[savnet] Re: Ketan Talaulikar's Discuss on draft-ietf-savnet-inter-domain-problem-statement-21: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
Ketan Talaulikar <ketant.ietf@gmail.com> Mon, 26 October 2026 06:03 UTC
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From: Ketan Talaulikar <ketant.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 26 Oct 2026 11:33:29 +0530
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Subject: [savnet] Re: Ketan Talaulikar's Discuss on draft-ietf-savnet-inter-domain-problem-statement-21: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
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Thanks for the update, Libin. Please let me know when you have something for me to review - either an update posted to datatracker (preferred) or a PR. Thanks, Ketan On Fri, Oct 23, 2026 at 8:55 PM Libin Liu <liulb= 40zgclab.edu.cn@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote: > Hi Ketan, > > Thank you for your detailed review and valuable comments. > > We have prepared an updated version of the draft to address your comments > and those from other IESG reviewers. The changes are currently under > discussion and review among the authors. > > We will provide detailed responses to your comments soon. Thanks again for > your time and helpful feedback! > > > Best, > Libin and co-authors > > > > -----Original Messages----- > > From: "Ketan Talaulikar via Datatracker" <noreply@ietf.org> > > Send time:Thursday, 22/10/2026 01:32:02 > > To: "The IESG" <iesg@ietf.org> > > Cc: draft-ietf-savnet-inter-domain-problem-statement@ietf.org, > gengnan@huawei.com, savnet-chairs@ietf.org, savnet@ietf.org > > Subject: Ketan Talaulikar's Discuss on > draft-ietf-savnet-inter-domain-problem-statement-21: (with DISCUSS and > COMMENT) > > > > Ketan Talaulikar has entered the following ballot position for > > draft-ietf-savnet-inter-domain-problem-statement-21: Discuss > > > > When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all > > email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this > > introductory paragraph, however.) > > > > > > Please refer to > https://www.ietf.org/about/groups/iesg/statements/handling-ballot-positions/ > > for more information about how to handle DISCUSS and COMMENT positions. > > > > > > The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here: > > > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-savnet-inter-domain-problem-statement/ > > > > > > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > DISCUSS: > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > Thanks to the authors and the WG for their work on this document. > > > > The review is inline in the idnits output of v21 of this document. > Please look for > > the tag <EoRv21> to ensure you have the full review. > > > > Thanks for aligning the terminology and the document contents with the > intra-domain > > document. > > > > I have one concern that I would like to discuss. It has also come up in > > other ballots, so I am perhaps not the only one stumbling on this but > please > > correct me if I am wrong. > > > > <discuss-1> EFP-uRPF Alg-B and the LPP gap (Section 4.1.1) > > > > 483 block when performing SAV with existing mechanisms. These > mechanisms > > 484 include EFP-uRPF Alg-A, which is the focus of the following > analysis, > > 485 while it also applies to Strict uRPF and FP-uRPF. All these > > 486 mechanisms suffer from the same problem of improper block in > this > > 487 scenario. > > > > Section 4.1.1 analyses EFP-uRPF Alg-A, but RFC 8704 recommends Alg-B on > > customer interfaces, and its Section 3.3 is essentially Figure 2: Alg-A > fails > > it and Alg-B passes it. In Figure 2, Alg-B at AS 4 accepts AS 1's > prefixes on > > the AS 2 interface, because AS 1's routes arrive on another customer > interface > > of AS 4. For Alg-B the LPP gap is narrower, and the tolerance is paid > for in > > directionality (Section 4.1.3). Suggest: > > > > CURRENT > > These mechanisms > > include EFP-uRPF Alg-A, which is the focus of the following analysis, > > while it also applies to Strict uRPF and FP-uRPF. All these > > mechanisms suffer from the same problem of improper block in this > > scenario. > > SUGGEST > > These mechanisms > > include Strict uRPF, FP-uRPF, and EFP-uRPF Alg-A; the following > > analysis uses EFP-uRPF Alg-A. EFP-uRPF Alg-B, which [RFC8704] > > recommends for customer interfaces, avoids the improper block in > > Figure 2 because AS 1, the origin AS of those prefixes, is seen on > > another customer interface of AS 4. Alg-B still blocks when the > origin AS > > of the prefix is not seen on any customer interface of the > > validating AS, and its tolerance comes at the cost of > > directionality (Section 4.1.3). > > > > and in the improper-block bullets of Sections 1 and 4.4: > > > > s/mechanisms suffer from/mechanisms (Alg-B less so) suffer from/ > > > > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > COMMENT: > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > I also have some comments and suggestions to offer: > > > > 116 [RFC9234]. Further, [RFC9234] mentions RS and RS-client. An > RS-to- > > 117 RS-client interface is akin to the customer interface. For the > > 118 purposes of SAV, an RS-client-to-RS interface may be treated > (1) like > > 119 a provider interface for simplicity, or (2) like a union of > lateral > > 120 peers considering all the ASes the RS-client chose to peer with > at > > 121 the IXP RS. > > > > <minor> A route server does not forward traffic (RFC 7947, Section 1), > so an > > RS-to-RS-client interface carries no data to validate; on the RS-client > side > > the traffic comes from the member ASes, often over one IXP interface > shared > > with bilateral peers. Perhaps, with RFC 7947 as an informative reference: > > > > CURRENT > > Further, [RFC9234] mentions RS and RS-client. An RS-to- > > RS-client interface is akin to the customer interface. For the > > purposes of SAV, an RS-client-to-RS interface may be treated (1) like > > a provider interface for simplicity, or (2) like a union of lateral > > peers considering all the ASes the RS-client chose to peer with at > > the IXP RS. > > SUGGEST > > Further, [RFC9234] mentions RS and RS-client. A route server does > > not forward data traffic [RFC7947]; the traffic an RS-client > > receives at an IXP comes from the member ASes, often over one > > interface shared by route-server and bilateral peers. For the > > purposes of SAV, that interface may be treated (1) like a provider > > interface for simplicity, or (2) like a union of lateral peers > > considering all the ASes the RS-client exchanges routes with at the > > IXP, which requires distinguishing the member AS that sent each > > packet. > > > > > > 137 The following summarizes the fundamental problems with existing > SAV > > 138 mechanisms, as analyzed in Section 4. > > > > <major-editorial> The requirements and the scope are spread across the > > document. Sections 6 and 7 are requirements outside Section 5. Section 8 > > bounds the requirements but comes after them, and repeats the > > packet-modification exclusion of Section 1. Section 1 repeats the gap > list of > > Section 4.4 and the requirements of Section 5, the latter with drift > (Section > > 5.1). Perhaps make Sections 6 and 7 subsections of Section 5, move > Section 8 > > ahead of the gap analysis, and replace the two bulleted lists in Section > 1 > > with a pointer. I know this is a lot of editorial changes and too late in > > the document cycle, but I still wanted to offer this for the authors' > > consideration. > > > > 168 It must achieve zero improper blocking (i.e., avoid false > > 169 positives) in certain scenarios of interest (Section 4). > Further, > > > > <major> This bullet says "must achieve", while the requirement itself in > > Section 5.1 says "must seek to achieve", and "certain scenarios of > interest" > > is as open here as there; see my comments on line 882 for suggestions. > > > > 256 Configuration Information: > > 257 This information is configured locally by the AS operator. > For > > 258 example, an AS provisions (suballocates) prefixes p1 and p2 > for a > > 259 non-BGP customer network, which also owns an RIR-allocated > prefix > > 260 p3. The customer instructs the AS to advertise p1 via eBGP > on the > > 261 public Internet, restrict p2 strictly to internal use (in the > > 262 customer network), and refrain from advertising p3 while > still > > 263 allowing it to source outbound traffic. The AS locally > configures > > 264 these prefixes accordingly. This configuration information > is > > 265 valuable for both intra-domain SAV to permit expected > prefixes and > > 266 inter-domain SAV at other interfaces to block unexpected > prefixes. > > > > <minor> Local configuration appears in both the "SAV-related > Information" and > > "SAV-specific Information" definitions, and Section 5.4 sets different > > protection requirements for each, so it is unclear which applies to it. > > Perhaps: > > > > NEW (end of the "Configuration Information" definition) > > Configuration that populates the RIB or FIB (e.g., static routes) > > is SAV-related information; configuration made for SAV (e.g., p3 > > above) is SAV-specific information. > > > > 338 - Loose uRPF [RFC3704]: Loose uRPF verifies that the source > > 339 address of a packet is routable on the Internet by > matching it > > 340 with one or more prefixes in the FIB, regardless of the > > 341 interface on which the packet arrives. If the source > address > > 342 is not routable, Loose uRPF discards the packet. Loose > uRPF is > > 343 typically deployed at the provider interfaces of an AS to > block > > 344 packets with source addresses from prefixes that are not > routed > > 345 on the global Internet (e.g., IANA-allocated private-use > > 346 addresses, unallocated IPv4/IPv6 addresses, multicast > > 347 addresses, etc.). > > > > <minor> RFC 3704 Section 2.4 notes that, unless the implementation checks > > where the default route points, a default route nullifies loose uRPF; > Section > > 2.5 describes loose uRPF ignoring default routes. Many ASes that buy > transit > > carry a default, so perhaps: > > > > NEW (end of the Loose uRPF bullet in Section 3) > > If the FIB contains a default route, Loose uRPF permits all > > source addresses unless the implementation ignores the default > > route ([RFC3704], Sections 2.4 and 2.5). > > > > > > 863 The limitations of existing uRPF-based mechanisms are due to > their > > 864 exclusive reliance on BGP data. Although the algorithms > themselves > > 865 have evolved (e.g., [RFC8704]), the underlying input has > remained > > 866 unchanged, inherently constraining their accuracy in scenarios > such > > 867 as LPP and HP. With the availability of authoritative > SAV-related > > > > <minor> RFC 8704 Section 3.5 already augments the RPF lists with ROA and > IRR > > data, and Section 3.7 recommends it, so "exclusive reliance on BGP data" > and > > "the underlying input has remained unchanged" do not describe the > published > > method. The conclusion holds, since the augmentation only adds prefixes > of > > origin ASes already seen in BGP. Am I correct? Perhaps: > > > > CURRENT > > The limitations of existing uRPF-based mechanisms are due to their > > exclusive reliance on BGP data. Although the algorithms themselves > > have evolved (e.g., [RFC8704]), the underlying input has remained > > unchanged, inherently constraining their accuracy in scenarios such > > as LPP and HP. > > SUGGEST > > The limitations of existing uRPF-based mechanisms are due to their > > reliance on BGP data. [RFC8704] (Section 3.5) augments it with ROA > > and IRR data, but only for origin ASes already seen in BGP, which > > leaves their accuracy constrained in scenarios such as LPP and HP. > > > > 868 information, plus the potential for SAV-specific information > > 869 (Section 2), it would be possible to develop comprehensive new > SAV > > 870 algorithms or mechanisms to overcome the existing gaps. > > > > <minor> SIDROPS is working on draft-ietf-sidrops-bar-sav, which uses BGP > > UPDATEs, ASPA and ROA objects to address the improper block identified > here > > and proposes to update RFC 8704. A pointer would help readers coming > from the > > RPKI side. Perhaps: > > > > NEW (after the last paragraph of Section 4.4) > > [I-D.ietf-sidrops-bar-sav] is an example of such work: it uses > > ASPA and ROA objects in addition to BGP UPDATE messages. > > > > > > 882 mechanisms. It must seek to achieve zero improper blocking > (i.e., > > 883 avoid false positives) in certain scenarios of interest > (Section 4). > > > > <major> Section 1 says a new mechanism "must achieve zero improper > blocking"; > > Section 5.1, the requirement itself, says it "must seek to achieve" it. > Please > > align the two, and perhaps name the scenarios: Section 4 also covers > prefixes > > never advertised in BGP, where zero blocking depends on SAV-specific > > information that Section 5.3 says cannot be assumed. If the stronger > form is > > intended: > > > > CURRENT > > It must seek to achieve zero improper blocking (i.e., > > avoid false positives) in certain scenarios of interest (Section 4). > > SUGGEST > > It must achieve zero improper blocking (i.e., avoid false > > positives) in the Limited Propagation of a Prefix and Hidden Prefix > > scenarios (Section 4.1) where the information it relies on is > > available. > > > > with the same wording in the corresponding bullet of Section 1. > > > > 899 Any new inter-domain SAV mechanism must not assume pervasive > adoption > > 900 of the SAV method, the SAV-related information, or the > SAV-specific > > 901 information. It should benefit early adopters by providing > effective > > 902 protection from spoofing of source addresses even in partial > > 903 deployment. > > > > <major> Section 5.3 asks that early adopters benefit, but nothing asks > that a > > new mechanism do no harm where its information is missing: for an AS > that has > > not adopted it, or a prefix with no SAV-specific information published. A > > mechanism that blocked more legitimate traffic than RFC 8704 in that case > > would struggle in partial deployment, and the requirement would also give > > "over existing mechanisms" (Section 5.1) a baseline. Perhaps: > > > > NEW (end of Section 5.3) > > Where the SAV-related or SAV-specific information a new mechanism > > relies on is absent for a prefix or an AS, the mechanism should not > > improperly block more traffic than the existing mechanism it > > replaces (e.g., EFP-uRPF Alg-B [RFC8704] on customer interfaces). > > > > I will leave the wording, and its strength, to the authors and the WG. > > > > 911 diligent about this). If any new inter-domain SAV mechanism > > 912 introduces or uses SAV-specific information, security > mechanisms must > > 913 exist to prevent malicious injection or alteration of the SAV- > > 914 specific information. > > > > <major> This covers injection and alteration of SAV-specific > information, but > > not stale or replayed information, nor limiting its distribution to the > ASes > > that need it. I would like to propose text that includes a sentence for > the end > > of this section; see my comments on line 1005. > > > > 952 false negatives (improper permits). Consequently, > troubleshooting > > 953 these anomalies will rely on operational feedback loops, where > > 954 network operators receive, investigate, and resolve routing and > > 955 reachability complaints from affected downstream or peering > parties. > > > > <minor> An ASBR cannot judge its own drops, but operators find improper > blocks > > with per-interface drop counters, exported samples of dropped packets, > and a > > log-only mode before enforcement, not only through complaints. Perhaps > ask new > > mechanisms for those: > > > > CURRENT > > Consequently, troubleshooting > > these anomalies will rely on operational feedback loops, where > > network operators receive, investigate, and resolve routing and > > reachability complaints from affected downstream or peering parties. > > SUGGEST > > Consequently, a new mechanism should provide counters of packets > > dropped by SAV (per interface and, where feasible, per prefix), a > > means to export samples of dropped packets, and a mode that logs > > without dropping, so that operators can detect improper blocks > > before, and in addition to, complaints from affected parties. > > > > 983 * Native IP forwarding: This includes both the global routing > table > > 984 based forwarding and Customer Edge (CE) site forwarding of > VPN > > 985 traffic. > > > > <question> Section 8 puts "Customer Edge (CE) site forwarding of VPN > traffic" > > in scope. Does this mean SAV at a PE's VRF interface facing an eBGP CE? > If so, > > the SAV-related information there is the VRF's routes, and the RPKI > objects of > > Section 2 and the SLURM approach of Section 7 do not describe VPN address > > space, which is often private and overlapping. It may be worth saying > which > > requirements apply in that context or drop the entire VPN thing? > > > > 1005 The SAV table will be generated based on SAV-related > information and/ > > 1006 or SAV-specific information. If such information is poisoned by > > 1007 attackers, the resulting SAV table will be inaccurate. > Consequently, > > 1008 legitimate traffic may be dropped improperly, or spoofing > traffic may > > 1009 be permitted improperly. For SAV mechanisms that use BGP data > as > > 1010 input for generating SAV tables, the use of applicable BGP > routing > > 1011 security methods is important. Such methods include mechanisms > for > > 1012 the prevention, detection, and mitigation of route hijacks, > route > > 1013 leaks, and AS_PATH manipulations. > > > > <major> SAV-specific information is a new channel between ASes, and > Section 9 > > does not cover three of its exposures. It can disclose what an operator > keeps > > out of BGP on purpose: hidden or DSR prefixes, prefixes sent with > NO_EXPORT, > > customer relationships. Stale or replayed information causes improper > permit > > or improper block. And anyone able to influence another AS's SAV inputs > can > > get legitimate traffic dropped, so improper block is itself a > > denial-of-service vector. The BGP security methods mentioned are also > uncited. > > Perhaps: > > > > NEW (end of Section 9) > > SAV-specific information may disclose prefixes, routing policy, or > > business relationships that an AS deliberately keeps out of BGP. > > Stale or replayed SAV-specific information can cause improper > > permit or improper block, and an attacker able to influence the SAV > > inputs of another AS can use improper block to deny service to > > legitimate traffic. Relevant BGP security methods include route > > origin validation [RFC6811], BGPsec [RFC8205], and route leak > > prevention [RFC9234]. > > > > NEW (end of Section 5.4) > > Such mechanisms should also bound the freshness of SAV-specific > > information and allow its distribution to be limited to the ASes > > that need it. > > > > <EoRv21> > > > > > _______________________________________________ > savnet mailing list -- savnet@ietf.org > To unsubscribe send an email to savnet-leave@ietf.org >
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