[Seat] Re: [Rats] Re: [WIMSE] Re: Follow-up of meeting 122 presentation (Formal proof of insecurity of Intel's RA-TLS and draft-fossati-tls-attestation)

Muhammad Usama Sardar <muhammad_usama.sardar@tu-dresden.de> Fri, 09 January 2026 19:57 UTC

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Date: Fri, 09 Jan 2026 20:57:31 +0100
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To: Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com>, Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu>
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From: Muhammad Usama Sardar <muhammad_usama.sardar@tu-dresden.de>
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Subject: [Seat] Re: [Rats] Re: [WIMSE] Re: Follow-up of meeting 122 presentation (Formal proof of insecurity of Intel's RA-TLS and draft-fossati-tls-attestation)
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Hi Kathleen,

On 09.01.26 20:34, Kathleen Moriarty wrote:

> I’m in agreement with Justin and I think it’s clear from my first email.

Sincere apologies; your statement is still not clear to me. Could you 
please explain/rephrase/clarify what exactly you mean by this statement 
and how this is relevant to the discussion in this thread?

"Hundreds of protocols and formats in the IETF use TLS, so it does not 
make sense to RAT-hole on attestation whenever TLS comes up."

-Usama