[SCITT] Re: New draft: Attested Payment Authorization for Autonomous Agents (draft-hawkins-scitt-attested-agent-payment-00)

Dick Brooks <dick@businesscyberguardian.com> Sat, 08 August 2026 15:18 UTC

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From: Dick Brooks <dick@businesscyberguardian.com>
To: hello@quantsynth.net, scitt@ietf.org, wdhawkins46@gmail.com
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Date: Sat, 08 Aug 2026 11:18:38 -0400
Organization: Business Cyber Guardian
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Reply-To: dick@businesscyberguardian.com
Subject: [SCITT] Re: New draft: Attested Payment Authorization for Autonomous Agents (draft-hawkins-scitt-attested-agent-payment-00)
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Thanks to all that are providing useful recommendations aimed at improving the Trust Registry implementation.

Imam, you can see the results of a checktrust function, from the cache data (not from the ledger) using this URL
Html: https://softwareassuranceguardian.com/labellink/getTrustedProductLabel?ProductID=53F9F4CBA9C8F87C794F33294ECB4FCE438D3BA3CCCD521168FA2B8944F005D3&html=1
JSON: https://softwareassuranceguardian.com/labellink/getTrustedProductLabel?ProductID=53F9F4CBA9C8F87C794F33294ECB4FCE438D3BA3CCCD521168FA2B8944F005D3
The SAGScore is used to determine trust, a -1 means not trusted (not registered), Anything >0 means the item is registered and in the ledger, a SAGScore =0 means the SAGScore is redacted, but the item, identified by its Digital DNA ID (ProductID/ztdnaid) is in the registry, so a SAGScore >= 0 means trusted and registered.

Walter, we do not record every action/event on the VDS ledger in order to keep the Merkle Tree from growing too large. But we do record all of the events you identified in log files and/or SAG-CTR database tables, i.e. Registration Policies in effect along with their SHA256 hash.
For example, the Risk Assessor ZTDNAID is used to check the trustworthiness of a Risk Assessor using a Zero Trust method that results in lots of log records (whenever a Risk Assessor performs an action under our 7 step risk assessment method covering 67 risk factors) there is a log record. This amount of traffic would quickly expand the Merkle Tree resulting in a performance impact. We store data on the Merkle Tree (VDS) for registration events (add new, withdraw existing). We do not place rejections on the Merkle Tree, however these are recorded in other places. 
The Merkle Tree used in SAG-CTR (provided by Microsoft) is used to answer one question "Is this *thing* trusted?" - Yes or No (represented in a SAGScore (trust score) SAGScore>= 0 is trusted, SAGScore = -1 means not trusted.

Thanks again to all that have engaged in this discussion. Your insights are helping others improve their own SCITT Trust Registry implementations.

Thanks,

Dick Brooks
   
Active Member of the CISA Critical Manufacturing Sector, 
Sector Coordinating Council – A Public-Private Partnership
Lifetime IEEE Member, #SBOM SIG member 
https://businesscyberguardian.com/ 


-----Original Message-----
From: hello@quantsynth.net <hello@quantsynth.net> 
Sent: Friday, August 7, 2026 11:40 PM
To: scitt@ietf.org; wdhawkins46@gmail.com
Subject: [SCITT] Re: New draft: Attested Payment Authorization for Autonomous Agents (draft-hawkins-scitt-attested-agent-payment-00)

Walter,

As offered: we registered a scope-shaped statement in our witnessed log and report what verified and what did not.

The statement carries the six members of your Authorization Scope (apk, code, limits, expiry, rails, payees). The apk value is a genuinely computed RFC 9679 COSE Key Thumbprint over a throwaway
Ed25519 key; the statement declares in its own body that it carries no payment authority. It is registered at leaf 7235 of log.markovianprotocol.com. The receipt, exact leaf bytes, and a stdlib-only offline verifier:
https://github.com/MarkovianProtocol/tlog-bitcoin-anchor/tree/main/interop/hawkins-agent-payment

What verified: inclusion of the canonical bytes at leaf 7235 against a checkpoint cosigned by 7 of 7 independent witnesses, by recomputing the RFC 6962 fold from the served proof. What did not verify, because our log does not claim it: the apk binding to any hardware, the attestation evidence behind code, and whether limits are honored - existence and witnessed order of the bytes, nothing more.

Three findings about the statement shape, which you said were the useful part:

1. The draft does not pin a deterministic encoding for the Authorization Scope CBOR map. Two conforming encoders can produce different bytes for the same scope, so "referenced by digest" yields different digests for the same authorization. -01 could require CBOR Core Deterministic Encoding (RFC 8949 s4.2.1) for any scope that is digested or registered.

2. limits carries amounts "with an explicit unit" but does not constrain the numeric type. Floats here reintroduce a divergence class we have measured elsewhere: the same amount serialises differently across implementations, and the scope's digest stops being reproducible. An integer count of the currency's smallest unit, with the scale declared alongside, avoids this; our registered example uses that form.

3. expiry has the same ambiguity in miniature: epoch integer vs date-time string changes the bytes. Either works; the draft should pick one.

None of these blocks registration; all three decide whether two independent parties compute the same digest for the same scope.

Description of the claim for RFC 7942 purposes, verbatim as you
requested: existence and witnessed order of canonical bytes, nothing about whether the attested software is correct.

Colin Winter
Markovian Protocol

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