[secdir] Re: Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-tls13-10

[[e-mail]]

Hi Russ, all,

While waiting for a follow-up from Russ, I'd like to recall that the reasoning for the CURRENT wording in 3.2.2 was described in an external review (https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/opsawg/U3mPq3WlRF48blMmr2uCF80KLiI/; see points# 7 and 8). That reasoning was consistent with the intent described by Doug below.

Cheers,
Med (Doc Shepherd)

De : Douglas Gash (dcmgash) <[e-mail]>
Envoyé : mardi 2 juillet 2024 10:07
À : Russ Housley <[e-mail]>; [e-mail]
Cc : [e-mail]; [e-mail]; [e-mail]
Objet : Re: Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-tls13-10

Hi Russ,

Many thanks for taking the time to review.

Before we dig into the issues raised, I'd like to check to see if your comments spring from the doc misleading due to bad wording, or if you have in mind a deeper issue.

What the doc is trying to express (and we will refactor a little to make this clearer), is that:


  *   Implementations MUST always support the core implementation of mutual Cert based authentication. There is always the core of "compatibility"
  *   Implementations MAY support other options as these options mature and are widely accepted, such as PSK, RPK
  *   Deployments do not have to use Cert based if implementations support these other options.

I suspect that this may not actually address your real concerns though: please let us know if the issues you see are deeper than the implementation/deployment matrix of options.

Many Thanks!

From: Russ Housley via Datatracker <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>
Date: Monday, 1 July 2024 at 19:06
To: [e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]> <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>
Cc: [e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]> <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>, [e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]> <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>, [e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]> <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>
Subject: Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-tls13-10
Reviewer: Russ Housley
Review result: Not Ready

I reviewed this document as part of the Security Directorate's ongoing
effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG.  These
comments were written primarily for the benefit of the Security Area
Directors.  Document authors, document editors, and WG chairs should
treat these comments just like any other IETF Last Call comments.

Document: draft-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-tls13-10
Reviewer: Russ Housley
Review Date: 2024-07-01
IETF LC End Date: Unknown
IESG Telechat date: Unknown

Summary: Not Ready


Major Concerns:

Section 3.2.2 says: "Certificate based mutual authentication MUST be
supported."  I assume that this means that it MUST be supported, but
I does not have to be used.  However, the next sentence seems to
require certificates,

Section 3.2.2: With the removal of the reference to [RFC8773], how is
the requirement for certificates accomplished while also using external
PSKs?  I am unaware of any other way to do so.

Section 3.2.2 says: "...[RFC7250] must be used in context of [RFC8446]".
How is the requirement for certificates accomplished with raw public
keys?  I am unaware of any way to do so.


Minor Concerns:  None


Nits: None

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