extremely large SASL blocks.
>
>   Replaced UTF-8 ABNF with the reference to the UTF-8 document.
>
>   Added text about SASLprep for authentication identities and
>   passwords.  Described where SASLprep preparation should take place.
>
>   Added paragraph about verifying authorization identities.
>
>   Added a protocol profile requirement to specify interaction between
>   SASL and TLS security layers.
>
>   Added a protocol profile requirement to specify if it supports
>   reauthentication.
>
>   Removed the text that seemed to suggest that SASL security layer must
>   not be used when TLS is available.
>
>   Created two subsections in 4.2 to talk separately about proxy
>   authorization and format of the authorization identities.
>
>   Made requirement to verify that an authorization identity is correct
>   by performing SASLprep a SHOULD, instead of a MUST.
>
>   Clarified that each SASL mechanism must decide where SASLprep is
>   taking place.
>
>   Added 4 new examples for initial response and additional data with
>   success.
>
>   Added text on checking the list of available SASL mechanisms after
>   negotiating a security layer.
>
>   Added definition of "integrity protection" and "confidentiality
>   protection".
>
>   Added warning about negotiating no layer once a security layer is
>   negotiated.
>
>   Added new section with guidelines to a SASL mechanism designer.
>
>   Added a requirement to specify how an empty initial challenge is
>   encoded if initial response is supported by a protocol.
>
>
>
>   Status of this Memo .......................................... i
>   1.    Abstract ............................................... 2
>   2.    Organization of this document .......................... 2
>   2.1.  How to read this document .............................. 2
>   2.2.  Conventions used in this document ...................... 2
>   3.    Overview ............................................... 3
>   4.    Authentication mechanisms .............................. 3
>   4.1.  Authentication protocol exchange ....................... 4
>   4.2.  Authorization and authentication identities ............ 4
>   4.2.1.  Authorization identities and proxy authentication .... 5
>   4.2.2.  Authorization Identity Format ........................ 6
>   4.3.  Security layers ........................................ 6
>   4.4.  Character string issues ................................ 7
>   5.    Protocol profile requirements .......................... 7
>   5.    Protocol and mechanism profiles ........................ 7
>   5.1.  Protocol profile requirements .......................... 7
>   5.2.  Mechanism profile guidelines ........................... 8
>   6.    Specific issues ........................................ 9
>   6.1.  Client sends data first ................................ 9
>   6.1.1.  Examples ............................................. 9
>   6.2.  Server returns success with additional data ........... 10
>   6.2.1.  Examples ............................................ 10
>   6.3.  Multiple authentications .............................. 12
>   6.3.1.  Description of Multiple Authentication attack ....... 13
>   7.    The EXTERNAL mechanism ................................ 14
>   7.1.  Formal syntax ......................................... 15
>   7.2.  Example ............................................... 15
>   8.    IANA Considerations ................................... 15
>   8.1.  Guidelines for IANA ................................... 16
>   8.2.  Registration procedure ................................ 16
>   8.3.  Comments on SASL mechanism registrations .............. 16
>   8.4.  Change control ........................................ 17
>   8.5.  Registration template ................................. 17
>   8.6.  The EXTERNAL mechanism registration ................... 18
>   9.   Security considerations ................................ 18
>   10.    References ........................................... 20
>   10.1.  Normative References ................................. 20
>   10.2.  Informative References ............................... 21
>   11.   Editor's Address ...................................... 21
>   12.   Acknowledgments ....................................... 22
>   13.   Full Copyright Statement .............................. 22
>   Appendix A. Relation of SASL to transport security .......... 23
>   Appendix B. Changes since RFC 2222 .......................... 24