[secdir] secdir review of draft-ietf-regext-allocation-token-08

David Mandelberg <david+work@mandelberg.org> Tue, 31 July 2018 18:53 UTC

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To: draft-ietf-regext-allocation-token.all@ietf.org, iesg@ietf.org, secdir@ietf.org
From: David Mandelberg <david+work@mandelberg.org>
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Date: Tue, 31 Jul 2018 14:53:41 -0400
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Subject: [secdir] secdir review of draft-ietf-regext-allocation-token-08
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I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's
ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the
IESG.  These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the
security area directors.  Document editors and WG chairs should treat
these comments just like any other last call comments.

The summary of the review is Ready with nits.

Section 2.1 says "The server MUST have the Allocation Token for each 
object to match against the Allocation Token passed by the client to 
authorize the allocation of the object." Does it make sense for a server 
to have salted+hashed tokens instead of the tokens themselves? Or to 
otherwise cryptographically verify tokens without storing the tokens?

I think there's a typo in section 7, bullet 6, and I'm not sure what the 
intent of that sentence is.