[Seat] Fwd: FW: New Version Notification for draft-fossati-seat-early-attestation-07.txt

[tirumal reddy <[e-mail]>]

Hi all,

We have published draft-fossati-seat-early-attestation-07. The main change
is that Security Considerations now covers the attacks discussed in the
SEAT use cases draft and explains how the solution mitigates each of them.

Diff:
https://author-tools.ietf.org/iddiff?url2=draft-fossati-seat-early-attestation-07

Figure 4 (Section 8.1.1) works through a relay attempt under
handshake-secret compromise step by step and shows why the binder mismatch
causes the handshake to abort. Anyone who believes this draft still permits
a relay attack can demonstrate it with an equivalent call diagram: state
the adversary's starting capability, show each message exchanged, and show
the point at which the binder check succeeds for the attacker.

Please read the draft and send targeted comments on attacks against the
mechanism as specified. As a reminder, formal analysis of external drafts,
external implementations, and external publications are not part of the
current SEAT specification work.

Regards,
-Tiru
-----Original Message-----
From: [e-mail] <[e-mail]>
Sent: Sunday, September 20, 2026 7:17 PM
To: K Tirumaleswar Reddy (Nokia) <[e-mail]>; Ionut
Mihalcea <[e-mail]>; Ionut Mihalcea <[e-mail]>;
Thomas Fossati <[e-mail]>; K Tirumaleswar Reddy (Nokia) <
[e-mail]>; Yaron Sheffer <[e-mail]>;
Yogesh Deshpande <[e-mail]>; Yogesh Deshpande <
[e-mail]>
Subject: New Version Notification for
draft-fossati-seat-early-attestation-07.txt

A new version of Internet-Draft draft-fossati-seat-early-attestation-07.txt
has been successfully submitted by Tirumaleswar Reddy and posted to the
IETF repository.

Name:     draft-fossati-seat-early-attestation
Revision: 07
Title:    Using Attestation in Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram
Transport Layer Security (DTLS)
Date:     2026-09-20
Group:    Individual Submission
Pages:    37
URL:
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-fossati-seat-early-attestation-07.txt
Status:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-fossati-seat-early-attestation/
HTML:
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-fossati-seat-early-attestation-07.html
HTMLized:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-fossati-seat-early-attestation
Diff:
https://author-tools.ietf.org/iddiff?url2=draft-fossati-seat-early-attestation-07

Abstract:

   The TLS handshake protocol allows authentication of one or both peers
   using static, long-term credentials.  In some cases, it is also
   desirable to ensure that the peer runtime environment is in a secure
   state.  Such an assurance can be achieved using remote attestation
   which is a process by which an entity produces Evidence about itself
   that another party can use to appraise whether that entity is found
   in a secure state.  This document describes a TLS extension that
   enables the negotiation and binding of the TLS authentication key to
   a remote attestation session.  This enables an entity capable of
   producing attestation Evidence, such as a confidential workload
   running in a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE), or an IoT device
   that is trying to authenticate itself to a network access point, to
   present a more comprehensive set of security metrics to its peer.
   This extension has been designed to allow the peers to use any
   attestation technology, in any remote attestation topology, and to
   use them mutually.



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