Diffs to draft-newman-auth-scram-10 for new GS2

[Nicolas Williams <[e-mail]>]

Here's my diffs.  See Appendix C for a list of changes.

[NOTE: These are slightly massaged because the conversion of
draft-newman-auth-scram-10 from nroff to XML source created some
gratouitous diffs, mostly the symbol used for bulletted lists, but also
indentation, reference naming and misc such diffs.  The edits I made to
get these diffs were to correct for indentation, bullet symbols,
wrapping and to put two spaces between sentence ending periods and the
next sentence; I also removed the page headers and footers and
associated whitespace.]



--- a	2009-03-19 10:35:18.666715000 -0500
+++ b	2009-03-19 11:20:16.791477000 -0500
@@ -1,828 +1,1072 @@
-Network Working Group                                  Abhijit Menon-Sen
-Internet-Draft                                    Oryx Mail Systems GmbH
-Intended Status: Proposed Standard                          Chris Newman
-Expires: August 2009                                    Sun Microsystems
-                                                         Alexey Melnikov
-                                                               Isode Ltd
-                                                       February 21, 2009
 
 
-            Salted Challenge Response (SCRAM) SASL Mechanism
 
-                     draft-newman-auth-scram-10.txt
+NETWORK WORKING GROUP                                       A. Menon-Sen
+Internet-Draft                                    Oryx Mail Systems GmbH
+Intended status: Standards Track                             A. Melnikov
+Expires: September 20, 2009                                    Isode Ltd
+                                                               C. Newman
+                                                             N. Williams
+                                                        Sun Microsystems
+                                                          March 19, 2009
+
 
+            Salted Challenge Response (SCRAM) SASL Mechanism
+                     draft-newman-auth-scram-11.txt
 
 Status of this Memo
 
    This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
    provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
 
    Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
    Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that
    other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
    Drafts.
 
    Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
    and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
    time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
    material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
 
    The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
-   http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.  The list of Internet-
-   Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
-   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
+   http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.
 
-   This Internet-Draft expires in July 2009.
+   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
+   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
 
+   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 20, 2009.
 
 Copyright Notice
 
    Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
    document authors.  All rights reserved.
 
    This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
    Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
    (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
    publication of this document.  Please review these documents
    carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
    to this document.
 
 Abstract
 
    The secure authentication mechanism most widely deployed and used by
    Internet application protocols is the transmission of clear-text
    passwords over a channel protected by Transport Layer Security (TLS).
    There are some significant security concerns with that mechanism,
    which could be addressed by the use of a challenge response
    authentication mechanism protected by TLS.  Unfortunately, the
    challenge response mechanisms presently on the standards track all
    fail to meet requirements necessary for widespread deployment, and
    have had success only in limited use.
 
    This specification describes a family of authentication mechanisms
    called the Salted Challenge Response Authentication Mechanism
    (SCRAM), which addresses the security concerns and meets the
    deployability requirements.  When used in combination with TLS or an
    equivalent security layer, a mechanism from this family could improve
    the status-quo for application protocol authentication and provide a
    suitable choice for a mandatory-to-implement mechanism for future
    application protocol standards.
 
+Table of Contents
+
+   1.          Conventions Used in This Document  . . . . . . . . . .  4
+   1.1.        Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
+   1.2.        Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
+   2.          Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
+   3.          SCRAM Algorithm Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
+   4.          SCRAM Mechanism Names  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
+   5.          SCRAM Authentication Exchange  . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
+   5.1.        SCRAM Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
+   6.          Channel Binding  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
+   6.1.        Channel Binding to TLS Channels  . . . . . . . . . . . 16
+   7.          Formal Syntax  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
+   8.          SCRAM as a GSS-API Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
+   8.1.        GSS-API Principal Name Types for SCRAM . . . . . . . . 20
+   8.2.        GSS-API Per-Message Tokens for SCRAM . . . . . . . . . 20
+   8.3.        GSS_Pseudo_random() for SCRAM  . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
+   9.          Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
+   10.         IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
+   11.         Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
+   Appendix A. Other Authentication Mechanisms  . . . . . . . . . . . 25
+   Appendix B. Design Motivations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
+   Appendix C. SCRAM Examples and Internet-Draft Change History . . . 27
+   12.         References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
+   12.1.       Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
+   12.2.       Normative References for GSS-API implementors  . . . . 30
+   12.3.       Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
+               Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
 
 1.  Conventions Used in This Document
 
    The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
    "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
    document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
 
    Formal syntax is defined by [RFC5234] including the core rules
    defined in Appendix B of [RFC5234].
 
    Example lines prefaced by "C:" are sent by the client and ones
    prefaced by "S:" by the server.  If a single "C:" or "S:" label
    applies to multiple lines, then the line breaks between those lines
    are for editorial clarity only, and are not part of the actual
    protocol exchange.
 
-
 1.1.  Terminology
 
    This document uses several terms defined in [RFC4949] ("Internet
    Security Glossary") including the following: authentication,
    authentication exchange, authentication information, brute force,
    challenge-response, cryptographic hash function, dictionary attack,
    eavesdropping, hash result, keyed hash, man-in-the-middle, nonce,
    one-way encryption function, password, replay attack and salt.
    Readers not familiar with these terms should use that glossary as a
    reference.
 
    Some clarifications and additional definitions follow:
 
    o Authentication information: Information used to verify an identity
      claimed by a SCRAM client.  The authentication information for a
      SCRAM identity consists of salt, iteration count, the "StoredKey"
      and "ServerKey" (as defined in the algorithm overview) for each
      supported cryptographic hash function.
 
    o Authentication database: The database used to look up the
      authentication information associated with a particular identity.
      For application protocols, LDAPv3 (see [RFC4510]) is frequently
      used as the authentication database.  For network-level protocols
      such as PPP or 802.11x, the use of RADIUS is more common.
 
    o Base64: An encoding mechanism defined in [RFC4648] which converts
      an octet string input to a textual output string which can be
      easily displayed to a human.  The use of base64 in SCRAM is
      restricted to the canonical form with no whitespace.
 
    o Octet: An 8-bit byte.
 
    o Octet string: A sequence of 8-bit bytes.
 
-   o Salt: A random octet string that is combined with a password before
-     applying a one-way encryption function.  This value is used to
-     protect passwords that are stored in an authentication database.
-
+   o  Salt: A random octet string that is combined with a password
+      before applying a one-way encryption function.  This value is used
+      to protect passwords that are stored in an authentication
+      database.
 
 1.2.  Notation
 
    The pseudocode description of the algorithm uses the following
    notations:
 
    o ":=": The variable on the left hand side represents the octet
      string resulting from the expression on the right hand side.
 
    o "+": Octet string concatenation.
 
    o "[ ]": A portion of an expression enclosed in "[" and "]" may not
      be included in the result under some circumstances.  See the
      associated text for a description of those circumstances.
 
    o HMAC(key, str): Apply the HMAC keyed hash algorithm (defined in
      [RFC2104]) using the octet string represented by "key" as the key
      and the octet string "str" as the input string.  The size of the
      result is the hash result size for the hash function in use.  For
      example, it is 20 octets for SHA-1 (see [RFC3174]).
 
    o H(str): Apply the cryptographic hash function to the octet string
      "str", producing an octet string as a result.  The size of the
      result depends on the hash result size for the hash function in
      use.
 
    o XOR: Apply the exclusive-or operation to combine the octet string
      on the left of this operator with the octet string on the right of
-     this operator.  The length of the output and each of the two inputs
-     will be the same for this use.
+      this operator.  The length of the output and each of the two
+      inputs will be the same for this use.
 
    o Hi(str, salt):
 
+
+
          U0   := HMAC(str, salt + INT(1))
          U1   := HMAC(str, U0)
          U2   := HMAC(str, U1)
          ...
          Ui-1 := HMAC(str, Ui-2)
          Ui   := HMAC(str, Ui-1)
 
          Hi := U0 XOR U1 XOR U2 XOR ... XOR Ui
+
      where "i" is the iteration count, "+" is the string concatenation
-     operator and INT(g) is a four-octet encoding of the integer g, most
-     significant octet first.
+      operator and INT(g) is a four-octet encoding of the integer g,
+      most significant octet first.
 
-     This is, essentially, PBKDF2 [RFC2898] with HMAC() as the PRF and
+   o  This is, essentially, PBKDF2 [RFC2898] with HMAC() as the PRF and
      with dkLen == output length of HMAC() == output length of H().
 
-
 2.  Introduction
 
    This specification describes a family of authentication mechanisms
    called the Salted Challenge Response Authentication Mechanism (SCRAM)
    which addresses the requirements necessary to deploy a challenge-
    response mechanism more widely than past attempts.  When used in
-   combination with Transport Layer Security (TLS, see [TLS]) or an
+   combination with Transport Layer Security (TLS, see [RFC5246]) or an
    equivalent security layer, a mechanism from this family could improve
    the status-quo for application protocol authentication and provide a
    suitable choice for a mandatory-to-implement mechanism for future
    application protocol standards.
 
    For simplicity, this family of mechanism does not presently include
    negotiation of a security layer.  It is intended to be used with an
-   external security layer such as that provided by TLS or SSH.
+   external security layer such as that provided by TLS or SSH, with
+   optional channel binding [RFC5056] to the external security layer.
+
+   SCRAM is specified herein as a pure Simple Authentication and
+   Security Layer (SASL) [RFC4422] mechanism, but it conforms to the new
+   bridge between SASL and the Generic Security Services Application
+   Programming Interface (GSS-API) called "GS2" [ref-needed].  This
+   means that SCRAM is actually both, a GSS-API and SASL mechanism.
 
    SCRAM provides the following protocol features:
 
    o The authentication information stored in the authentication
      database is not sufficient by itself to impersonate the client.
-     The information is salted to prevent a pre-stored dictionary attack
-     if the database is stolen.
+      The information is salted to prevent a pre-stored dictionary
+      attack if the database is stolen.
 
    o The server does not gain the ability to impersonate the client to
      other servers (with an exception for server-authorized proxies).
 
    o The mechanism permits the use of a server-authorized proxy without
      requiring that proxy to have super-user rights with the back-end
      server.
 
    o A standard attribute is defined to enable storage of the
      authentication information in LDAPv3 (see [RFC4510]).
 
-   o Both the client and server can be authenticated by the protocol.
+   o  Mutual authentication is supported, but only the client is named
+      (i.e., the server has no name).
 
    For an in-depth discussion of why other challenge response mechanisms
    are not considered sufficient, see appendix A.  For more information
    about the motivations behind the design of this mechanism, see
    appendix B.
 
-   Comments regarding this draft may be sent either to the ietf-
-   [e-mail] mailing list or to the authors.
-
+   Comments regarding this draft may be sent either to the
+   [e-mail] mailing list or to the authors.
 
 3.  SCRAM Algorithm Overview
 
    Note that this section omits some details, such as client and server
    nonces.  See Section 5 for more details.
 
    To begin with, the client is in possession of a username and
    password.  It sends the username to the server, which retrieves the
    corresponding authentication information, i.e.  a salt, StoredKey,
    ServerKey and the iteration count i.  (Note that a server
    implementation may chose to use the same iteration count for all
    account.) The server sends the salt and the iteration count to the
    client, which then computes the following values and sends a
    ClientProof to the server:
 
+
         SaltedPassword  := Hi(password, salt)
         ClientKey       := H(SaltedPassword)
         StoredKey       := H(ClientKey)
         AuthMessage     := client-first-message + "," +
                            server-first-message + "," +
                            client-final-message-without-proof
         ClientSignature := HMAC(StoredKey, AuthMessage)
         ClientProof     := ClientKey XOR ClientSignature
         ServerKey       := HMAC(SaltedPassword, salt)
         ServerSignature := HMAC(ServerKey, AuthMessage)
 
+
    The server authenticates the client by computing the ClientSignature,
    exclusive-ORing that with the ClientProof to recover the ClientKey
    and verifying the correctness of the ClientKey by applying the hash
    function and comparing the result to the StoredKey.  If the ClientKey
    is correct, this proves that the client has access to the user's
    password.
 
    Similarly, the client authenticates the server by computing the
    ServerSignature and comparing it to the value sent by the server.  If
    the two are equal, it proves that the server had access to the user's
    ServerKey.
 
    The AuthMessage is computed by concatenating messages from the
    authentication exchange.  The format of these messages is defined in
-   the Formal Syntax section.
+   Section 7.
 
-
-4.  SCRAM mechanism names
+4.  SCRAM Mechanism Names
 
    A SCRAM mechanism name is a string "SCRAM-HMAC-" followed by the
    uppercased name of the underlying hashed function taken from the IANA
-   "Hash Function Textual Names" registry (see http://www.iana.org).
+   "Hash Function Textual Names" registry (see http://www.iana.org),
+   optionally followed by the suffix "-PLUS" (see below)..
 
    For interoperability, all SCRAM clients and servers MUST implement
-   the SCRAM-HMAC-SHA-1 authentication mechanism, i.e.  an
-   authentication mechanism from the SCRAM family that uses the SHA-1
-   hash function as defined in [RFC3174].
-
+   the SCRAM-HMAC-SHA-1 authentication mechanism, i.e. an authentication
+   mechanism from the SCRAM family that uses the SHA-1 hash function as
+   defined in [RFC3174].
+
+   The "-PLUS" suffix is used only when the server supports channel
+   binding to the external channel.  In this case the server will
+   advertise both, SCRAM-HMAC-SHA-1 and SCRAM-HMAC-SHA-1-PLUS, otherwise
+   the server will advertise only SCRAM-HMAC-SHA-1.  The "-PLUS" exists
+   to allow negotiation of the use of channel binding.  See Section 6.
 
 5.  SCRAM Authentication Exchange
 
    SCRAM is a text protocol where the client and server exchange
    messages containing one or more attribute-value pairs separated by
    commas.  Each attribute has a one-letter name.  The messages and
-   their attributes are described in section 5.1, and defined in the
-   Formal Syntax section.
+   their attributes are described in Section 5.1, and defined in
+   Section 7.
 
    This is a simple example of a SCRAM-HMAC-SHA-1 authentication
    exchange:
-        C: n=Chris Newman,r=ClientNonce
+
+
+      C: n,n=Chris Newman,r=ClientNonce
         S: r=ClientNonceServerNonce,s=PxR/wv+epq,i=128
         C: r=ClientNonceServerNonce,p=WxPv/siO5l+qxN4
         S: v=WxPv/siO5l+qxN4
 
-   With channel-binding data sent by the client this might look like this:
 
-        C: n=Chris Newman,r=ClientNonce
+   With channel-binding data sent by the client this might look like
+   this:
+
+
+      C: p,n=Chris Newman,r=ClientNonce
         S: r=ClientNonceServerNonce,s=PxR/wv+epq,i=128
         C: c=0123456789ABCDEF,r=ClientNonceServerNonce,p=WxPv/siO5l+qxN4
         S: v=WxPv/siO5l+qxN4
 
+
    <<Note that the channel-bind data above, as well as all hashes are
    fake>>
 
-   First, the client sends a message containing the username, and a
-   random, unique nonce.  In response, the server sends the user's
-   iteration count i, the user's salt, and appends its own nonce to the
-   client-specified one.  The client then responds with the same nonce
-   and a ClientProof computed using the selected hash function as
-   explained earlier.  In this step the client can also include an
-   optional authorization identity.  The server verifies the nonce and
-   the proof, verifies that the authorization identity (if supplied by
-   the client in the second message) is authorized to act as the
-   authentication identity, and, finally, it responds with a
-   ServerSignature, concluding the authentication exchange.  The client
-   then authenticates the server by computing the ServerSignature and
-   comparing it to the value sent by the server.  If the two are
-   different, the client MUST consider the authentication exchange to be
-   unsuccessful and it might have to drop the connection.
+   First, the client sends a message containing:
 
+   o  a GS2 header consisting of a flag indicating whether channel
+      binding is supported-but-not-used, not supported, or used, and the
+      SASL authzid (optional);
+
+   o  SCRAM username and client nonce attributes.
+
+   In response, the server sends the user's iteration count i, the
+   user's salt, and appends its own nonce to the client-specified one.
+   The client then responds with the same nonce and a ClientProof
+   computed using the selected hash function as explained earlier.  In
+   this step the client can also include an optional authorization
+   identity.  The server verifies the nonce and the proof, verifies that
+   the authorization identity (if supplied by the client in the second
+   message) is authorized to act as the authentication identity, and,
+   finally, it responds with a ServerSignature, concluding the
+   authentication exchange.  The client then authenticates the server by
+   computing the ServerSignature and comparing it to the value sent by
+   the server.  If the two are different, the client MUST consider the
+   authentication exchange to be unsuccessful and it might have to drop
+   the connection.
 
-5.1 SCRAM attributes
+5.1.  SCRAM Attributes
 
    This section describes the permissible attributes, their use, and the
    format of their values.  All attribute names are single US-ASCII
    letters and are case-sensitive.
 
-   o a: This optional attribute specifies an authorization identity.  A
-   client may include it in its second message to the server if it wants
-   to authenticate as one user, but subsequently act as a different
-   user.  This is typically used by an administrator to perform some
-   management task on behalf of another user, or by a proxy in some
-   situations.
-
-     Upon the receipt of this value the server verifies its correctness
-     according to the used SASL protocol profile.  Failed verification
-     results in failed authentication exchange.
+   o  a: This is an optional attribute, and is part of the GS2 [ref-
+      needed] bridge between the GSS-API and SASL.  This attribute
+      specifies an authorization identity.  A client may include it in
+      its second message to the server if it wants to authenticate as
+      one user, but subsequently act as a different user.  This is
+      typically used by an administrator to perform some management task
+      on behalf of another user, or by a proxy in some situations.
+
+         Upon the receipt of this value the server verifies its
+         correctness according to the used SASL protocol profile.
+         Failed verification results in failed authentication exchange.
 
      If this attribute is omitted (as it normally would be), or
      specified with an empty value, the authorization identity is
      assumed to be derived from the username specified with the
      (required) "n" attribute.
 
      The server always authenticates the user specified by the "n"
-     attribute.  If the "a" attribute specifies a different user, the
-     server associates that identity with the connection after
+         attribute.  If the "a" attribute specifies a different user,
+         the server associates that identity with the connection after
      successful authentication and authorization checks.
 
-     The syntax of this field is the same as that of the "n" field with
-     respect to quoting of '=' and ','.
+         The syntax of this field is the same as that of the "n" field
+         with respect to quoting of '=' and ','.
 
    o n: This attribute specifies the name of the user whose password is
      used for authentication.  A client must include it in its first
      message to the server.  If the "a" attribute is not specified
      (which would normally be the case), this username is also the
-     identity which will be associated with the connection subsequent to
-     authentication and authorization.
+      identity which will be associated with the connection subsequent
+      to authentication and authorization.
 
-     Before sending the username to the server, the client MUST prepare
-     the username using the "SASLPrep" profile [SASLPrep] of the
-     "stringprep" algorithm [RFC3454]. If the preparation of the
-     username fails or results in an empty string, the client SHOULD
-     abort the authentication exchange (*).
+         Before sending the username to the server, the client MUST
+         prepare the username using the "SASLPrep" profile [RFC4013] of
+         the "stringprep" algorithm [RFC3454].  If the preparation of
+         the username fails or results in an empty string, the client
+         SHOULD abort the authentication exchange (*).
 
      (*) An interactive client can request a repeated entry of the
      username value.
 
      Upon receipt of the username by the server, the server SHOULD
-     prepare it using the "SASLPrep" profile [SASLPrep] of the
+         prepare it using the "SASLPrep" profile [RFC4013] of the
      "stringprep" algorithm [RFC3454]. If the preparation of the
      username fails or results in an empty string, the server SHOULD
      abort the authentication exchange.
 
-     The characters ',' or '=' in usernames are sent as '=2C' and '=3D'
-     respectively.  If the server receives a username which contains '='
-     not followed by either '2C' or '3D', then the server MUST fail the
-     authentication.
+         The characters ',' or '=' in usernames are sent as '=2C' and
+         '=3D' respectively.  If the server receives a username which
+         contains '=' not followed by either '2C' or '3D', then the
+         server MUST fail the authentication.
 
    o m: This attribute is reserved for future extensibility.  In this
-     version of SCRAM, its presence in a client or a server message MUST
-     cause authentication failure when the attribute is parsed by the
-     other end.
+      version of SCRAM, its presence in a client or a server message
+      MUST cause authentication failure when the attribute is parsed by
+      the other end.
 
    o r: This attribute specifies a sequence of random printable
-     characters excluding ',' which forms the nonce used as input to the
-     hash function.  No quoting is applied to this string (<<unless the
-     binding of SCRAM to a particular protocol states otherwise>>).  As
-     described earlier, the client supplies an initial value in its
+      characters excluding ',' which forms the nonce used as input to
+      the hash function.  No quoting is applied to this string (<<unless
+      the binding of SCRAM to a particular protocol states otherwise>>).
+      As described earlier, the client supplies an initial value in its
      first message, and the server augments that value with its own
      nonce in its first response.  It is important that this be value
-     different for each authentication.  The client MUST verify that the
-     initial part of the nonce used in subsequent messages is the same
-     as the nonce it initially specified.  The server MUST verify that
-     the nonce sent by the client in the second message is the same as
-     the one sent by the server in its first message.
-
-   o c: This optional attribute specifies base64-encoded channel-
-     binding data.  It is sent by the client in the second step.  If
-     specified by the client, if the server supports the specified
-     channel binding type and if the server can't verify it, then the
-     server MUST fail the authentication exchange.  Whether this
-     attribute is included, and the meaning and contents of the
-     channel-binding data depends on the external security layer in use.
-     This is necessary to detect a man-in-the-middle attack on the
-     security layer.
+      different for each authentication.  The client MUST verify that
+      the initial part of the nonce used in subsequent messages is the
+      same as the nonce it initially specified.  The server MUST verify
+      that the nonce sent by the client in the second message is the
+      same as the one sent by the server in its first message.
+
+   o  c: This REQUIRED attribute specifies base64-encoded of a header
+      and the channel-binding data.  It is sent by the client in its
+      second authentication message.  The header consist of:
+
+      *  the GS2 header from the client's first message (recall: a
+         channel binding flag and an optional authzid);
+
+      *  followed by the external channel's channel binding type prefix
+         (see [RFC5056], if and only if the client is using channel
+         binding;
+
+      *  followed by the external channel's channel binding data, if and
+         only if the client is using channel binding.
 
    o s: This attribute specifies the base64-encoded salt used by the
      server for this user.  It is sent by the server in its first
      message to the client.
 
    o i: This attribute specifies an iteration count for the selected
      hash function and user, and must be sent by the server along with
      the user's salt.
 
-     For SCRAM-HMAC-SHA-1 SASL mechanism servers SHOULD announce a hash
-     iteration-count of at least 128.
+         For SCRAM-HMAC-SHA-1 SASL mechanism servers SHOULD announce a
+         hash iteration-count of at least 128.
 
    o p: This attribute specifies a base64-encoded ClientProof.  The
-   client computes this value as described in the overview and sends it
-   to the server.
+      client computes this value as described in the overview and sends
+      it to the server.
 
    o v: This attribute specifies a base64-encoded ServerSignature.  It
    is sent by the server in its final message, and may be used by the
    client to verify that the server has access to the user's
-   authentication information.  This value is computed as explained in
-   the overview.
+      authentication information.  This value is computed as explained
+      in the overview.
+
+6.  Channel Binding
 
+   SCRAM supports channel binding to external secure channels, such as
+   TLS.  Clients and servers may or may not support channel binding,
+   therefore the use of channel binding is negotiable.  SCRAM does not
+   provide security layers, however, therefore it is imperative that
+   SCRAM provide integrity protection for the negotiation of channel
+   binding.
+
+   Use of channel binding is negotiated as follows:
+
+   o  The server advertises support for channel binding by advertising
+      both, SCRAM-HMAC-<hash-function> and SCRAM-HMAC-<hash-function>-
+      PLUS.
+
+   o  If the client negotiates mechanisms then client MUST select SCRAM-
+      HMAC-<hash-function>-PLUS if offered by the server.  Otherwise, if
+      the client does not negotiate mechanisms then it MUST select only
+      SCRAM-HMAC-<hash-function> (not suffixed with "-PLUS").
+
+   o  If the client and server both support channel binding, or if the
+      client wishes to use channel binding but the client does not
+      negotiate mechanisms, the client MUST set the GS2 channel binding
+      flag to "p" and MUST include channel binding data for the external
+      channel in the computation of the "c=" attribute (see
+      Section 5.1).
+
+   o  If the client supports channel binding but the server does not
+      then the client MUST set the GS2 channel binding flag to "y" and
+      MUST NOT include channel binding data for the external channel in
+      the computation of the "c=" attribute (see Section 5.1).
+
+   o  If the client does not support channel binding then the client
+      MUST set the GS2 channel binding flag to "n" and MUST NOT include
+      channel binding data for the external channel in the computation
+      of the "c=" attribute (see Section 5.1).
+
+   o  If the server receives a client first message with the GS2 channel
+      binding flag set to "y" and the server supports channel binding
+      the server MUST fail authentication.  This is because if the
+      client sets the GS2 channel binding flag set to "y" then the
+      client must have believed that the server did not support channel
+      binding -- if the server did in fact support channel binding then
+      this is an indication that there has been a downgrade attack
+      (e.g., an attacker changed the server's mechanism list to exclude
+      the -PLUS suffixed SCRAM mechanism name(s)).
+
+   The server MUST always validate the client's "c=" field.  The server
+   does this by constructing the value of the "c=" attribute and then
+   checking that it matches the client's c= attribute value.
+
+6.1.  Channel Binding to TLS Channels
+
+   If an external TLS channel is to be bound into the SCRAM
+   authentication, and if the channel was established using a server
+   certificate to authenticate the server, then the SCRAM client and
+   server MUST use the 'tls-server-end-point' channel binding type.  See
+   the IANA Channel Binding Types registry.
+
+   If an external TLS channel is to be bound into the SCRAM
+   authentication, and if the channel was established without the use of
+   any server certificate to authenticate the server, then the SCRAM
+   client and server MUST use the 'tls-unique' channel binding type.
 
-6.  Formal Syntax
+7.  Formal Syntax
 
    The following syntax specification uses the Augmented Backus-Naur
    Form (ABNF) notation as specified in [RFC5234].  "UTF8-2", "UTF8-3"
-   and "UTF8-4" non-terminal are defined in [UTF-8].
+   and "UTF8-4" non-terminal are defined in [RFC3629].
+
 
       generic-message = attr-val *("," attr-val)
                         ;; Generic syntax of any server challenge
                         ;; or client response
 
       attr-val        = ALPHA "=" value
 
-      value           = 1*(value-char)
+     value           = *(value-char)
 
       value-safe-char = %01-2B / %2D-3C / %3E-7F /
                         UTF8-2 / UTF-3 / UTF8-4
                         ;; UTF8-char except NUL, "=", and ",".
 
       value-char      = value-safe-char / "="
 
       base64-char     = ALPHA / DIGIT / "/" / "+"
 
       base64-4        = 4*4(base64-char)
 
       base64-3        = 3*3(base64-char) "="
 
       base64-2        = 2*2(base64-char) "=="
 
       base64          = *(base64-4) [base64-3 / base64-2]
 
       posit-number = (%x31-39) *DIGIT
                         ;; A positive number
 
       saslname        = 1*(value-safe-char / "=2C" / "=3D")
                         ;; Conforms to <value>
 
       authzid         = "a=" saslname
                         ;; Protocol specific.
 
+     gs2-cbind-flag  = "n" / "y" / "p"
+                       ;; "n" -> client doesn't support channel binding
+                       ;; "y" -> client does support channel binding
+                       ;;        but thinks the server does not.
+                       ;; "p" -> client requires channel binding
+     gs2-header      = gs2-cbind-flag [ authzid ] ","
+                       ;; GS2 header for SCRAM
+                       ;; (the actual GS2 header includes an optional
+                       ;; flag to indicate that the GSS mechanism is not
+                       ;; "standard" but since SCRAM is "standard" we
+                       ;; don't include that flag).
+
       username        = "n=" saslname
                         ;; Usernames are prepared using SASLPrep.
 
       reserved-mext  = "m=" 1*(value-char)
                         ;; Reserved for signalling mandatory extensions.
                         ;; The exact syntax will be defined in
                         ;; the future.
 
+     ;;cbind-type    = value
+     ;;cbind-input   = gs2-header [ value ":" cbind-data ]
       channel-binding = "c=" base64
+                       ;; base64 encoding of cbind-input
 
       proof           = "p=" base64
 
       nonce           = "r=" c-nonce [s-nonce]
                         ;; Second part provided by server.
 
       c-nonce         = value
 
       s-nonce         = value
 
       salt            = "s=" base64
 
       verifier        = "v=" base64
                         ;; base-64 encoded ServerSignature.
 
       iteration-count = "i=" posit-number
                         ;; A positive number
 
       client-first-message =
-                        [reserved-mext ","] username "," nonce [","
-                        extensions]
+                       gs2-header [reserved-mext ","]
+                       username "," nonce ["," extensions]
 
       server-first-message =
                         [reserved-mext ","] nonce "," salt ","
                         iteration-count ["," extensions]
 
       client-final-message-without-proof =
-                        [authzid ","] [channel-binding ","] nonce [","
+                       [channel-binding ","] nonce [","
                         extensions]
 
       client-final-message =
                         client-final-message-without-proof "," proof
 
       server-final-message =
                         verifier ["," extensions]
 
       extensions = attr-val *("," attr-val)
                         ;; All extensions are optional,
-			;; i.e.  unrecognized attributes ;; not defined
-			in this document ;; MUST be ignored.
+                       ;; i.e. unrecognized attributes
+                       ;; not defined in this document
+                       ;; MUST be ignored.
+
+8.  SCRAM as a GSS-API Mechanism
+
+   This section and its sub-sections and all normative references of it
+   not referenced elsewhere in this document are INFORMATIONAL for SASL
+   implementors, but they are NORMATIVE for GSS-API implementors.
+
+   SCRAM is actually also GSS-API mechanism.  The messages are the same,
+   but a) the GS2 header on the client's first message and channel
+   binding data is excluded when SCRAM is used as a GSS-API mechanism,
+   and b) the RFC2743 section 3.1 initial context token header is
+   prefixed to the client's first authentication message (context
+   token).
+
+   The GSS-API mechanism OID for SCRAM is <TBD> (see Section 10).
+
+8.1.  GSS-API Principal Name Types for SCRAM
+
+   SCRAM does not name acceptors.  Therefore only GSS_C_NO_NAME and
+   names of type GSS_C_NT_ANONYMOUS shall be allowed as the target name
+   input of GSS_Init_sec_context() when using a SCRAM mechanism.
+
+   SCRAM supports only a single name type for initiators:
+   GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME.  GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME is the default name type for
+   SCRAM.
+
+   There is no name canonicalization procedure for SCRAM beyond applying
+   SASLprep as described in Section 5.1.
+
+   The query, display and exported name syntax for SCRAM principal names
+   is the same: there is no syntax -- SCRAM principal names are free-
+   form.  (The exported name token does, of course, conform to [RFC2743]
+   section 3.2, but the "NAME" part of the token is just a SCRAM user
+   name.)
+
+8.2.  GSS-API Per-Message Tokens for SCRAM
+
+   The per-message tokens for SCRAM as a GSS-API mechanism SHALL BE the
+   same as those for the Kerberos V GSS-API mechanism [RFC4121], using
+   the Kerberos V "aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96" enctype [RFC3962].
 
+   The 128-bit session key SHALL be derived by using the least
+   significant (right-most) 128 bits of HMAC(StoredKey, "GSS-API session
+   key" || ClientKey || AuthMessage).
 
-7.  Security Considerations
+   SCRAM does support PROT_READY, and is PROT_READY on the initiator
+   side first upon receipt of the server's reply to the initial security
+   context token.
+
+8.3.  GSS_Pseudo_random() for SCRAM
+
+   The GSS_Pseudo_random() [RFC4401] for SCRAM SHALL be the same as for
+   the Kerberos V GSS-API mechanism [RFC4402].  There is no acceptor-
+   asserted sub-session key for SCRAM, thus GSS_C_PRF_KEY_FULL and
+   GSS_C_PRF_KEY_PARTIAL are equivalent for SCRAM's GSS_Pseudo_random().
+
+9.  Security Considerations
 
    If the authentication exchange is performed without a strong security
    layer, then a passive eavesdropper can gain sufficient information to
    mount an offline dictionary or brute-force attack which can be used
    to recover the user's password.  The amount of time necessary for
    this attack depends on the cryptographic hash function selected, the
    strength of the password and the iteration count supplied by the
    server.  An external security layer with strong encryption will
    prevent this attack.
 
    If the external security layer used to protect the SCRAM exchange
    uses an anonymous key exchange, then the SCRAM channel binding
    mechanism can be used to detect a man-in-the-middle attack on the
    security layer and cause the authentication to fail as a result.
    However, the man-in-the-middle attacker will have gained sufficient
    information to mount an offline dictionary or brute-force attack.
    For this reason, SCRAM includes the ability to increase the iteration
    count over time.
 
    If the authentication information is stolen from the authentication
    database, then an offline dictionary or brute-force attack can be
    used to recover the user's password.  The use of salt mitigates this
    attack somewhat by requiring a separate attack on each password.
    Authentication mechanisms which protect against this attack are
    available (e.g., the EKE class of mechanisms), but the patent
    situation is presently unclear.
 
    If an attacker obtains the authentication information from the
    authentication repository and either eavesdrops on one authentication
    exchange or impersonates a server, the attacker gains the ability to
    impersonate that user to all servers providing SCRAM access using the
    same hash function, password, iteration count and salt.  For this
    reason, it is important to use randomly-generated salt values.
 
    If the server detects (from the value of the client-specified "h"
    attribute) that both endpoints support a stronger hash function that
    the one the client actually chooses to use, then it SHOULD treat this
    as a downgrade attack and reject the authentication attempt.
 
    A hostile server can perform a computational denial-of-service attack
    on clients by sending a big iteration count value.
 
-8.  IANA considerations
+10.  IANA Considerations
 
-   IANA is requested to add the following entry to the SASL Mechanism
+   IANA is requested to add the following entries to the SASL Mechanism
    registry established by [RFC4422]:
 
+
    To: [e-mail]
    Subject: Registration of a new SASL mechanism SCRAM-HMAC-SHA-1
 
    SASL mechanism name (or prefix for the family): SCRAM-HMAC-SHA-1
    Security considerations: Section 7 of [RFCXXXX]
    Published specification (optional, recommended): [RFCXXXX]
    Person & email address to contact for further information:
     IETF SASL WG <[e-mail]>
    Intended usage: COMMON
    Owner/Change controller: IESG <[e-mail]>
    Note:
 
+   To: [e-mail]
+   Subject: Registration of a new SASL mechanism SCRAM-HMAC-SHA-1-PLUS
+
+   SASL mechanism name (or prefix for the family): SCRAM-HMAC-SHA-1-PLUS
+   Security considerations: Section 7 of [RFCXXXX]
+   Published specification (optional, recommended): [RFCXXXX]
+   Person & email address to contact for further information:
+    IETF SASL WG <[e-mail]>
+   Intended usage: COMMON
+   Owner/Change controller: IESG <[e-mail]>
+   Note:
+
+
    Note that even though this document defines a family of SCRAM-HMAC
    mechanisms, it doesn't register a family of SCRAM-HMAC mechanisms in
    the SASL Mechanisms registry.  IANA is requested to prevent future
    registrations of SASL mechanisms starting with SCRAM-HMAC- without
    consulting the SASL mailing list <[e-mail]> first.
 
    Note to future SCRAM-HMAC mechanism designers: each new SCRAM-HMAC
    SASL mechanism MUST be explicitly registered with IANA and MUST
-   comply with SCRAM-HMAC mechanism naming convention defined in Section
-   4 of this document.
-
+   comply with SCRAM-HMAC mechanism naming convention defined in
+   Section 4 of this document.
 
+   We hereby request that IANA assign a GSS-API mechanism OID for SCRAM.
 
-9.  Acknowedgements
+11.  Acknowledgements
 
    The authors would like to thank Dave Cridland for his contributions
    to this document.
 
+Appendix A.  Other Authentication Mechanisms
 
-10.  Normative References
-
-    [RFC4648]  Josefsson, "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
-               Encodings", RFC 4648, SJD, October 2006.
+   The DIGEST-MD5 [I-D.ietf-sasl-digest-to-historic] mechanism has
+   proved to be too complex to implement and test, and thus has poor
+   interoperability.  The security layer is often not implemented, and
+   almost never used; everyone uses TLS instead.  For a more complete
+   list of problems with DIGEST-MD5 which lead to the creation of SCRAM
+   see [I-D.ietf-sasl-digest-to-historic].
 
-    [UTF-8]    Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
-               10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, November 2003.
-
-    [RFC2104]  Krawczyk, Bellare, Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for
-               Message Authentication", IBM, February 1997.
-
-    [RFC2119]  Bradner, "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
-               Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, Harvard University, March
-               1997.
-
-    [RFC3174]  Eastlake, Jones, "US Secure Hash Algorithm 1 (SHA1)", RFC
-               3174, Motorola, September 2001
+   The CRAM-MD5 SASL mechanism, while widely deployed has also some
+   problems, in particular it is missing some modern SASL features such
+   as support for internationalized usernames and passwords, support for
+   passing of authorization identity, support for channel bindings.  It
+   also doesn't support server authentication.  For a more complete list
+   of problems with CRAM-MD5 see [I-D.ietf-sasl-crammd5-to-historic].
 
-    [RFC5234]  Crocker, Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
-               Specifications: ABNF", RFC 5234, January 2008.
+   The PLAIN [RFC4616] SASL mechanism allows a malicious server or
+   eavesdropper to impersonate the authenticating user to any other
+   server for which the user has the same password.  It also sends the
+   password in the clear over the network, unless TLS is used.  Server
+   authentication is not supported.
 
-    [RFC4422]  Melnikov, Zeilenga, "Simple Authentication and Security
-               Layer (SASL)", RFC 4422, Isode Limited, June 2006.
+Appendix B.  Design Motivations
 
-    [SASLPrep] Zeilenga, K., "SASLprep: Stringprep profile for user
-               names and passwords", RFC 4013, February 2005.
+   The DIGEST-MD5 [I-D.ietf-sasl-digest-to-historic] mechanism has
+   proved to be too complex to implement and test, and thus has poor
+   interoperability.  The security layer is often not implemented, and
+   almost never used; everyone uses TLS instead.  For a more complete
+   list of problems with DIGEST-MD5 which lead to the creation of SCRAM
+   see [I-D.ietf-sasl-digest-to-historic].
 
-    [RFC3454] Hoffman, P., Blanchet, M., "Preparation of
-               Internationalized Strings ("stringprep")", RFC 3454,
-               December 2002.
+   The CRAM-MD5 SASL mechanism, while widely deployed has also some
+   problems, in particular it is missing some modern SASL features such
+   as support for internationalized usernames and passwords, support for
+   passing of authorization identity, support for channel bindings.  It
+   also doesn't support server authentication.  For a more complete list
+   of problems with CRAM-MD5 see [I-D.ietf-sasl-crammd5-to-historic].
 
+   The PLAIN [RFC4616] SASL mechanism allows a malicious server or
+   eavesdropper to impersonate the authenticating user to any other
+   server for which the user has the same password.  It also sends the
+   password in the clear over the network, unless TLS is used.  Server
+   authentication is not supported.
 
+Appendix C.  SCRAM Examples and Internet-Draft Change History
 
-11.  Informative References
+   <<To be written.>>
 
-    [RFC2195]  Klensin, Catoe, Krumviede, "IMAP/POP AUTHorize Extension
-               for Simple Challenge/Response", RFC 2195, MCI, September
-               1997.
+   (RFC Editor: Please delete everything after this point)
 
-    [RFC2202]  Cheng, Glenn, "Test Cases for HMAC-MD5 and HMAC-SHA-1",
-               RFC 2202, IBM, September 1997
+   Open Issues
 
-    [RFC2898]  Kaliski, B., "PKCS #5: Password-Based Cryptography
-               Specification Version 2.0", RFC 2898, September 2000.
+   o  The appendices need to be written.
 
-    [TLS]  Dierks, Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security (TLS)
-               Protocol, Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.
+   o  Should the server send a base64-encoded ServerSignature for the
+      value of the "v" attribute, or should it compute a ServerProof the
+      way the client computes a ClientProof?
 
-    [RFC4949]  Shirey, "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2", RFC
-               4949, FYI 0036, August 2007.
+   Changes since -10
 
-    [RFC4086]  Eastlake, Schiller, Crocker, "Randomness Requirements for
-               Security", RFC 4086, BCP 0106, Motorola Laboratories,
-               June 2005.
+   o  Converted the source for this I-D to XML.
 
-    [RFC4510]  Zeilenga, "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP):
-               Technical Specification Road Map", RFC 4510, June 2006.
+   o  Added text to make SCRAM compliant with the new GS2 design.
 
-    [DIGEST-MD5] Leach, P.  and C.  Newman , "Using Digest
-    Authentication as a SASL Mechanism", RFC 2831, May 2000.  <<Also
-    draft- ietf-sasl-rfc2831bis-12.txt>>
+   o  Added text on channel binding negotiation.
 
-    [DIGEST-HISTORIC] Melnikov, "Moving DIGEST-MD5 to Historic", work in
-               progress, draft-ietf-sasl-digest-to-historic-00.txt, July
-               2008
+   o  Added text on channel binding, including a reference to RFC5056.
 
-    [CRAM-HISTORIC] Zeilenga, "CRAM-MD5 to Historic", work in progress,
-               draft-ietf-sasl-crammd5-to-historic-00.txt, November
-               2008.
+   o  Added text on SCRAM as a GSS-API mechanism.  This noted as not
+      relevant to SASL-only implementors -- the normative references for
+      SCRAM as a GSS-API mechanism are segregated as well.
 
-    [PLAIN] Zeilenga, "The PLAIN Simple Authentication and Security
-               Layer (SASL) Mechanism" RFC 4616, August 2006.
+   Changes since -07
 
+   o  Updated References.
 
-12.  Authors' Addresses
+   o  Clarified purpose of the m= attribute.
 
-    Abhijit Menon-Sen
-    Oryx Mail Systems GmbH
+   o  Fixed a problem with authentication/authorization identity's ABNF
+      not allowing for some characters.
 
-    Email: [e-mail]
+   o  Updated ABNF for nonce to show client-generated and server-
+      generated parts.
 
+   o  Only register SCRAM-HMAC-SHA-1 with IANA and require explicit
+      registrations of all other SCRAM-HMAC- mechanisms.
 
-    Alexey Melnikov
-    Isode Ltd
+   Changes since -06
 
-    EMail: [e-mail]
+   o  Removed hash negotiation from SCRAM and turned it into a family of
+      SASL mechanisms.
 
+   o  Start using "Hash Function Textual Names" IANA registry for SCRAM
+      mechanism naming.
 
-    Chris Newman
-    Sun Microsystems
-    1050 Lakes Drive
-    West Covina, CA 91790
-    USA
+   o  Fixed definition of Hi(str, salt) to be consistent with [RFC2898].
 
-    Email: [e-mail]
+   o  Clarified extensibility of SCRAM: added m= attribute (for future
+      mandatory extensions) and specified that all unrecognized
+      attributes must be ignored.
 
+   Changes since -05
 
-Appendix A: Other Authentication Mechanisms
+   o  Changed the mandatory to implement hash algorithm to SHA-1 (as per
+      WG consensus).
 
-    The DIGEST-MD5 [DIGEST-MD5] mechanism has proved to be too complex
-    to implement and test, and thus has poor interoperability.  The
-    security layer is often not implemented, and almost never used;
-    everyone uses TLS instead.  For a more complete list of problems
-    with DIGEST-MD5 which lead to the creation of SCRAM see [DIGEST-
-    HISTORIC].
+   o  Added text about use of SASLPrep for username canonicalization/
+      validation.
 
-    The CRAM-MD5 SASL mechanism, while widely deployed has also some
-    problems, in particular it is missing some modern SASL features such
-    as support for internationalized usernames and passwords, support
-    for passing of authorization identity, support for channel bindings.
-    It also doesn't support server authentication.  For a more complete
-    list of problems with CRAM-MD5 see [CRAM-HISTORIC].
+   o  Clarified that authorization identity is canonicalized/verified
+      according to SASL protocol profile.
 
-    The PLAIN [PLAIN] SASL mechanism allows a malicious server or
-    eavesdropper to impersonate the authenticating user to any other
-    server for which the user has the same password.  It also sends the
-    password in the clear over the network, unless TLS is used.  Server
-    authentication is not supported.
+   o  Clarified that iteration count is per-user.
 
+   o  Clarified how clients select the authentication function.
 
-Appendix B: Design Motivations
+   o  Added IANA registration for the new mechanism.
 
-    The following design goals shaped this document.  Note that some of
-    the goals have changed since the initial version of the document.
+   o  Added missing normative references (UTF-8, SASLPrep).
 
-      The SASL mechanism has all modern SASL features: support for
-      internationalized usernames and passwords, support for passing of
-      authorization identity, support for channel bindings.
+   o  Various editorial changes based on comments from Hallvard B
+      Furuseth, Nico William and Simon Josefsson.
 
-      Both the client and server can be authenticated by the protocol.
+   Changes since -04
 
-      The authentication information stored in the authentication
-      database is not sufficient by itself to impersonate the client.
+   o  Update Base64 and Security Glossary references.
 
-      <<The server does not gain the ability to impersonate the client
-      to other servers (with an exception for server-authorized
-      proxies).>>
+   o  Add Formal Syntax section.
 
-      The mechanism is extensible, but [hopefully] not overengineered in
-      this respect.
+   o  Don't bother with "v=".
 
-      Easier to implement than DIGEST-MD5 in both clients and servers.
+   o  Make MD5 mandatory to implement.  Suggest i=128.
 
+   Changes since -03
 
-Appendix C: SCRAM Examples
+   o  Seven years have passed, in which it became clear that DIGEST-MD5
+      suffered from unacceptably bad interoperability, so SCRAM-MD5 is
+      now back from the dead.
 
-    <<To be written.>>
+   o  Be hash agnostic, so MD5 can be replaced more easily.
 
-        (RFC Editor: Please delete everything after this point)
+   o  General simplification.
 
+12.  References
 
-Open Issues
+12.1.  Normative References
 
-    o The appendices need to be written.
+   [RFC2104]  Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
+              Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
+              February 1997.
 
-    o Should the server send a base64-encoded ServerSignature for the
-      value of the "v" attribute, or should it compute a ServerProof the
-      way the client computes a ClientProof?
+   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
+              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
 
+   [RFC3174]  Eastlake, D. and P. Jones, "US Secure Hash Algorithm 1
+              (SHA1)", RFC 3174, September 2001.
 
-Changes since -07
+   [RFC3454]  Hoffman, P. and M. Blanchet, "Preparation of
+              Internationalized Strings ("stringprep")", RFC 3454,
+              December 2002.
 
-    Updated References.
+   [RFC3629]  Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
+              10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, November 2003.
 
-    Clarified purpose of the m= attribute.
+   [RFC4013]  Zeilenga, K., "SASLprep: Stringprep Profile for User Names
+              and Passwords", RFC 4013, February 2005.
 
-    Fixed a problem with authentication/authorization identity's ABNF
-      not allowing for some characters.
+   [RFC4422]  Melnikov, A. and K. Zeilenga, "Simple Authentication and
+              Security Layer (SASL)", RFC 4422, June 2006.
 
-    Updated ABNF for nonce to show client-generated and server-generated
-      parts.
+   [RFC4648]  Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
+              Encodings", RFC 4648, October 2006.
 
-    Only register SCRAM-HMAC-SHA-1 with IANA and require explicit
-      registrations of all other SCRAM-HMAC- mechanisms.
+   [RFC5056]  Williams, N., "On the Use of Channel Bindings to Secure
+              Channels", RFC 5056, November 2007.
 
+   [RFC5234]  Crocker, D. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
+              Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234, January 2008.
 
+12.2.  Normative References for GSS-API implementors
 
-Changes since -06
+   [RFC2743]  Linn, J., "Generic Security Service Application Program
+              Interface Version 2, Update 1", RFC 2743, January 2000.
 
-    Removed hash negotiation from SCRAM and turned it into a family of
-      SASL mechanisms.
+   [RFC3962]  Raeburn, K., "Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
+              Encryption for Kerberos 5", RFC 3962, February 2005.
 
-    Start using "Hash Function Textual Names" IANA registry for SCRAM
-      mechanism naming.
+   [RFC4121]  Zhu, L., Jaganathan, K., and S. Hartman, "The Kerberos
+              Version 5 Generic Security Service Application Program
+              Interface (GSS-API) Mechanism: Version 2", RFC 4121,
+              July 2005.
 
-    Fixed definition of Hi(str, salt) to be consistent with [RFC2898].
+   [RFC4401]  Williams, N., "A Pseudo-Random Function (PRF) API
+              Extension for the Generic Security Service Application
+              Program Interface (GSS-API)", RFC 4401, February 2006.
 
-    Clarified extensibility of SCRAM: added m= attribute (for future
-      mandatory extensions) and specified that all unrecognized
-      attributes must be ignored.
+   [RFC4402]  Williams, N., "A Pseudo-Random Function (PRF) for the
+              Kerberos V Generic Security Service Application Program
+              Interface (GSS-API) Mechanism", RFC 4402, February 2006.
 
+12.3.  Informative References
 
+   [I-D.ietf-sasl-crammd5-to-historic]
+              Zeilenga, K., "CRAM-MD5 to Historic",
+              draft-ietf-sasl-crammd5-to-historic-00 (work in progress),
+              November 2008.
 
-Changes since -05
+   [I-D.ietf-sasl-digest-to-historic]
+              Melnikov, A., "Moving DIGEST-MD5 to Historic",
+              draft-ietf-sasl-digest-to-historic-00 (work in progress),
+              July 2008.
 
-    Changed the mandatory to implement hash algorithm to SHA-1 (as per
-      WG consensus).
+   [I-D.ietf-sasl-rfc2831bis]
+              Melnikov, A., "Using Digest Authentication as a SASL
+              Mechanism", draft-ietf-sasl-rfc2831bis-12 (work in
+              progress), March 2007.
 
-    Added text about use of SASLPrep for username
-      canonicalization/validation.
+   [RFC2195]  Klensin, J., Catoe, R., and P. Krumviede, "IMAP/POP
+              AUTHorize Extension for Simple Challenge/Response",
+              RFC 2195, September 1997.
 
-    Clarified that authorization identity is canonicalized/verified
-      according to SASL protocol profile.
+   [RFC2202]  Cheng, P. and R. Glenn, "Test Cases for HMAC-MD5 and HMAC-
+              SHA-1", RFC 2202, September 1997.
 
-    Clarified that iteration count is per-user.
+   [RFC2898]  Kaliski, B., "PKCS #5: Password-Based Cryptography
+              Specification Version 2.0", RFC 2898, September 2000.
 
-    Clarified how clients select the authentication function.
+   [RFC4086]  Eastlake, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, "Randomness
+              Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086, June 2005.
 
-    Added IANA registration for the new mechanism.
+   [RFC4510]  Zeilenga, K., "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
+              (LDAP): Technical Specification Road Map", RFC 4510,
+              June 2006.
 
-    Added missing normative references (UTF-8, SASLPrep).
+   [RFC4616]  Zeilenga, K., "The PLAIN Simple Authentication and
+              Security Layer (SASL) Mechanism", RFC 4616, August 2006.
 
-    Various editorial changes based on comments from Hallvard B
-      Furuseth, Nico William and Simon Josefsson.
+   [RFC4949]  Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2",
+              RFC 4949, August 2007.
 
+   [RFC5246]  Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
+              (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.
 
+Authors' Addresses
 
-Changes since -04
+   Abhijit Menon-Sen
+   Oryx Mail Systems GmbH
 
-    o Update Base64 and Security Glossary references.
+   Email: [e-mail]
 
-    o Add Formal Syntax section.
 
-    o Don't bother with "v=".
+   Alexey Melnikov
+   Isode Ltd
 
-    o Make MD5 mandatory to implement.  Suggest i=128.
+   Email: [e-mail]
 
 
+   Chris Newman
+   Sun Microsystems
+   1050 Lakes Drive
+   West Covina, CA  91790
+   USA
 
-Changes since -03
+   Email: [e-mail]
 
-    o Seven years have passed, in which it became clear that DIGEST-MD5
-      suffered from unacceptably bad interoperability, so SCRAM-MD5 is
-      now back from the dead.
 
-    o Be hash agnostic, so MD5 can be replaced more easily.
+   Nicolas Williams
+   Sun Microsystems
+   5300 Riata Trace Ct
+   Austin, TX  78727
+   USA
 
-    o General simplification.
+   Email: [e-mail]