Re: [secdir] Review of draft-ietf-hip-hiccups-02

[Jan Melen <[e-mail]>]

Thanks for review. I will submit a new version as soon as I have gone through all the other review comments from other reviewers.

On Jun 15, 2010, at 12:38 AM, David McGrew wrote:

> I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's  
> ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the  
> IESG.  These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the  
> security area directors.  Document editors and WG chairs should treat  
> these comments just like any other last call comments.
> 
> There are several points where the draft could be made more clear,  
> some of which might impact security.  I've listed those below,  
> intermingled with some nits.
> 
> Abstract and Section 1.  "secure" is used where "authenticated" would  
> be better, since this protocol does not provide any confidentiality  
> services or encryption.
> 

Changed as proposed


> RFC 4949 lists "message integrity code (MIC)" as a deprecated term,  
> but this term is defined and used.  In this case what is meant is  
> "collision-resistant hash"; that phrase should be used in Sections 2  
> and 7.  "Checksum" is an inappropriate term for a collision-resistant  
> hash and it should be replaced in Section 4.   For the security  
> considerations section: does the hash need strong collision- 
> resistance, or just second preimage resistance (also called weak  
> collision-resistance)?


Replaced with collision-resistance and added preimage requirements to security considerations.


> Section 4 nits: "with help of MIC." -> "with the help of the MIC."
> "HIP DATA packet"-> "The HIP DATA packet"
> "Hash algorithm used to generate MIC is same " -> "The hash algorithm  
> used to generate the MIC is the same "

Done

> 
> Section 4.1.  I suggest emphasizing the requirement for the "Sequence  
> Number" fields in distinct SEQ_DATA parameters to be distinct.
> 

Done

> Section 4.3. says "Payload Data 8 last bytes of the payload data over  
> which the MIC is calculated. This field is used to uniquely bind  
> PAYLOAD_MIC parameter to next header, in case there are multiple  
> copies of same type."   It seems to me that this uniqueness is not  
> guaranteed, but that if the last-8-bytes is not unique, the MIC  
> verification process would fail, but that there is no way that an  
> attacker could exploit this fact.   I suggest noting this property in  
> the security considerations.
> 

Added to Security considerations

> Section 4.3: The PAYLOAD_MIC parameter has a field called "Payload  
> MIC".  It would be less confusing if the latter was called "MIC Value"  
> or some other named that is distinct from the parameter name.

Done

> Section 4.3 nit: "Identifies the data that protected by this MIC." add  
> "is".

Done.

> Section 5.1 nit: "A HIP DATA packet MUST contain SEQ_DATA or ACK_DATA  
> parameter if both parameters are missing then packet MUST be dropped  
> as invalid." -> "A HIP DATA packet MUST contain either a SEQ_DATA or  
> ACK_DATA parameter; if both parameters are missing, then the packet  
> MUST be dropped as invalid."

Done.

> Section 5.2 says "The receiver MUST validate these MICs."  It should  
> also describe how to validate them, and S 5.3 would be a more  
> appropriate place to detail that process.

That is already defined in 5.3.1 so I added reference to that.


> Section 5.2 says " ... no SEQ_DATA sequence number is reused before  
> the receiver has closed the processing window for the previous packet  
> using the same SEQ_DATA sequence number."  Important question: what  
> enables the receiver to tell the difference?   I assume that there are  
> some other fields (e.g. nonces) associated with the connection that  
> might serve this purpose; if that is right, I suggest documenting that  
> fact.

It can be easily checked by comparing the MIC value and I added also a statement on that to section 5.3.1.

   Regards,
     Jan