[SCITT] Re: Independent implementation of draft-fassbender-scitt-time-anchor-03

Jonna Fassbender <j.fassbender@umarise.com> Thu, 06 August 2026 15:34 UTC

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Date: Thu, 06 Aug 2026 15:33:57 +0000
To: Tiago Pinto <tiago=40donttrustverify.pt@dmarc.ietf.org>, hello@quantsynth.net, "scitt@ietf.org" <scitt@ietf.org>
From: Jonna Fassbender <j.fassbender@umarise.com>
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Subject: [SCITT] Re: Independent implementation of draft-fassbender-scitt-time-anchor-03
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Colin, Tiago, all,

Thank you both. As the author, let me put the resolution on the record.

D-01 is a real defect and the reading you both arrive at is the one -04 will adopt. Section 1.4 will state the return condition once, in terms of the content of the merged proof: serialised bytes whenever the merged proof carries a Bitcoin path, NULL only where the calendar returned nothing new and no Bitcoin path is present. That keeps Section 2.4.1's definition of "failed" intact and leaves every branch of D.2 reachable.

-04 will also guard the FAIL_AFTER branch at D.2 step 2b with the condition that the proof carries no Bitcoin attestation. Under the reformulated Section 1.4 that branch is already unreachable for a proof carrying a Bitcoin path, so the guard is redundant. I am adding it anyway: a reader should be able to see the local intent at 2b without deriving it from a definition three sections earlier.

Colin, I will take the boundary exactly as you drew it. You do not implement this profile and your leaf and receipt shapes differ, so nothing in -04 will present your log as an implementation of the profile or as evidence of interoperability. Two readers reaching the same resolution of the same ambiguity is the overlap I will treat as real, and it is what lets me record D-01 as settled rather than pending.

Kind regards,

Jonna Fassbender
Founder, Umarise


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-------- Original Message --------
On Thursday, 08/06/26 at 10:17 Tiago Pinto <tiago=40donttrustverify.pt@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
Colin,

Thanks, and the 518 checkpoints are the useful part: the header-source and depth conditions are not only evaluable, they are running.

Agreed on the boundary. Two implementations built from text alone, closing the same gate the same way, is the comparable part; the profiles differ and no interoperability claim follows from this.

On D-01, an independent reading landing on the same resolution is worth having on the record.

Regards,
Tiago Pinto

Em quinta-feira, 6 de agosto de 2026 às 00:42, hello@quantsynth.net <hello@quantsynth.net> escreveu:

> Tiago - the D-01 finding holds. It bites in exactly the state you
> name: a proof already carrying a Bitcoin attestation but held pending
> by the depth gate. Read Section 1.4 literally and OTS-UPGRADE returns
> bytes, leaving step 2c unreachable; follow the 2b comment and it
> returns NULL, and the age test marks the proof "failed" - which
> Section 2.4.1 reserves for a commitment that was never answered. Both
> cannot hold. Returning bytes whenever the merged proof carries a
> Bitcoin path, NULL only when nothing changed and no path exists, is
> the reading we would land on as well: it keeps Section 2.4.1 intact
> and every D.2 branch reachable.
>
> One independent data point on the check Appendix C records as not yet
> evaluated. We run a witnessed append-only log - a separate deployment,
> not an implementation of this profile - anchored via OpenTimestamps.
> Its anchor verifier does the equivalent of what the profile's
> verification turns on: it replays each anchored checkpoint's digest
> against the Merkle root of the header at the attested height, and
> requires confirmation depth, against headers from a chain it validates
> itself rather than a block explorer. Current state: 518 anchored
> checkpoints' roots matched self-validated headers, 0 mismatches. So
> the header-source and depth-gate checks are not only evaluable - they
> run continuously in a second, unrelated deployment.
>
> I would stop short of any interoperability claim between our systems:
> we do not implement the Fassbender profile, and our leaf and receipt
> shapes differ. The overlap worth the group's attention is narrower -
> two implementations, each built from the text alone, closing the same
> real-node verification gate the same way. Glad to share our verifier
> if it is useful.
>
> Colin Winter
> Markovian Protocol
>
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