Re: [secdir] Secdir review of draft-ietf-nfsv4-rfc5666bis-10

Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Fri, 24 February 2017 18:57 UTC

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From: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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To: Vincent Roca <vincent.roca@inria.fr>
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Subject: Re: [secdir] Secdir review of draft-ietf-nfsv4-rfc5666bis-10
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> On Feb 24, 2017, at 4:59 AM, Vincent Roca <vincent.roca@inria.fr> wrote:
> 
> Hello,
> 
> I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate’s ongoing
> effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG. These
> comments were written primarily for the benefit of the security area
> directors.  Document editors and WG chairs should treat these comments just
> like any other last call comments.
> 
> 
> Summary: ready with issues
> 
> Main comments:
> 
> A long and detailed Security considerations section is provided, which is clearly a good thing. However I have
> a few comments WRT this section:

Hi Vincent-

Thanks for your review.

I believe your questions are mostly rhetorical,
so I will respond to those by saying the authors,
shepherd, and AD will attempt to address these
issues with the next document revision.

There is one remaining comment that IMO needs
group discussion, below.


> ** Privacy or confidentiality? Throughout section 8, authors mention "Privacy" inappropriately IMHO.
> Privacy refers to PII (Personally identifiable information) which is different. For instance in section 8.2, when saying:
>         "However, integrity and privacy services require significant movement of data on each endpoint host."
> the authors really mean confidentiality (this is mentioned just above, when saying that RPCSEC_GSS implements
> "per-message confidentiality"). There are several mistakes of that kind throughout section 8.
> 
> 
> ** On the opposite, meta-data can raise privacy issues, regardless of whether the content is encrypted or not.
> Can an eavesdropper who observes the traffic from an intermediate node (for instance) derive these meta-data
> and identify the hosts that communicate together, at what frequency, when?
> It probably depends on the protection provided (IPsec versus other RPCSEC integrated approach if I understand
> correctly). However if this is the case then there can be privacy impacts... Is it the case, this is not detailed?
> 
> 
> ** Section 8.1: it is said:
>         "The use of RPC-over-RDMA MUST NOT introduce any vulnerabilities to system memory contents, nor to
> 	memory owned by user processes."
> This is of course highly desirable, but how can the destination be sure that data copied in its own memory does not
> contain a malware? I have the feeling (but may be wrong) that there's a confusion between the RPC-over-RDMA 
> **protocol** that MUST be secure, and the **content** transferred between two hosts where it's more a matter of
> trust between them.
> 
> 
> ** Section 8.2.2.1: What happens when there's no TCP based NFS server on port 2049? The authors could be
> more explicit and provide guidance.
> 
> 
> ** Section 8.2.2.4: There's something that is not clear to me.
> It is said that "IDs, connection credit limits, and chunk lists" are exposed and if an attacker alters them, several
> consequences are possible.
> I understand that this information **is not** included in the RPCSEC_GSS integrity verifications.
> Is it really the case?  I'm asking this because the paragraph concludes with:
>         "The use of RPCSEC_GSS integrity or privacy services enable the requester to detect if such tampering 
> 	has been done and reject the RPC message."
> which suggests that this information **is** protected.
> 
> 
> ** Last sentence:
> 	"To address attacks on RDMA protocols themselves, RDMA transport implementations should conform
> 	to [RFC5042]."
> "should" or "SHOULD"?

Lower case "should" is used here because this statement
is IMO not an interoperability directive. I hope I
correctly understand the intent of your question.

If there is a security requirement that this be changed
to the RFC 2119 term, please let us know and that can be
done.

Any other thoughts about this?


> Minor comments:
> 
> - A side comment: can we really say that IPsec can be co-located in RDMA hardware "without any [...] loss of 
> data movement efficiency"? I'd rather say that the IPsec performance impacts can be **greatly reduced**.
> 
> - Typo in Introduction: "future NFSv4 minor verions" => versions
> 
> 
> Cheers,
> 
>    Vincent
> 

--
Chuck Lever