Re: [SCITT] Intel is taking the lead on a Trust Service Registry

[John Andersen <[e-mail]>]

Thanks guys,

We’re trying to outline a methodology for securing a rolling release across
a poly repo development topology. Amber is a piece which can fit into that
methodology. S2C2F recommends rebuilding OSS and mirroring. When pulling
directly from upstream without org specific patches, this results in
duplication of builds across the industry, lots of wasted compute. By
leveraging artifact upload admission control policy engines running in
attested environments we can enable trusted cross org data sharing. As
build systems build software and store the content addresses of the BOMs
and associated metadata in transparency services, they enable downstream
users to verify when third parties are running that specific software
within attestation enabled environments.

Just as builds of OSS are attested, we can attest to the trust we have in
that OSS via the same mechanisms, by running projects like OpenSSF
scorecard within the same style of environment we use to build packages.

Federation of built package and trust attestations via transparency
services enables peer to peer (or org to org) communication of what we
expect software to be when built (SLSA) and if we think one should use the
software (Scorecard). This also forms the basis for a sort of review system.

I know this is fairly abstract, but once again, from the definition of the
reference entity perspective we can about the methodology for trusting
components. Confidential compute and attestations from image builds within
those environments are one way we can facilitate decentralization of
communication of data related to trustworthiness. This is because we
potentially (future looking) can tie attestations back to arbitrary
hardware roots of trust. Obviously that’s not the current setup, but
independent verification leveraging end user defined sets of hardware
rooted public keys could potentially facilitate true decentralized
communication in a trustworthy manner. That's the hope at least, please
shoot holes in that until it’s solid or falls over.

Thank you,
John

On Thu, Jul 13, 2023 at 05:59 Dick Brooks <[e-mail]>
wrote:

> John,
>
>
>
> Here’s the link to the Project Amber story that Hannes is referring to:
>
>
> https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/newsroom/news/trust-service-startup-inside-chip-company.html
>
>
>
> Thanks,
>
>
>
> Dick Brooks
>
>
>
> *Active Member of the CISA Critical Manufacturing Sector, *
>
> *Sector Coordinating Council – A Public-Private Partnership*
>
>
>
> *Never trust software, always verify and report!
> <https://reliableenergyanalytics.com/products>* ™
>
> http://www.reliableenergyanalytics.com
>
> Email: [e-mail]
>
> Tel: [phone]
>
>
>
>
>
> *From:* Hannes Tschofenig <[e-mail]>
> *Sent:* Thursday, July 13, 2023 8:29 AM
> *To:* 'John Andersen' <[e-mail]>;
> [e-mail]
> *Cc:* [e-mail]
> *Subject:* AW: [SCITT] Intel is taking the lead on a Trust Service
> Registry
>
>
>
> Thanks for pointing us to your work, John.
>
>
>
> Project Amber, as pointed out by Dick, is an attestation verification
> service (the verifier in the IETF RATS terminology). Intel has ben
> operating such a service in the past for prior Intel attestation
> technologies.
>
>
>
> How is your project on “Rolling Alice” related to Project Amber?
>
>
>
> Ciao
>
> Hannes
>
>
>
> *Von:* SCITT <[e-mail]> *Im Auftrag von *John Andersen
> *Gesendet:* Samstag, 27. Mai 2023 20:36
> *An:* [e-mail]
> *Cc:* John Whiteman <[e-mail]>; [e-mail];
> [e-mail]; scrm-nist <[e-mail]>; swsupplychain-eo <
> [e-mail]>
> *Betreff:* Re: [SCITT] Intel is taking the lead on a Trust Service
> Registry
>
>
>
> This talk is the foundation for this work:
>
>
> https://gist.github.com/07b8c7b4a9e05579921aa3cc8aed4866#file-rolling_alice_progress_report_0003_down_the_dependency_rabbit_hole_bsides_portland_2019-md
>
>
>
> Progress is slow but steady. The goal is to bake as much of the
> methology’s risk analysis and reaction capabilities into existing tooling,
> processes, formats, and infrastructure as possible.
>
>
>
> Thank you,
>
> John
>
>
>
> On Sat, May 27, 2023 at 11:19 John Andersen <[e-mail]>
> wrote:
>
> I wholeheartedly agree with you!!!
>
>
>
> Hence the pursuit of Alice Intelligence (AI, John W gets credit for that
> acronym)
>
> https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/scitt/iEAhuuicVxgoXJiAZIGmpZOctcc/
>
>
>
> Thank you,
>
> John
>
>
>
> On Sat, May 27, 2023 at 10:49 Dick Brooks <
> [e-mail]> wrote:
>
> Thanks, John.
>
>
>
> I’m doubtful that open source, volunteer, software maintainers will want
> to invest their energies doing the tedious work of analyzing software
> supply chain risk assessment data and preserve tamper-proof evidence that
> can be presented in a lawsuit or audit, and support/operate an online,
> reliable service to answer consumer queries like “Is this software product
> vulnerable as of right now?”. It’s a lot of tedious work, that must be done
> in order to operate a credible, legitimate “Trust Registry” Service, that
> also costs money to operate.
>
>
>
> But I’ve been wrong before, I never thought anyone would buy a “pet rock”
> but some did.
>
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pet_Rock
>
>
>
> Thanks,
>
>
>
> Dick Brooks
>
>
>
> *Active Member of the CISA Critical Manufacturing Sector, *
>
> *Sector Coordinating Council – A Public-Private Partnership*
>
>
>
> *Never trust software, always verify and report!
> <https://reliableenergyanalytics.com/products>* ™
>
> http://www.reliableenergyanalytics.com
>
> Email: [e-mail]
>
> Tel: [phone]
>
>
>
>
>
> *From:* John Andersen <[e-mail]>
> *Sent:* Saturday, May 27, 2023 1:32 PM
> *To:* John Whiteman <[e-mail]>;
> [e-mail]
> *Cc:* [e-mail]; [e-mail]; scrm-nist <[e-mail]>;
> swsupplychain-eo <[e-mail]>
> *Subject:* Re: [SCITT] Intel is taking the lead on a Trust Service
> Registry
>
>
>
> Hi Dick,
>
>
>
> Thanks for sending those and looping them into this discussion. Sections
> 2.1.1 and 3.2 respectively look related to the high level goals of the use
> case doc. We plan to leverage threat models heavily (
> https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=TMlC_iAK3Rg) to assist with risk
> determination and further sharing of vuln details including how much data
> to share about the architecture of the system context in question for the
> triggering event.
>
>
>
> We want to enable OSS maintainers, and the secure software forges to have
> these same capabilities.
>
>
>
> Thank you,
>
> John
>
>
>
> On Sat, May 27, 2023 at 10:09 Dick Brooks <
> [e-mail]> wrote:
>
> Thanks, John.
>
>
>
> I’m not familiar with the vuln sharing goals of OpenSSF stream 8, but I am
> familiar with the NIST Vulnerability Disclosure concepts in SP 800-216 and
> C-SCRM SP 800-161:
>
> https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-216/final
>
>
>
> This document recommends *guidance for establishing a federal
> vulnerability disclosure framework, properly handling vulnerability
> reports, and communicating the mitigation and/or remediation of
> vulnerabilities.* The framework allows for local resolution support while
> providing federal oversight and should be applied to all software,
> hardware, and digital services under federal control.
>
>
>
> The SP 800-216 framework is also in harmony with SP 800-161 RA-5
> Vulnerability Disclosure Reports, where software suppliers provide
> consumers with software product vulnerability disclosures, at the SBOM
> component level:
>
> https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-161/rev-1/final
>
>
>
>
>
> Thanks,
>
>
>
> Dick Brooks
>
>
>
> *Active Member of the CISA Critical Manufacturing Sector, *
>
> *Sector Coordinating Council – A Public-Private Partnership*
>
>
>
> *Never trust software, always verify and report!
> <https://reliableenergyanalytics.com/products>* ™
>
> http://www.reliableenergyanalytics.com
>
> Email: [e-mail]
>
> Tel: [phone]
>
>
>
>
>
> *From:* John Andersen <[e-mail]>
> *Sent:* Saturday, May 27, 2023 12:58 PM
> *To:* [e-mail]
> *Cc:* [e-mail]; [e-mail]; scrm-nist <[e-mail]>;
> swsupplychain-eo <[e-mail]>
> *Subject:* Re: [SCITT] Intel is taking the lead on a Trust Service
> Registry
>
>
>
> WIP but related:
>
> https://github.com/ietf-scitt/use-cases/pull/18
>
>
>
> Have been mocking up how we can run SCITT within TEEs which leverage the
> Amber attestation environment to attest to validity of insert policy run (
> https://github.com/scitt-community/scitt-api-emulator/pull/27#issuecomment-1528073552
> ) within hermetic builds. This facilitates a recursive trust relationship
> which enables dependency review (trust propagation) of OSS. Results are
> federated across the decentralized network of software forges.
>
>
>
> This work is in pursuit of the vuln sharing goals of OpenSSF stream 8.
>
>
>
> Thank you,
>
> John
>
>
>
> On Sat, May 27, 2023 at 08:11 Dick Brooks <
> [e-mail]> wrote:
>
> Hello Everyone,
>
>
>
> This announcement from Intel is further proof that a “Trust Service” is
> becoming a foundational requirement for trustworthy computing.
>
> *A Trust Service Startup Inside the Chip Company*
>
>
> https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/newsroom/news/trust-service-startup-inside-chip-company.html
>
>
>
> Amen to this: ““Attestation is the ability for you to prove that something
> is what it says it is,” Yeluri explains. “And that is really the ground
> truth in confidential computing. *If you can’t attest and say it is truly
> what it is, confidential computing is immaterial.”*
>
>
>
> “Before taking that big step, Yeluri and team *checked with a couple
> dozen customers — banks, manufacturers, telecommunications services — and
> received votes of support*.”
>
>
>
> The following observation is “spot on” *based on REA’s experience
> operating the SAG Community Trust Registry ™ (SAG-CTR ™)*:
>
>
>
> “A few suggested Intel just build it as open source. But Yeluri and team
> believed that while the core attestation primitives can be open sourced, *a
> solution could only succeed “as a turnkey service. That means somebody has
> to operate it at scale,” he says, “and we think we can do that.”*
>
>
>
> REA agrees with the above statement, operating a reliable, trustworthy
> “trust service” at scale, like REA’s SAG-CTR, is a lot of work that
> requires the analysis, storage and maintenance of evidence that is
> trustworthy and can be presented during a lawsuit or audit, that cannot be
> properly operated by open source volunteers.
>
>
>
>
> https://www.einpresswire.com/article/545051889/announcing-the-sag-ctr-tm-community-trust-registry-for-digitally-signed-software
>
>
>
> Thanks,
>
>
>
> Dick Brooks
>
>
>
> *Active Member of the CISA Critical Manufacturing Sector, *
>
> *Sector Coordinating Council – A Public-Private Partnership*
>
>
>
> *Never trust software, always verify and report!
> <https://reliableenergyanalytics.com/products>* ™
>
> http://www.reliableenergyanalytics.com
>
> Email: [e-mail]
>
> Tel: [phone]
>
>
>
>
>
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