[Seat] Re: Threat model and properties for attested TLS

[Iman Schrock <[e-mail]>]

All,

I have reviewed this thread. Dr. Schmeig's point is important in SEAT
context that additional protocol complexity in early-attestation must be
justified.

One implementation point I would like to add is that for EMILIA, we also
need assurance that the attested peer is bound to the TLS 1.3
application traffic keys used on the specific connection. The current
early-attestation design does not yet give us that assurance, so we
would not implement it as an EMILIA dependency in its present form.

We are prepared to evaluate the EXPAT draft and may contribute an
implementation if our tests confirm the binding we need.

Best,
Iman Schrock
Founder, EMILIA Protocol
emiliaprotocol.ai